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This book is an edited collection of papers gathered from an international 
conference held at the University of Bergamo, Italy,1 which brought together 
regional economists, economic geographers, and international political scientists. 
The aim of the book is to assess the importance of space, by drawing together 
different related, although rarely integrated, strands of research. The main aim 
is to analyze the shaping and reshaping of the global map and to identify the 
major impacts on people and places which occupy different positions in the 
global economic system. Different approaches are grouped together here in order 
to understand the pressures and constraints put on space by the current phase of 
capitalist development. All the different streams of literature presented here have 
complementary arguments in both their theoretical and empirical composition, 
mainly in terms of the role of space in the global economy. Some consider space 
only in geometrical terms, others in relational terms, others in terms of power. 
These arguments feature throughout the book, which is structured in two parts. 
Part I is more theoretical and focuses on the different conceptualizations of space: 
space in political terms (Chapter 1), space in terms of power (Chapter 2), space 
as a system (Chapter 3), and space as an intellectual concept (Chapter 4). Part II 
is empirical and deals with the current role of space in this new phase of capitalist 
development.
The contributors to the present volume believe that a transformation of the 
world economy is taking place and that it has had a crucial impact on the way pro-
duction is organized in space. The debate over the global economy was brought 
about by the political, economic, and social changes occurring since the mid-
1970s, which affected all geographical scales – notably international, regional, 
national, and local. Since these geographical scales are interrelated in a complex 
way, and do not simply constitute a hierarchical structure from top (international) 
to bottom (local), the geography of contemporary capitalism can be viewed as a 
global jigsaw puzzle of organization of production.
At international level, a new division of labor has been brought about. Just after 
World War II, it was common to split the world into two great areas: the core, com-
posed of the advanced capitalist economies producing mainly goods and services 
for international markets, and the periphery, formed by the developing countries, 
supplying mainly raw and natural materials (Myrdal 1957). Nowadays, the world 
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is a more complex and kaleidoscopic structure, involving the fragmentation of 
many production processes and their geographical relocation. The emergence of 
new “newly industrialized countries” (i.e., the East Asian countries) as fresh cent-
ers for industrial production shows how difficult it is to understand contemporary 
global capitalism. The world economy can be represented as a system of pros-
perous polarized regional economies, surrounded by hinterland, ancillary com-
munities, prosperous agricultural zones, and underdeveloped areas. Moreover, 
the current “financialization” has contributed to reshape the economic landscape. 
Financial flows of capital contribute, or even reinforce, rather than reduce, uneven 
geographical development (Martin 1999). Free movement of money and capital 
leads to spatial centralization of financial systems, concentrated in the big stock 
exchange markets, and to uneven development between different areas, due to 
outflow of capital from lower return zones to those with higher returns.
At a regional level, an increasing number of regional integration agreements 
has characterized the last decades.2 Their main aim is a discriminatory trade lib-
eralization: two or more countries can decide to lower trade barriers against one 
another vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Although regional agreements have been 
known since the end of World War II, this new phase of regionalism is quite dif-
ferent from the old one and presents several distinctive characteristics (Das 2004). 
While old regionalism was essentially confined to agreements between advanced 
countries or developing economies, the new regionalism is instead known for 
cross-alliances between developing, emerging, and advanced countries. Moreover, 
the new regionalism is not limited to neighboring economies, but creates bonds 
among economies far away from each other. Finally, the new regionalism is not 
exclusive, meaning that one country can simultaneously be a member of more than 
one regional agreement. This new regionalism helps to bring about changes to the 
landscape of contemporary capitalism, by creating spaces where the exchange of 
goods, services, and people is simplified, but also by raising barriers against the 
countries and/or areas excluded by this integration process.
At a national level, the most important issue related to the reshaping of the 
world economy is the role of the nation-state. The state has always had two main 
tasks – to contain distinctive institutions and practices and to regulate human 
interactions at all levels (social, political, economic, etc.) – which the literature 
about the nation-state has always acknowledged. Yet, nowadays, there are dif-
ferent positions regarding the role of the nation-state in the global economy. On 
the one side, some claim the “death of the nation-state” and exalt the “borderless 
economy”, based on the conviction that the nation-state can no longer perform its 
two main tasks (Ohmae 1990). Those of this opinion contend that state borders 
are increasingly permeable and no longer contain those distinctive institutions 
and practices that used to characterize them. Moreover, international institutions 
increasingly regulate human interactions and, in this new international political 
system, the nation-state is just one level of a more complex system of overlapping 
hierarchical powers. Opponents of this argument affirm that, despite globalization 
processes, the role of the nation-state is still relevant and important, albeit altered 
(Jessop 1994, Weiss 1998). This group contends that there is still a national dis-
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tinctiveness in all aspects of life and, consequently, the nation-state maintains its 
tasks, although they are performed differently.
At local level, the new information and communication technological para-
digm has made possible the shift toward a more flexible form of production. The 
integration of electrical and electronic technology in the production processes has 
led to greater flexibility. With increasingly sophisticated automated processes and 
electronically controlled technology, great changes in production processes need 
not necessarily be associated with increasing scales of production. It has become 
possible to reduce the scale of production and maintain technological efficiency. 
Moreover, it is feasible to switch rapidly and to tailor production to meet customer 
requirements. All these changes in the organization of the production process 
could occur within the boundaries of the firm or outside them. Subcontracting and 
outsourcing are typical ways of breaking down the production process to a smaller 
scale in order to achieve increased flexibility. The “post-Fordist” era has begun. 
Today, the production chain of a single product has increasingly become an inter-
national linked sequence of functions in which each stage, usually geographically 
relocated, adds value to the process of the final goods or services. Nevertheless, 
the “post-Fordism” phenomenon as a new model of capitalist development is a 
highly controversial issue. On the one hand, this form of organization of pro-
duction, based on smaller organizational units, is seen as a new characteristic 
of future capitalist development (Piore and Sabel 1984). On the other hand, less 
rigid and smaller-scale productions have always coexisted with mass production 
methods, because this is the way capitalism develops (Sayer and Walker 1992, 
Harrison 1997).
The aim of this book is to contribute to the debate about globalization and 
space, by bringing together a collection of original analyses, written by leading 
researchers in the field. The collection does not claim to be exhaustive in its cov-
erage, nor does it seek to develop or impose any individual conceptual or meth-
odological framework. However, the different studies and topics covered here 
do demonstrate persuasively the enduring role of space in the global economy. 
My task in the remainder of this introductory chapter is to sketch out some of the 
principal issues and themes which form the background to the rest of the book.
Globalization: a questionable phenomenon
In order to understand whether the global economy has undermined the role of space, 
it is crucial to remember that globalization is a highly controversial phenomenon. 
This section aims to quickly review the main opinions indicated in the literature, 
without laying any claim to being complete. The “globalization debate” refers to 
the views of two opposing camps: those who consider contemporary globalization 
as a real and significant phenomenon – “globalists” (Ohmae 1990, 1995, Reich 
1991, Castells 1996, Dicken 2003) – and those who believe that globalization is 
just an ideological and mythical construction with marginal explanatory value 
– “skeptics” (Hirst and Thompson 1996, Held et al. 1999, Held and McGrew 
2000, Went 2000). The disagreement starts from the very beginning: the definition. 
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There is no common and universally agreed definition of globalization, since the 
term has been vaguely defined and used with widely varying meanings. Giddens 
(1990) speaks about “action at a distance” to highlight the fact that the actions of 
one economic agent in one location can have an influence on economic agents 
located in other places. Harvey (1989) refers to “time–space compression” to 
show that new technologies have reduced time and space constraints on social 
organization. Modelski (1972) considers globalization as the “enlargement” 
of the geographical scope of human communities, thus stressing a more social 
aspect. Held et al. (1999) speak about the “global interconnectedness” in different 
historical periods. Castells (1996) talks about “network capitalism,” based on 
global and structured social constructions, representing the new unit of analysis 
in the current phase of capitalism.
Important issues about globalization divide the social scientists. The first one 
is the novelty of the current phase of capitalist development. Globalists remark 
how this phase is completely new, and no comparison can be made with other 
historical phases of capitalist development (Ohmae 1990, Castells 1996, Dicken 
2003). Flows of trade, capital, and people across the world have been facilitated 
by new infrastructures. The growing intensity of these flows enables states and 
societies to become increasingly interconnected with a worldwide system of net-
works and interactions. This speeding up and deepening impact of inter-regional 
flows should be seen as the emergence of an harmonious world society. We now 
live in a borderless world in which the “national” is no longer relevant. The con-
temporary world is a place where nation-states are no longer significant actors, 
and consumer tastes are homogenized and satisfied by standard global products 
created by global corporations. The fact that a significant segment of the world’s 
population is either untouched or remains largely excluded from globalization 
does not seem to be an issue.
Skeptics believe that the “newness” of the current phase of capitalist develop-
ment has been grossly exaggerated (Harvey 1989, Geyer and Bright 1995, Hirst 
and Thompson 1996, Held et al. 1999). We live not in a global economy but in 
a more international one, where national forces do still play a significant and 
meaningful role. Moreover, in order to understand the true novelty, this phase 
must be compared with past historical phases of capitalist development. Some 
authors believe that the originality of this latest phase has been to alter the dis-
tribution of global wealth in favor of Western economies (Modelski 1972) or to 
result directly in an increased Western expansionism (Geyer and Bright 1995). 
The different historical phases of globalization share not only the acceleration 
of European expansion but also, and above all, a new ordering of relations of 
domination and subordination. Both the Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana 
were attempts to establish global order. Hirst and Thompson (1996) compare this 
phase of capitalist development with the so-called belle époque. They conclude 
that we are far from a true global society, due to the lack of global institutions 
governing global economy, via a process of global democracy. By contrast, we 
live in a more internationalized world, with more flows of goods, services, and 
people around the world. The authors prefer to speak about “internationalization,” 
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“regionalization,” and “triadization” of the world because of the growing links 
between essentially discrete national economies.
A second concern is about the role of the nation-state. Globalists believe that 
the global economy, dominated by stateless corporations and borderless finance, 
has rendered obsolete the concept of the nation-state as a unit of analysis (Ohmae 
1990, 1995, Reich 1991). This state denial refers to a diminution or displacement 
of states as powerful actors in the national and international arena. Globalization 
seems to rapidly erode the power of the nation-state since capital, finance, and 
technology flow effortlessly across its borders. Therefore, the sovereignty itself 
of the nation-states is being undermined. According to this view, in this new era, 
transnational corporations stomp across the world randomly, and national govern-
ments are increasingly powerless to influence the economic welfare of their citi-
zens. The “collapse of the welfare state,” the “death of industrial policy,” the “end 
of national diversity,” and the “demise of the nation-state” are the key phrases of 
this new era of state denial.
By contrast, skeptics believe that the nation-state does still play a fundamental 
role in this phase of capitalist development. The nation-state is not disappearing 
but, instead, its role is changing. There is no doubt that the role of the nation-state 
has changed markedly since the Keynesian era. States are less autonomous, they 
have less exclusive control over the economic and social processes within their 
territories, and they are less able to maintain national distinctiveness and cultural 
homogeneity. Nevertheless, the state capacity, defined as general capabilities 
whether in the national or international arena, and whether in industrial, foreign, 
or social policy, is still crucial in the global economy (Weiss 1998). Evidence for 
this is the fact that some nations are notably more successful than others in antici-
pating and responding to economic change. In general, the highly coordinated 
market economies such as Japan and Germany have sustained a great capacity 
for growth with equity than have the least coordinated market economies (Weiss 
1998). Moreover, state capacity is an important source of competitiveness for a 
variety of reasons. First, state coordination is vital to induce firms to engage in 
activities whose risk level is so high as to otherwise discourage them from doing 
so. Second, the state can resolve many important problems of coordination better 
than the market, by reducing transaction costs in the wider economy (Chang 1994). 
Finally, a quick look at world history shows that the state has grown together with 
the globalization process and has not, instead, been destroyed by it (Geyer and 
Bright 1995).
A third argument concerns transnational corporations (TNCs). Globalists have 
always considered TNCs as “the primary shaper of the contemporary global 
economy” (Dicken 2003: 198). The changing geography of the global economy is 
influenced by the TNCs’ decisions to invest, or not invest, in particular geographi-
cal locations. The potential ability to take advantage of geographical differences 
in the distributions of factors of production and in state policy has some bearing 
on the TNCs’ decisions to invest. Moreover, potential geographical flexibility, in 
other words the ability to switch resources and operations between locations on an 
international or even a global scale, plays a crucial role as well. TNCs’ decisions 
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to invest contribute to create an international production chain entangled in a spi-
der’s web of collaborative relationships. By contrast, skeptics quote the evidence 
that TNCs’ investments do not extend all over the world but, on the contrary, 
are concentrated in certain specific geographical areas (Dunning 1997a,b). The 
reason is that production needs some physical and social infrastructures in order 
to work, and these are not available everywhere in the world. Therefore, TNCs’ 
international production chains have a strong geographical connotation, reflecting 
the level of development reached by the different host countries.
A fourth issue of disagreement concerns the empirical evidence for globali-
zation in the three key economic areas: trade, international finance, and foreign 
direct investments. Globalists argue that the post-war growth of international trade 
has led to the merging of distinctive national markets of goods and services into 
a global one. The underlying idea is that production and consumption in national 
economies have become separated, as consumers can now buy from around the 
globe. Therefore, international trade is one of the most important forces of glo-
balization. By contrast, skeptics believe that the growth of international trade has 
been widely overestimated. They claim that world trade relative to output has 
only recently returned to the classical gold standard level. As far as international 
finance is concerned, globalists believe that the global financial flows achieved 
by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the removal of any barriers to 
capital mobility represent the ultimate perfect global market. Capital is now free 
to move where the rates of return are highest. Moreover, most of these transac-
tions are speculative in nature, hence undermining and weakening the opportunity 
for countries to pursue independent monetary policy. By contrast, skeptics con-
tend that almost all of these speculative financial transactions are concentrated 
in very few financial centers, the core of capitalism (Martin 1999). Finally, as 
far as foreign direct investments are concerned, globalists state that TNCs aim to 
shift production around the globe in order to respond to differences in economic 
conditions. TNCs tend to move productions to those locations where labor costs 
are lower and/or natural resources and input are cheaper and easily available. By 
contrast, skeptics point out that even in the case of the largest TNCs the majority 
of sales and assets are in the domestic country, along with their core operations. 
TNCs are seen as national companies with international operations, but subjected 
to national controls.
Space in the global economy
The common thread of this book, which gathers together authors adhering 
to different theoretical paradigms, is a shared dissatisfaction with the idea of 
globalization as a homogenizing force in space. Uneven development means that 
social and economic change in capitalist societies enhances the wealth of some 
places at the expense of others. Globalists believe that the resulting geographical 
differentiation into types and levels of development will disappear as soon as 
market forces are free to work or market imperfections are corrected. By contrast, 
skeptics believe that uneven development is the result of spatial expression of 
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social differences, inequalities, and processes lying at the heart of the capitalist 
system of production. Despite theoretical differences among the contributors, this 
book aims to show that differentiation in space does still exist even in the so-
called global economy. Global forces are not likely to reduce, or even eliminate, 
geographical differences. On the contrary, space still matters and an increasing 
differentiation between localities, territories, regional areas, or continents 
characterizes this phase of capitalist development. 
The theoretical explanation of globalization as a flattening force finds its basis 
in the neoclassical growth theory (Solow 1956, 1957). With Solow’s model, two 
different kinds of economic convergence can be analyzed. So-called absolute 
convergence occurs when poorer regions grow faster than richer ones, thus catch-
ing them up. Absolute convergence means that the further a region is from the 
common steady state in the initial year, the faster the growth rate turns out to 
be in the following period. This implies that there should be a negative relation-
ship between the initial level of the economy and its average rate of growth. 
The negative relationship indicates that regions whose gross domestic product 
(GDP) is initially below average show an above average growth rate. Yet, this 
kind of convergence occurs only under two strict assumptions: (i) capital should 
show diminishing rates of return in the production function – meaning that poor 
economies, with a lower ratio of capital per worker and thus higher returns to 
capital, will experience a faster rate of capital accumulation and faster growth; 
and (ii) the economies should share the same economic fundamentals and dif-
fer only in terms of their initial level of income. This means that the economies 
should have the same production function and should converge toward the same 
steady state. Nevertheless, the steady state will be the same only if propensity to 
save, demographic growth, technological change, and the stock of human capital 
are the same in all the economies. In this case, the catching-up process will be 
inevitable and absolute convergence will then take place.
The assumptions required to hold for absolute convergence to take place are 
strict and very difficult to meet. Thus, a second type of convergence is taken into 
consideration, the so-called conditional convergence. In this case also, convergence 
exists when there is a negative relationship between the initial level of GDP and its 
average growth rate. Yet, convergence is conditioned by the controlling variables 
that measure differences in fundamentals and steady states across economies. This 
concept of convergence is more meaningful than absolute convergence because it 
predicts whether lagging regions would be able to grow quickly and catch up with 
leading regions if all the structural differences could be eliminated. In this case, 
growth rates can vary from region to region either because of differences in the 
parameters determining their steady states or because of differences in their initial 
positions. Thus, convergence occurs conditional to the set of variables controlling 
for structural differences of the regional economies. Differences in these variables 
are responsible for different processes of economic growth and, consequently, 
the chosen set of variables becomes crucial in marking the reasons why absolute 
convergence does not occur. Empirical evidence has not been conclusive, because 
some studies have confirmed the Solow model (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1991, 
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Quah 1996, Sala-I-Martin 1996), whereas others have disproved it (Canova and 
Marcet 1995, Boldrin and Canova 2001, Canova 2004).
The new economic geography suggests that the existence of increasing returns 
and imperfect competition will lead to geographical divergence rather than con-
vergence (Krugman 1991a,b, 1998, Krugman and Venables 1995, Ottaviano 2000, 
Neary 2001, Fujita and Krugman 2004). High fixed costs, widespread increasing 
returns, and externalities are the sources of geographical differentiation among 
space. In this case, a geographical concentration of economic activities would 
be the most frequent result. Increasing returns send the most productive factors 
flowing toward the advanced regions, where their returns are higher, leaving the 
disadvantaged areas further behind. The final result is a great geographical differ-
ence among territories, at whatever level, exacerbated by “market imperfections.” 
Geographical concentration is the result of the relationship between centripetal 
and centrifugal forces (Krugman 1991b). On the one hand, firms want to locate 
close to the largest possible market and workers want to have access to a large 
number of goods. Both of these choices operate as centripetal forces and lead 
toward geographical concentration. On the other hand, firms need to serve the 
peripheral markets. This need acts as a centrifugal force, leading to geographi-
cal dispersion. Moreover, geographical concentration depends on the interaction 
among the share of manufacturing goods in total expenditure, the level of trans-
port costs, and the extent of scale economies. If transport costs are high and/or the 
share of expenditure in manufactured goods is low, or scale economies are weak, 
no clustering will take place. However, when scale economies are high enough, 
firms will cluster and, because of transport costs, they will cluster where demand 
is great.
Both these traditions – Solow’s growth theory and the new economic geogra-
phy – consider “space” only in terms of metrical distance and give some sugges-
tions for policy. The concentration of economic activities is either a short-term 
phenomenon or the result of market imperfections. In the first case, economic 
growth, and therefore wealth, will be broadened everywhere by the simple opera-
tions of market forces, which, in turn, will lead to homogenization of space, with-
out any kind of state intervention. In the second case, intervention is limited to 
the removal of market imperfections, in order to permit market forces to spread 
wealth everywhere in the world.
In other traditions, space is seen in relational terms. Global space is character-
ized by strong and increasing differentiation between localities and territories, as a 
result of the relationships that firms form with local institutions. These approaches 
share the common view that a firm is not an isolated entity but is, instead, related 
to its territory by its relations and networks with other firms, institutions, and 
organizations clustered in the same geographical area. Social, economic, political, 
and institutional relations characterize the space where the firm operates.
Among these various approaches, the most notable is surely that of the indus-
trial districts. The theoretical “pedigree” of the notion is quite well known, as it 
goes back to Alfred Marshall’s (1990 [1890]) observation of the tendency of small 
specialized firms to concentrate in a limited geographical area. This phenomenon 
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was explained by the opportunity for firms to reap external economies of scale. In 
Becattini’s earlier revisitation (1979, 1987, 1990) of Marshall’s tradition, the dis-
trict gained a new impulse. Becattini (1990: 38) talks about the industrial district 
as “a socio-territorial entity which is characterized by the active presence of both 
a community of people and a population of firms in one naturally and historically 
bounded area.” This definition marks a certain shift from the consideration of 
purely economic factors to the inclusion of social factors too: the “population of 
firms” must exist within a “community of people.” Although the firm does not 
“melt” into the district, the collectivity of firms still captures more attention than 
their individuality. The “community of people” works in creating and maintaining 
a homogeneous system of values and the “population of firms” is specialized in 
one or a few phases of the production processes.
The milieu innovateur is another approach that stems from the Marshallian tra-
dition, and investigates the relationship between technology and space (Aydalot 
1986, Camagni 1991). The milieu innovateur is actually considered as the “incu-
bator” of innovations and innovative firms, in which the firm is indeed a player, 
but just one of the many involved in the innovative process. In such an approach, 
firms are rooted in their territory and constrained by both their local industrial 
atmosphere and their social, institutional, and political condition. Interactions are 
given much more emphasis, to the point that they are considered more important 
than the availability of local factors and resources. Within the “milieu,” non-mar-
ket interactions, as well as interpersonal relations, create a local synergy that turns 
out to be a more powerful explanation of innovation and local growth (Maillat 
1995). In this approach, the idea of space is evidently quite different from that of 
standard industrial economics – where industries come first and create the terri-
tory – or of economic geography – where it is, instead, space that comes first. In 
the “milieu” approach industry and space are ontological equals, as the territory 
has a twofold interrelated nature. On the one hand, it is the result of the innovation 
processes. On the other hand, it performs different collective tasks in order to 
foster innovation.
In addition, the regional innovation system and the learning region approaches 
consider space in relational terms (Braczyk et al. 1998, Howells 1999, Cooke 
2001). A regional system becomes a crucial arena for localized learning and tacit 
know-how sharing, thanks to its institutional fabrics and informal links. The 
concept of a regional system of innovation or “learning region” is founded on 
five constituent elements: (i) the region as an administrative and political unit 
with some cultural and historical homogeneity and with some statutory power; 
(ii) innovation in the neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary approach; (iii) networks as 
relationships based on trust, reputation, custom, reciprocity, and reliability; (iv) 
learning processes in the sense of institutional learning; (v) interactions driven 
by formal and informal links and relationships. Whatever its exact composition, 
this conceptual framework is able to incorporate firms within specific regional 
contexts, but still keeps the former conceptually “independent” from the latter. 
This approach considers space as an administrative and cultural unit of analysis.
This brief review, which I do not claim to be exhaustive, shows a different 
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concept of space. Space in geometrical terms (i.e., metrical distance) is irrelevant 
here. Space is considered in terms of the relationships and networks created 
among different economic agents, such as firms, institutions, organizations, local 
authorities, trade unions, etc. Moreover, all these different streams suggest that 
“localness” is an important source of competitiveness. The ability of a territory to 
succeed in a global economy is to stress and emphasize its local assets, based on 
local relationships. “Glocal” – think globally but act locally – has become the new 
keyword, suggesting that global competition can be won by relying more heavily 
on local capacity, expertise, and competence.
Finally, there is a stream of research that considers space from a class perspec-
tive. Marxist geographers believe that each mode of production creates distinct 
spatial arrangements, and that successions of modes of production alter landscape 
in any given space (Harvey 1982, Massey 1984, Storper and Walker 1989). The 
idea is not how economy is reflected in space but, on the contrary, how economy 
arranges the political, cultural, and social organization of space. The theoretical 
background is the Marxist theory of economic growth, which, under capitalism, 
puts capital accumulation at the center of a dynamic and inevitably expansionary 
mode of production. The capitalist system has a pathological expansionistic logic 
because capital needs to expand to new markets in order to maintain profits. Newly 
local patterns and improvements in transportation and communication technology 
are an inevitable and necessary part of capital accumulation. In fact, the increas-
ing scale of production and the concentration and centralization of capital have 
been matched by urban agglomeration in a widening international capitalist space. 
Yet the collapse of spatial barriers does not imply a decreasing significance of 
space. On the contrary, the diminishing of spatial barriers gives capitalists the 
power to exploit spatial differentiation (Harvey 1989). Local availability of mate-
rial resources, local variations of market taste, local difference in entrepreneurial 
ability, venture capital, scientific and technical know-how, local differences in 
social attitudes, and local labor markets consequently become sources of com-
petitive advantage. Within this theoretical tradition, uneven development is the 
general rule rather than the exception, and it is intrinsic to capitalist development 
and not just a temporary out-of-equilibrium situation or the result of market fail-
ures. Uneven development is the spatial form taken by the geography of capital 
accumulation (Amin 1976). The source of uneven development is related to the 
division of labor, which is the product of competition between capitals and which 
perpetually divides places, as much as enterprises and people, on the basis on their 
ability to differentiate their systems of production from those of their neighbors 
and competitors. Therefore, uneven development is at the heart of capitalist devel-
opment, thus enhancing the wealth of some places at the expense of others.
Outline of the book
The book is organized into two distinctive, but closely related, parts. Part I is 
concerned with different theoretical approaches to the space–globalization issue. 
Part II contains empirical evidence showing the enduring role of space even in the 
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global economy. In Chapter 1, Bellofiore and Vertova focus on the relevance of 
space for uneven capitalist development as an intrinsically unbalanced process. 
The starting point is dissatisfaction with the ways space has been considered by 
neoclassical theory. The chapter surveys how space, agglomeration, and external 
economies have been theorized by both Walrasian tradition, extending to the 
new economic geography, and the Marshallian one, with the traditional district 
literature. The former neglects space as an element of differentiation in its basic 
model, and sees globalization as a homogenizing process. The latter praises local 
assets in global competition, but within what is substantially a “harmonic” social 
and economic view. In fact, in both perspectives conflict is abolished (i) at micro 
level, between individual capitalists; (ii) at macro level, between capital and 
labor; and (iii) at geographical level, between the center and the periphery. The 
authors then survey a different geographical paradigm in the Marxist tradition, 
that of David Harvey, as a promising alternative way to theorize space. However, 
some of his limits lead the authors to suggest a new heterodox approach based on 
(but also going beyond) an integration between Marx, Schumpeter, and Keynes as 
authors for whom the capitalist economy is a monetary economy characterized by 
endogenous development, instability, and crises. The critical point is the political 
as well as the spatial dialectic of the two “special” Marxian commodities: the 
“labor power” of the workers, from which living labor is extracted, and “money” 
as finance to production. In both cases, geographical specification and institutional 
(and state) regulation are fundamental. This is true also of the crucial role of 
“effective demand” in driving capitalist production. This analytical skeleton 
helps to focus on the general tendency toward the increasing “precariousness” 
or “casualization” of labor (whatever its skill or nature, manual or intellectual), 
on the “regionalization” of economies, on the free mobility of short-term capital, 
and on the aggressive competition between global players, as defining features 
of a contemporary “flexible” and “financial” capitalism. “Labor” and “space” 
are under stress nowadays because of the essential link between the primacy of 
finance and the instability of growth, on the one hand, and the fragmentation 
of work and territories, on the other. This new capitalism is built on a system 
of valorization whereby workers are automatically “controlled” by subordination 
to more stagnant and/or unstable commodity markets, subsumption to financial 
markets, and the consequent revolutions in the corporate governance, organization, 
and productive structure of firms.
In Chapter 2, Sheppard explores the question of how space still matters for 
the study of economic geography, by focusing on an aspect of space that has 
recently received diminishing attention in the field: the differential positionality 
of locations within the out-of-equilibrium dynamic capitalist space–economy. 
Positionality refers to how both social and geographical locations shape the 
conditions of possibility faced by economic agents. Starting from this definition, 
Sheppard develops a conceptualization of positionality as an emergent, socially 
constructed, and produced feature of complex economic systems that also shapes 
their evolution. Contrasting this view of positionality with the ways in which 
relative location is treated in the new economic geography in economics has sig-
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nificant theoretical implications. It challenges a number of standard propositions 
of non-spatial economic theory, neoclassical and Marxian alike. Sheppard argues 
that positionality also remains important to the evolution of contemporary spatial 
economic systems, notwithstanding the “shrinking world” thesis. While the world 
may be shrinking in absolute terms, and social distance is becoming more and 
more non-Euclidean, in relative terms, positionality differences matter as much as 
ever. The chapter ends by providing some empirical insights into the importance 
of positionality today in the global mobility of commodities, people, capital, and 
foreign aid. The world has become smaller and faster, in absolute terms, but it does 
not follow, however, that space is being annihilated by time. On the contrary, the 
space-transcending technologies and institutions of contemporary globalization 
are compounding the complexity of mapping social relationships in geographic 
space. Sheppard concludes the chapter with some suggestions. The same practices 
will not have the same consequences in differently positioned places. Instead, 
places need the freedom to pursue different political economic strategies. Yet 
local actions to improve the business climate have little chance of improving the 
positionality of disadvantaged places. What is needed is collective action across 
space.
In Chapter 3, Conti and Giaccaria analyze the local system as the basis to 
understand economic change in a world characterized by information flows, 
knowledge, competence and capabilities, and the community of practices. The 
aim is the rediscovery of external relations (and thus agglomeration) as a factor 
of cooperation and collective learning. The differentiation and specification of the 
territorial pattern of development and competitiveness pivots around the concept 
of identity, a term through which it will be possible to attribute to the local system 
an autonomy from the abstract laws of the economy. Given these premises, the 
capability of a local system might be defined as what a (territorial) organization 
is able to do better than others, including the ability to renew, augment, and adapt 
its “core competencies” over time. Spatial proximity is not, therefore, a sufficient 
condition. On the contrary, a territory, in given circumstances, must be seen as 
an entity that combines organizational proximity and institutional proximity. The 
authors assume that institutional proximity endows the system’s actors with a 
common space of representation, roles, and models of learning and action, col-
lectively internalized by the actors themselves. The evolutionary trajectory leads 
the system to give specific (local) responses to general (global) stimuli. According 
to Conti and Giaccaria, present local development is characterized by two main 
shifts: (i) from government to governance and (ii) from politics to policy. Starting 
from these assumptions, the question is posed explicitly of the point of view, 
i.e., the position from which one describes the system. A point of view external 
to the system leads to representing and interpreting the relationship of the sys-
tem itself and its external environment in linear terms. In this way the territorial 
(local) system is seen as a mere subsystem of the global one, depriving it of its 
own conceptual autonomy. The idea of self-representation introduces, instead, 
the possibility of characterizing the system in terms of organization, of identity, 
inducing one to adopt a point of view internal to the system itself. Local policy as 
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the mere expression of a development ethic that accepts the laws and dynamics 
of contemporary capitalism produces nothing other than a simple – local – speci-
fication of standardizing processes and forces. In this case, although attention to 
places modifies the vision of development process, it cannot change the concept 
of development itself. The thesis that now emerges is fundamentally different. 
The systemic perspective is the bearer of the idea of a place that reproduces its 
own identity, given by the organization of those social, cultural, and economic 
relations that make that place “unique.” In this case, if the arbiter of development 
is no longer the market, but the local system, it follows that the benefits of local 
development are evaluated in terms of the maintenance of the system’s identity. It 
follows that a development path is not valid at all scales and nor does there exist 
a temporal succession of hegemonic models of development. In conclusion, a 
local system is not a Pandora’s box that encompasses all possible relations. In this 
sense, institutional biodiversity represents a fundamental condition for ensuring 
the availability to the local system of the greatest possible number of development 
paths.
In Chapter 4, Swann examines how, as geographical space loses one part of 
its economic meaning through globalization, it may acquire another economic 
meaning. According to Swann, competitive survival requires competitive distinc-
tion because, as the number of dimensions falls, the chance of a trader achieving 
competitive distinction within a given characteristics space tends to fall. Swann 
analyzes this “law” in what he calls the four ages of space: the medieval age, the 
industrial age, the age of global clusters, and, finally, the age of the new global 
village, which has yet to come. Before globalization, some traders would achieve 
competitive distinction simply through location. These traders might not perhaps 
offer a distinctive product or service, but what is distinctive is the location in 
which they trade. However, with the advent of space-shrinking technologies 
and the growth of globalization, place may no longer be the source of economic 
distinction that it was in the past. Traders may find new sources of competitive 
distinction from their spatial history, because traders seeking niches for them-
selves may have to invent new sources of competitive distinction. In an economy 
in which intellectual capital plays an increasingly important role in achieving 
competitive distinction, location may reappear as an indirect source of competi-
tive distinction. If intellectual capital is the source of competitive distinction, and 
intellectual capital in turn is forged by the trader’s history (including spatial his-
tory), then spatial history can shape competitive distinction. Spatial history shapes 
intellectual capital and, hence, place is still a source of competitive distinction. 
This will continue until all experiences are virtual – unconnected with place – if 
such a future will ever exist. In this apparently placeless world, distance may have 
died, but location – or, more specifically, the history of location – is not irrelevant, 
because place is still what we think with.
The second and empirical part starts with Walker’s chapter, dealing with the 
transformation of the San Francisco Bay Area during and after the boom of the 
New Economy. According to the author, rarely do we get to witness anything 
like the collapse of the Twin Towers, yet the morphological changes in American 
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cities are as inexorable in their destruction and alteration as acts of war. This 
relentless redevelopment of cities is driven by the logic of capital accumulation, 
which is capable of spectacular bouts of building that surpass anything in the past. 
In some cases, the economic forces are so compressed that they do their earth-
moving right before our eyes. Such was the case in the San Francisco Bay Area 
in the late 1990s. An economic boom of unparalleled ferocity hit the place like 
a bomb. The city was picked up, shaken, and dropped into a new configuration. 
The author highlights several key aspects to this. First, the dot-com bubble in San 
Francisco was only the tip of the iceberg of a larger boom centered in Silicon 
Valley. Second, the Bay Area was tightly linked to volcanic movements of finance 
capital through Wall Street and gained – and lost – far more from the record-set-
ting stock bubble than anywhere else. Third, this highly focused boom rested on 
the way in which the Bay Area became the paragon of the New Economy and 
the iconic space of the neoliberal 1990s. Fourth, the bubble economy drove local 
real estate markets insane, and prompted a massive makeover of the metropolis 
from SoMa (South of Market district) to San Jose, Santa Rosa to Tracy. Fifth, the 
collapse of the bubble and the New Economy ushered in the recall of Governor 
Davis and his replacement by the comic-book hero of California politics, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger. As usual, capital got off scot-free while others took the fall for 
the catastrophe. In short, the Bay Area of the 1990s provides a perfect case study 
for scholars of the geography of the capitalist economy, the dialectics of the local 
and the global, and the political economy of urban growth. This is a local story 
with a general lesson.
In Chapter 6, Asheim and Coenen show to what extent the analysis of the 
importance of different types of regional innovation systems must take place 
within a context of the actual knowledge base of various industries in the econ-
omy, as the innovation processes of firms are strongly shaped by their specific 
knowledge base. The authors distinguish between two types of knowledge base: 
analytical and synthetic. These types indicate different mixes of tacit and codified 
knowledge, codification possibilities and limits, qualifications and skills, required 
organizations and institutions involved, as well as specific competitive challenges 
from a globalizing economy. Moreover, Asheim and Coenen prove that the dif-
ferent knowledge bases of industries also have implications for the relations and 
analytical distinctions between clusters and regional innovation systems. They 
make a distinction between the existence of “pure” clusters, where regional inno-
vation systems are built in order to support innovation and localized learning, 
and the coexistence of clusters and regional innovation systems as integral parts. 
The traditional constellation of industrial clusters surrounded by innovation-sup-
porting organizations is nearly always to be found in the context of industries 
with a synthetic knowledge base (e.g., engineering-based industries). In contrast, 
the existence of regional innovation systems as an integral part of a cluster will 
normally be the case for industries based on an analytical knowledge base (e.g., 
science-based industries such as IT and biotechnology). The discussion of differ-
ent types of clusters and regional innovation systems is put forward by empiri-
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cal illustrations from a Nordic comparative project on small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and regional innovation systems. 
In Chapter 7, Paci and Usai tackle the issue of local economic performance 
in a scenario of an ongoing process of structural change, because they believe 
that it has meaningful implications for an analysis of the geography of economic 
activities, owing to the fact that several forces of agglomeration are at work. They 
assess the role of a large set of potential determinants of the process of local 
agglomeration of economic activity, distinguishing between manufacturing and 
service sectors. The authors also analyze the issue of spatial association of the 
local growth process. Paci and Usai acknowledge that, in the last decade, a vast 
body of literature has addressed the issue of the influence of local externalities on 
industry location and growth. Such literature has, however, paid little attention 
to the wider scenario in which such phenomena are rooted, that of an ongoing 
process of structural change that is transforming economies from manufacturing 
to service ones. This is the matter the authors intend to tackle with empirical 
evidence from the Italian case, by using a very ample database on socioeconomic 
indicators for 784 local labor systems and thirty-four sectors over the period 
1991–96. The novelty in comparison with similar works is that their database 
covers both the manufacturing and the service sectors, so that the whole economic 
system is considered. The econometric results show that local growth in Italy is 
not a homogeneous process. On the contrary, it is characterized by significant dif-
ferences across macro regions and especially across sectors. Moreover, the results 
confirm the existence of a very multifaceted picture when it comes to agglomera-
tion forces operating in very small geographical units. Among the most important 
determinants of local industry growth it is worth mentioning the positive role of 
the diversity externalities. The authors also find robust evidence of the negative 
influence of specialization externalities on labor dynamics at a local industry level. 
Moreover, Paci and Usai assess the effects of other determinants of local growth 
such as human capital, social environment, and network externalities. Finally, the 
presence of spatial autocorrelation is detected for the aggregate economy and also 
in some sectors and therefore dynamic spatial models have been estimated. 
In Chapter 8, Capello and Spairani assess the role of ICT policies for regional 
economic growth within Europe. The acknowledgment that national boundaries 
are no longer barriers to economic activity and trade, thanks to the institutional 
integration created by the European Union and advances in transport and com-
munication technologies, leads to the concept of accessibility being increasingly 
important as a determinant of local and economic competitiveness. Accessibility 
defines the ability to overcome spatial distance at low transport cost, and gather 
strategic information before competitors. Therefore, in a worldwide economy, 
accessibility reinforces its role of strategic factors in regional competitiveness. 
However, Capello and Spairani believe that “virtual” rather than physical acces-
sibility is the key factor. Virtual accessibility derives from information and 
communication technologies. The authors’ empirical work uses descriptive and 
interpretative analyses to examine the impact of accessibility on regional growth, 
based on accessibility indicators covering both ICT endowment and ICT inten-
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sity of use. The main data source is a survey commissioned by the European 
Commission, covering 44,000 households in 130 regions of the fifteen member 
states. This overwhelming dataset is also used to assess economic growth in rela-
tion to varying policy options. Different impacts on regional performance are 
analyzed in relation to three policy actions: (i) a short-term policy of increasing 
ICT endowments; (ii) a medium-term policy of spreading the necessary skills and 
knowledge for strategic ICT use; and (iii) a long-term policy of influencing the 
efficiency of the whole productive system. Furthermore, the authors extend the 
results of the assessment model into the future by considering different acces-
sibility policy options and their implications for future regional growth, by pro-
jecting the results in a twenty-year future scenario. Finally, Capello and Spairani 
highlight the differing impacts of accessibility policies on regions resulting from 
their different preconditions. ICT policies should take into account the different 
local preconditions relating to the level of ICT use, the level of ICT endowment, 
and the learning processes required to use these technologies. All these elements 
affect the impact of ICT policies in fostering regional development and cannot be 
ignored when policy actions are planned.
In Chapter 9, Terrasi is concerned with the effects that the new EU enlargement 
will have on regional inequalities and takes into account both the old and new 
member states. The effects of enlargement have been a frequent object of study in 
recent years, but they have mostly been analyzed at an aggregate level and from 
the point of view of the accession countries. At the spatial level, the main point of 
interest has been the problem of reforming European regional policy and reconcil-
ing the needs of the newcomers with those of the disadvantaged regions. In this 
chapter, the author turns her attention to the spatial effects of the enlargement by 
means of a more positive approach. First, Terrasi looks back at the experience of 
past enlargements in order to see whether it is possible to learn a lesson. In fact, 
the European Community has experienced other significant enlargements in its 
history even though in a different general economic context. The main tool of 
analysis is the Theil index of concentration and its disaggregation in different 
components, such as between and within country, productivity and employment, 
sectoral productivities. Subsequently, the author tries to understand whether 
some of the results obtained for the previous enlargements can be projected to 
understand the evolution of regional disparities after the next one. Terrasi uses a 
new dataset, provided by the regional database (REGIO) of Eurostat, for which 
the most recent data available are for the years 1995–2000 for the countries that 
were at that time the member states and eleven candidate countries. The Theil 
index is applied to the regional data of GDP per capita and gross value added 
(GVA) of different regions and sectors, in order to evaluate the change in regional 
inequalities and the contribution of different components at the enlarged EU level. 
These results, together with an examination of some crucial characteristics of the 
new globalized economy, make it possible to offer some hypotheses regarding the 
evolution of regional inequalities in the new EU and to evaluate their relevance 
for the reformulation of European regional policy strategies.
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Notes
 1 The international conference, Reinventing Space: The Geography of Globalization, 
was held on 19 and 20 December 2003.
 2 The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the Organization for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Mercado 
Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), to cite just some.
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1 Lost in space?
 The geographical and political 
dimension of uneven capitalist 
development
Riccardo Bellofiore and Giovanna Vertova
Introduction
The recent debate about globalisation has been marked by a contraposition of 
the continuity and discontinuity points of view. Those favouring the former think 
that the globalisation at the end of the 1900s is nothing but the resumption of the 
long-standing well-known ‘internationalisation’ of the capitalist economy (Hirst 
and Thompson 1999). Those favouring the latter viewpoint believe, instead, in 
the radical novelty of the current phase, so that the term ‘globalisation’ pertains 
only to this new reality (Ohmae 1995). Such a polarity recurs in respect of the 
relevance of territories and space in the global economy.
In fact, two opposing positions reappear also for those accepting the globalisa-
tion paradigm. On the one hand, mainstream neoliberal theories argue that glo-
balisation leads to a general tendency towards a homogenisation of firms, sectors 
and geographical areas that tends to cancel the role of ‘place’. On the other hand, 
we find many authors stressing that, in the new context, local and regional dimen-
sion acquires a fresh role, leading to a differentiation of territories and thus to a 
renewed importance of the geographical embedding of the economy. These two 
positions are not to be considered as fixed or mutually exclusive, since it is pos-
sible to find many intermediate positions. This debate has also crossed arguments 
for or against the ‘end of the nation-state’ (Reich 1991, Weiss 1998) as well as for 
or against the ‘end of work’ (Rifkin 1995, Bellofiore 1999), which are supposed 
to be distinctive features of the new capitalism for the hyperglobalisation views. 
The discussion has also affected the ‘radical’ left interpretation of contemporary 
capitalism. Here, of course, we find again those asserting the tendency towards 
homogenisation or the tendency towards differentiation. What is interesting, how-
ever, is that for both groups labour seems to be ‘lost in space’ – so to speak. In 
other words, both those who stress the loss of ‘local’ advantages or its more inten-
sive exploitation see a quantitative and/or qualitative ‘collapse’ of wage labour 
as being typical of the globalisation phase. Workers are no longer the ‘central’ 
subject of social progressive change within capitalism (Walker 1999).
This chapter starts with a discussion of the different basic paradigms in eco-
nomic theory, in order to test how they are able to deal with the differentiation 
of the ‘qualities’ of productive resources, techniques, means of production and 
labour power as something structural and essential in capitalist accumulation. This 
24 Bellofiore and Vertova
internal drive to a differentiation of the methods of production is inevitably rooted 
in ‘space’ and deeply affects the ‘local’ dimension and its history, with the ascent 
and decline of entire economic regions. The second section illustrates how the 
two main neoclassical currents, stemming from Walras and Marshall, deal with 
(or elude) this topic. The third section describes the alternative Marxian approach, 
through a dialogue with David Harvey’s re-reading and developments. The fourth 
section embarks on a more positive proposal on the terrain of economic theory, 
highlighting some problems in the Marxian system and suggesting the need for a 
confrontation of this tradition with the monetary heterodoxy of Schumpeter and 
Keynes. The fifth section applies this framework to the interpretation of contem-
porary capitalism. The final section shows how labour conditions are transformed 
in the new global economy. The concluding section clarifies in what sense these 
changes mark a historical watershed. 
The dead ends of the neoclassical tradition
Since the beginning, neoclassical mainstream theory has been divided along two 
main lines: the general economic equilibrium (GEE), originating with Walras 
(1988 [1874]), and the partial economic equilibrium (PEE), originating with 
Marshall (1990 [1890]). At no time have these two paths converged although 
it is possible to discern a tendency of both theoretical and applied economics to 
oscillate between the two, with movement in one or the other direction at different 
times. This oscillation is based on the impossibility of making either one or the 
other of these two approaches a coherent and convincing framework for the 
inquiry of an intrinsically dynamic and monetary economy such as capitalism.
Sraffa’s criticisms of marginalism
The internal logical soundness of marginalism in both its incarnations has been 
criticised on several occasions and with some justification. Piero Sraffa is the 
crucial actor in this story. In 1925–26, he attacked the Marshallian theory of perfect 
competition and the idea that limits to the size of output come from costs and the 
prevalence, after a certain point, of decreasing returns (Sraffa 1925, 1926). This 
critique challenges the idea that the competitive firm, necessarily small, works in 
a homogeneous market, in which it is indifferent whether to purchase from one 
firm rather than another. By contrast, there are many ‘particular’ markets and it 
is impossible to neglect market imperfections or product differentiation. In 1960, 
Sraffa destroyed the notion of ‘capital’ as a homogeneous factor of production and 
opened the way to the rebuttal of the aggregate production function. The view of 
profit as the remuneration of the marginal contributions to production of ‘capital’ 
as a factor of production was mortally wounded (Sraffa 1960). Sraffa denies the 
existence of a unique equilibrium distribution, and opens the economic system 
to conflicts in the distribution of the surplus. Social and political determinants 
may affect the ‘productive configuration’ and the methods of production of the 
system. 
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However, neither the Walrasian nor the Marshallian neoclassical traditions 
came out lethally injured by the attack against the laws of returns, or by the capi-
tal controversy, or by the revival of a Ricardian conflictual view of distribution. 
The way out from Sraffa’s 1925–26 criticism was the Robinson–Chamberlin 
‘imperfect competition’ literature. And the way out from Sraffa’s 1960 critique 
of neoclassical GEE was along the lines of disaggregated intertemporal general 
equilibrium models without capital as an aggregate notion. But it is a paradoxical 
situation when economics fluctuates between a list of particular cases and the 
abolition of capital itself from economic discourse, since the object of analysis is 
precisely the study of a capitalist system.
This paradox is an indication of an unsettled situation, which deserves to be 
investigated more accurately, especially by looking at the way in which temporal 
and spatial dimensions can be integrated fully within neoclassical economics.
The general equilibrium and the theory of location
Walras’s original general equilibrium model presents the relations of a one-point 
economy and the conditions for its equilibrium. The underlying assumptions – i.e. 
zero transport costs, perfect mobility of capital and labour, uniform technical 
conditions, neglect of local differences in supply and demand and the principle 
of ‘pure’ competition – are meaningful only when the economy is considered 
abstracting from space as well as time. The same is true for the later intertemporal 
version of general economic equilibrium (Debreu 1959). Here Walras’s model is 
extended to a sequence of periods by assuming the existence of complete markets 
and perfect forecasting, thus introducing a false conception of ‘time’. Commodities 
can be distinguished not only according to their product characteristics and the 
moment they are available, but also by the place where they are available and the 
states of nature. In this way, both time and space are considered but ‘neutralised’. 
The same happens to money, which is inessential too. Not only, as in Walras, is 
there a central coordination mechanism, the ‘auctioneer’, but the model is also 
framed so that present and future coordination is guaranteed, and there is no 
uncertainty. In fact, in the initial period the destiny of the system is defined once 
and for all.
Neoclassical location analysis managed to introduce space in the general 
equilibrium framework, by considering the distance factor in terms of transport 
costs. Alfred Weber (1971 [1929]) was the first economist to undertake a sys-
tematic analysis of location in a neoclassical framework. Weber’s main aim was 
to find the economic reason for the rapid urbanisation of the German economy 
by isolating three important explanatory forces: transport costs, labour costs and 
agglomeration forces. By taking into account these three determinants, an opti-
mum location becomes the point of overall minimum transport costs, although 
both labour costs and agglomeration economies can shift the optimal location 
towards other points. Weber’s work was indeed within the neoclassical tradition 
but limited to a partial equilibrium analysis. By contrast, Lösch (1954) developed 
a true general equilibrium analysis based on the definition of ‘economic region’ 
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and its determinants. His main aim was to elaborate a model of location valid for 
independent producers and consumers, for agriculture as well as industry, hence 
a universal model. Each producer (or consumer) is represented by a set of coordi-
nates and its boundaries are described in equation form. In this way, the regional 
economy is given by a system of mathematical equations, whose solution gives 
the optimum location for a firm. 
Lösch shared with Christaller (1966 [1933]) the idea that a hexagon is the 
shape which the market takes by the expansion of producers (or consumers). The 
hexagon market principle enables both authors to define equations for the general 
equilibrium model for location. Predöhl (1928) believed that the location problem 
is a price problem, and that the principle of substitution enables firms to move 
from one location to another, according to the relative prices of the factors of pro-
duction. Finally, Isard (1949, 1956), the post-war founder of the regional school, 
attempted to make the Weberian approach more dynamic, by introducing internal 
and external scale economies, and urbanisation economies. His equilibrium model 
of an idealised capitalist system was the result of the application of game theory 
to abstractly defined regions.
These theories of location all shared the same unrealistic assumptions, which 
were necessary to make the models work and give the equations a solution: a 
uniform–plain region with a uniform distribution of raw materials, a uniform 
transport surface, a uniform distribution of population, uniform tastes and pref-
erences, uniform technical knowledge and uniform production opportunities. 
Almost all these authors were aware of the lack of realism of these assumptions. 
Weber breaks through the limitations of such artificial assumptions in a section 
entitled ‘Reintroducing the Realities’ (Weber 1971 [1929]: chapter V, section III). 
Lösch did the same in a small section entitled ‘Economic Regions in Reality’ 
(Lösch 1954: chapter II, section B15). Isard, commenting on his diagrams and 
figures, remarks that they ‘pertain to a situation which abstracts from interest con-
flicts, undercutting and retaliation, advertising strategies, collusive action, market 
encroachment, and similar phenomena characteristic of firm behaviour’ (Isard 
1956: 264–5). Despite the acknowledgement of the unreality of their assump-
tions, the theory of location was the first attempt to include space in economic 
analysis.
Within the general equilibrium framework, geographical dimension can be 
related only to the choice of the optimum localisation of productive activities, 
and space can be considered only in terms of geographical distance (i.e. transport 
costs). Taking the technology as exogenous as well as the demand determined by 
voluntary households’ choices, the problem is to identify the ‘best’ distribution 
of productive activities across space and the ‘right’ settlement to minimise costs. 
‘Consumer sovereignty’ and exogeneity of techniques rule. The economic proc-
ess is understood as a one-way avenue from resources to consumption. The only 
problem is, therefore, the ‘efficient’ and ‘rational’ allocation of resources, relative 
to the ‘natural’ aim of the satisfaction of needs.
All these neoclassical approaches to space are challenged by the same critiques 
to general equilibrium. First, asymmetric information and bounded rationality are 
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not considered in the model, money is irrelevant, capital and labour are perfectly 
mobile and the production function is uniform throughout. Moreover, the con-
ceptualisation of space, explicitly considered only in terms of transport costs, 
is inconsistent with the idea of perfect competition and, consequently, with the 
original neoclassical approach (Sheppard 2000). Indeed, if different places can be 
treated as single different markets, the necessary conditions of a large number of 
buyers and sellers for each commodity and for each factor of production cannot be 
fulfilled and there is no uniform price paid by everyone. Least but not last, supply, 
demand and price adjustments – the typical neoclassical tools – cannot explain 
the location of industries because they cannot be considered independent of space. 
On the contrary, they are produced by industries themselves over time through an 
ongoing interaction between the production system and the location behaviour of 
industry (Storper and Walker 1989).
The neoclassical general equilibrium approach to location is compatible with 
the neoliberal argument that a firm is free to choose any location, depending only 
upon production and transport costs. Capital is seen as ‘footloose’ with the power 
to move freely across space and set up plants and industries everywhere in the 
world. Yet, if this were true, nowadays all plants in industrialised countries would 
have moved to the Third World. This does not happen because there are some 
negative externalities in locating plants everywhere. Moreover, relocation is not 
always a costless option for firms. High sunk costs in terms of long-term fixed 
investments, which are bound to local markets or suppliers, and dependence on 
specific labour supply qualities or on local (physical and social) infrastructures, 
discourage the mobility of firms. Against all this, the neoclassical general equi-
librium tradition enforces the idea of the global market as a homogeneous space, 
spontaneously created by market forces, where economic development occurs 
evenly. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Ways out inside the dominant theory: the new economic geography
The inessentiality of money, time and space has been considered as a serious 
limitation by the same authors working within the general equilibrium in more 
recent years. At the same time, other internal limitations of the basic foundations 
of neoclassical theory that appear to be even more damaging than the logical 
contradictions highlighted by Sraffa have been stressed. We refer to the discovery 
that the general equilibrium approach, even in its most abstract version – the 
intertemporal formulation à la Arrow-Debreu – is globally unstable, with multiple 
equilibria, and the very existence of equilibrium occurs only under specific and 
restrictive conditions. All these problems pushed forward a revision of the role 
of the general economic equilibrium model in neoclassical theory. The Walrasian 
world is no longer something that can be immediately applied to the analysis 
of ‘real’ economies (as, however, some neo-Walrasians still think). Instead, 
it is seen simply as a solution to an intellectual problem: what conditions are 
needed for ‘coherence’ in a social setting in which individual economic agents are 
‘dissociated’ and ‘opportunistic’; how a perfectly competitive market may give 
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origin to ‘order’ and ‘equilibrium’, rather than chaos. The fact that the solution 
to this intellectual problem gives rise to a world where money, time and space 
are ‘inessential’ is not to be considered as a ‘failure’ of the theory. Instead, it asks 
researchers to define those minimal changes in the basic hypothesis of the model 
which has to be introduced so that money, time and space ‘matter’.
Several attempts have been made along these lines. We can limit ourselves 
here to a reminder of some of them. The elimination of the auctioneer, so that 
the dichotomy between the phase of ‘bargaining’ and the phase of ‘simultaneous 
exchanges’ at equilibrium prices no longer holds and transactions at non-equilib-
rium prices are allowed. The non-existence of complete markets, so that markets 
must be thought of as reopening period after period, and the economy becomes 
sequential. The impossibility of economic agents foreseeing all future states of 
nature means that the presence of non-insurable risk or even of true uncertainty 
is the norm. Once ‘imperfections’ of this kind are taken into account, it becomes 
essential to consider that some commodities (first of all, labour and bank credit) 
do not possess the necessary characteristic of standardisation in order to be the 
object of buying and selling in auction markets. Transactions become ‘individual’, 
so to speak, with markets based on customer relationships between principal and 
agent. Not only must uncertainty be taken into consideration, but also the imper-
fect and asymmetric distribution of information becomes crucial. In contexts such 
as these, the local dimension is enhanced. Firms know the characteristics of their 
labour force better and can, therefore, control it better. Banks may better select 
entrepreneurs among their traditional borrowers. And so on.
In such a world, it is impossible to neglect exogenous shocks, increasing returns, 
market failures and asymmetric information. Here we are on the terrain of New 
Economic Geography, in which economies of scale, different local demands and 
externalities are taken into account. Standard location theory suggests that trans-
port costs will limit geographical concentration. However, firms can benefit from 
geographical concentration when economies of scale are available. Therefore, 
transport costs must be assessed in relation to the gains from economies of scale. 
If the benefits of economies of scale outweigh transport costs, the incentive for 
firms to cluster will be high (Krugman 1991, 1995). It is often advantageous to 
locate to the region with the largest market when demand varies between geo-
graphical areas and when there are economies of scale (Krugman and Venables 
1994, 1995). Moreover, in many cities where the existence of factors such as 
a natural harbour or navigable rivers leads to geographical concentration, firms 
discover, accidentally, the benefit of being located close to other firms engaging 
in similar types of operations and a process of clustering spontaneously emerges 
(Krugman 1996, Fujita et al. 1999).
What is crucial here is not the single event, sometimes considered as acciden-
tal, which starts the process of agglomeration of economic activities in space. 
Once the process has exogenously started, it is possible to assess its cumulative 
evolution over time, its mechanisms of adjustment and adaptation, the new equi-
librium it will lead to. History, geography and even policy can definitely have a 
decisive role in the process, thus affecting not only the costs of production but 
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also the transaction and the information costs. Yet, both the existence of multiple 
equilibria and the more complex representation of the rise and decline of indus-
trial concentration do not modify what remains in substance a ‘static’ approach. 
Clusters of firms, technological poles and local production systems are evident 
signs of the presence of increasing returns to scale. The analytical framework 
is, however, still a mechanical one and, within it, imperfections are just what the 
name suggests: a mere ‘deviation’ from the ideal world where economic agents 
have the same power, the same position in the market, the same information. In 
other words, perfect equilibrium is again the reference point on which, ideally, the 
system is judged and to which it must tend. As a consequence, policy has the task 
to correct that deviation, accelerate the convergence and, if necessary, smooth 
likely social tensions.
We thus reach the current theoretical situation. Although it is theoretically 
weak on many fundamental grounds, and although it appears an individualistic 
and unhistorical method, the neoclassical paradigm of general equilibrium has 
shown itself to be so eclectic and greedy as to be able to deal with the very many 
‘complications’ of reality, giving room also to the ‘local’ dimension. Here dif-
ferentiation (among firms, sectors and also geographical areas) appears as some-
thing marginal and fortuitous in the basic theoretical abstraction. Yet, this random 
accident is what explains the structure of economic regions, organisations and 
territories in their actual and concrete history.
Ways out internal to the dominant theory: Marshall and the districts
This section deals with the stream of the common neoclassical body, the partial 
economic equilibrium tradition. For Marshall (1990 [1890]) the firm is a tree 
within the forest that is the industry. In the industry, the cluster of firms produces 
a sufficiently homogeneous commodity that it is possible to construct a demand 
curve for it. Industry is, therefore, the organisational precondition of ‘perfect’ 
competition, without which the formation and determination of price cannot be 
theoretically constructed.
Each tree has its own life, characterised by different moments such as birth, 
development, decay and death. Yet, the forest continues to exist near individual 
trees: it is not their simple sum, and it survives even when the single units of 
production, the small firms, disappear. The decay and death of firms is vital to 
the preservation of perfect competition, otherwise firms would grow bigger and 
bigger, and perfect competition would transform into monopoly. The ongoing life 
of the industry is even more essential because it avoids losing the advantages of 
the developments of firms. In the Walrasian system there is no intermediate agent 
between the firm and the economic system as a whole. In the Marshallian one, it 
does exist and it is the industry. The distinction between industry and firm enables 
Marshall to distinguish between the ‘internal’ economies – depending upon the 
scale of production of the single firm – and ‘external’ economies – relying on the 
development of the industry as a whole.
It is not a task of the present work to criticise the vagueness of Marshall’s 
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definition of industry, or to discuss the difficulties in separating internal from 
external economies. Instead, what we want to stress are two points. On the one 
hand, Marshall puts forward a detailed examination of those external economies 
due to the localisation of the industry. On the other hand, he also depicts the 
external economies as resulting from the fact that entire groups of intertwined 
industries develop in close proximity. Marshall’s intuition becomes important 
when two aspects, missing in the Walrasian approach, are taken into considera-
tion. The first is that industry sets itself as a systemic ‘fact’. The second is that this 
element is intermediate between the micro level of the firm and the macro level of 
the economic system as a whole.
From here, the step towards the notion of the industrial district is a short one 
(Becattini 1979, 1987, 1990). Within the same cycle of production, small and 
medium-sized firms coexist thanks to a positive synergy of know-how and skills, 
technologies and labour power, a synergy that is also greatly facilitated by the fun-
damental homogeneity of culture, values and even of politics (Trigilia 1986). In 
the ensuing literature about industrial districts the focus is on cooperation among 
firms rather than on mere competition, on the network spread across the territory 
rather than on concentration and the increasing of scale, on the quality of labour 
rather than on its cost, on participation rather than on conflict. The belonging 
to a shared (not only industrial) history and to the same (not only productive) 
community becomes, at the same time, a competitive asset as well as a barrier 
to entry for outsiders. Similar characteristics are also found in other approaches 
to regional or local economics, such as the milieu innovateur (Aydalot 1986, 
Camagni 1991), the regional system of innovation (Braczyk et al. 1998), the 
flexible production system (Piore and Sabel 1984) and the new industrial space 
approach (Scott 1988). Complementarities among firms, spillovers and externali-
ties are all at the core of the picture. Technology and firm dimension go hand in 
hand with other advantages that may generate a ‘stratification’ because of the 
concentration of professional skills, presence of specialised suppliers and ease of 
accessing information. 
The merit of all these approaches is to reject the idea of the firm as an isolated 
entity with a maximising behaviour and, instead, consider it as ‘embedded’ in 
its territory. Firms are rooted in their territory through the industrial atmosphere 
created by relations and networks established with other firms, institutions and 
organisations placed in the same geographical area. Social aspects (Granovetter 
1985) as well as institutions (Hodgson 1999) become crucial for the explanation 
of firms’ behaviour. Social, institutional and territorial variables are the sources of 
external economies, explaining why firms tend to cluster together. Consequently, 
space is no longer considered in Euclidean terms, but in relational terms. The 
distance which matters is not only geographical but also, and fundamentally, eco-
nomic, social, cultural and institutional.
The partial equilibrium literature, in its less orthodox and more interesting lines 
of inquiry, has led to a wealth of descriptions of particular situations (Rabellotti 
1997, Bagella and Becchetti 2000, Guerrieri et al. 2001, Paniccia 2002, Becattini 
et al. 2003, Belussi et al. 2003, to cite just some of the many). But they have 
not produced a radical break with the mainstream and appear to suffer the same 
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shortcomings as the traditional neoclassical literature. Market-driven capital-
ist competition is once again seen as economically and socially beneficial. The 
main difference is that there is now a richer (and less individualistic) sociological 
definition of the actors, which are now the territories with their own idiosyncratic 
assets making that particular place economically unique. ‘Places’ compete among 
themselves, and the best-endowed ones will survive. Moreover, the role of state 
and local authorities is very often limited to the correction of market imperfec-
tions, by creating proper ‘factors’ (i.e. education, infrastructures, etc.) that are 
believed to sustain local growth.
Some deeper perplexities cannot be passed over. To what extent can local 
systems of production be ‘built’ if history did not root them in a long-term evolu-
tionary process? To what extent can they be considered a paradigm of industrial 
and territorial organisation able to become the ‘whole’, rather than just a partial 
element which can prosper only under particular conditions and macroeconomic 
policy? Is the cooperative and harmonic view of relationships between firms and 
other social agents not too idyllic? Is not technological change a phenomenon 
causing disequilibrium, whose causes are internal to a dynamic struggle between 
firms and, consequently, between social classes, a process that these approaches 
fail to appreciate enough? What is the role played by the monetary aspects of the 
capitalist process in all this?
The Marxian alternative
The Marxian economic geography works within a framework that puts ‘space’ 
at the core of a re-reading of the capitalist process as uneven development 
(see Swyngedouw 2000 for a survey). In contrast to the non-monetary general 
equilibrium of the neoclassical theorists, the basic model here is the cycle of money 
capital as described by Marx (1999 [1885]) in the second volume of Capital. In 
our interpretation, the capitalist process is illustrated by Marx mainly as a circular 
sequence sparked off by money capital, leading to the production of more money. 
Value and surplus value are nothing but the monetary expression of the abstract 
labour ‘congealed’ in commodities. The production of value and surplus value 
presupposes a social and physical ‘infrastructure’ that encompasses not only the 
legal system, the education system, the state administration, etc., but also a certain 
configuration of transport, environment and cities. The capitalist economy as a 
production of money by means of money can be reduced neither to a stationary 
economy, in which the surplus value is entirely consumed (‘simple reproduction’), 
nor to a ‘balanced’ proportional growth of the system, with the different branches 
growing at the same rate. In both cases, techniques are given, and there is no room 
for structural and discontinuous qualitative change.
Following Marx, accumulation must rather be seen as an uneven process 
whereby:
1 the extraction of surplus value comes from a lengthening of the social working 
day beyond the point at which the living labour of wage workers reproduces 
the value represented in the wage bill;
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2 technical progress is endogenously driven by the necessity to extract living 
labour from a potentially conflictual labour power;
3 capitalist competition is expressed not only by the ‘homogenising’ tendency 
among industries, resulting from the mobility of capital, which leads to an 
equalisation of the profit rate on the money capital advanced but also, and 
even more fundamentally, by the struggle among firms within industries for 
extra surplus value (and extra profits) that is the origin of an unending ‘dif-
ferentiation’ and ‘stratification’ of units of production of different quality.
It is evident that such a vision of the capitalist system is opposite in each sin-
gle element to the neoclassical theory. The capitalist process is characterised as 
an economic system in which access to money (as capital) is the privilege of 
one class (because money is not just a means of circulation that facilitates the 
exchange of goods). The relation of production is antagonistic, and the determina-
tion of wage is conflictual (because labour is not a factor of production among 
many, and the distribution of product is not cooperative). The introduction of 
innovations is internally forced by a permanent fight to obtain extra profit and 
ensure survival (competition is not just a simple adaptation to the already given 
optimum technique).
The Marxian starting point has significant consequences. The weaving of class 
struggle, technological dynamism and organisational change is prolonged into 
an analysis of structural instability and capitalist crises in which finance matters. 
The monetary and financial sector includes the banking system, which provides 
the initial finance to begin production, and the stock market, where firms can 
place securities among the savers. Thus, the accumulation of capital becomes 
independent from current surplus value or ex ante savings. Investments are less 
and less constrained from consumption. ‘Dynamic’ competition is empowered 
and makes the innovation–imitation sequence a process to which it is not possible 
to adapt gradually.
Capitalist development is thus a process inherently ‘out of equilibrium’, gen-
erating instability from within. This instability periodically breaks open in crises 
which at the same time express and solve the inner contradictions of the system. 
Investments and innovations become embodied in methods of production that use 
more elements of constant capital (means of production, raw materials, etc.) and 
expel living labour from production. This process may lead to a tendential fall in 
the rate of profit, if it is not countered by an adequate rise in the rate of surplus 
value. But a growing surplus value vis-à-vis the value of labour power exhibited 
in money by the wage bill leads to a fall in the relative wage, and thus a fall in 
workers’ consumption and in aggregate consumption. This is the root of the pos-
sibility of realisation crises, which comes into being thanks to the interaction with 
‘disproportionalities’ and the pathological explosion of ‘fictitious’ capital.
The alternation of capitalist development and crises depends upon the constant 
production and reproduction of capital and labour, within and outside the capitalist 
circulation of commodities. The financialisation of the capitalist economy can be 
interpreted as a means to overcome the overproduction of capital and commodi-
ties, either by lowering the turnover time of capital and increasing the potential 
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rate of profit or by sustaining investment (by guaranteeing that the actual rate of 
profit is as close as possible to the potential one). This solution is temporary, shifts 
the contradictions to the future and requires a rise in indebtedness that sooner or 
later will prove to be unsustainable.
There is also a spatial dimension of the capitalist accumulation and its crises. It 
is here that a dialogue with Harvey (1975, 1982), the key author in the ‘geopoliti-
cal’ rewriting of Marxian historical materialism, becomes crucial. The transfor-
mation of space is not only an opportunity to invest. If the Marxian inquiry about 
capital accumulation mainly stresses the realm of the ‘abstract’ and the ‘universal’, 
a consideration of geographical dimension opens to the realm of the ‘concrete’ 
and the ‘particular’ through which valorisation necessarily must pass. In fact, the 
exploitation of labour power, technical change and production of commodities is 
not even possible without a coherent territorial structure (Harvey 1982). Labour 
power can be controlled and organised, and the subsistence level of wages can be 
defined, only within a ‘region’. Moreover, within that ‘region’, infrastructures and 
fixed social capital are needed in order to enable and, when necessary, to limit the 
mobility of capital and labour power. The political dimension is crucial here, and 
it is also most visible in the control of money capital. 
Along these lines, the capitalist contradiction becomes the dialectic between 
the spatial, concrete rootedness of capital, on the one hand, and the unlimited 
expansion of abstract wealth, on the other. At a given point in time, labour, pro-
duction, innovation and finance can occur only within a particular and concrete 
space, and on the basis of infrastructures with a certain degree of ‘fixity’ resulting 
from political and state intervention. Through time, the continuous revolution-
ary changes resulting from capital accumulation put those spatial and regional 
configurations under pressure and create tensions. In this process, the creation 
of value shows its destructive face and its need to annihilate the concreteness of 
space to favour the growth of abstract wealth in a generic temporal dimension. 
With this approach, Harvey begins to include space within historical materialism 
in an essential and systematic way, going beyond the occasional remarks we find 
in Marx’s work.
A geographical dimension can also be found in the way in which capitalism 
answers the recurrent tendency to crises. ‘External’ markets, capital ‘exports’, 
‘regional’ alliances and competition among territories are all part of the history 
of the cyclical dynamics of capitalist accumulation. The state must intervene by 
enhancing the constitution, stability or dissolution of regional spaces. Nevertheless, 
it can never eliminate the tendency towards crises within the capitalist system of 
production.
The integration of Marx with Schumpeter and Keynes
Geographical dimension is not included in the foundational basic discourse of 
economic theory. Marx’s critique of political economy is just a partial exception, 
which is why Harvey’s connection between endogenous technological progress, 
uneven capitalist development, finance, instability and economic crisis is so 
important. In his interpretation, as in ours, the ‘differentiation’ of firms, industries 
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and territories is not accidental and marginal but essential and central. Harvey’s 
historical–geographical materialism also has the merit of being constructed 
outside a dogmatic approach to Marx. But we believe that Harvey follows the 
original formulation of Marx’s Capital too much, without resolving some of the 
difficulties that have become more and more evident in recent times. We outline 
some of these briefly:
1 The monetary circuit is constructed in a framework where money is a com-
modity and the bank is a financial intermediary that is able to grant credit in 
a flexible amount but which is however, in the end, limited by the availability 
of the ‘hard’ metallic base.
2 Value as a monetary representation of abstract labour is grounded only in 
the eventual validation on the commodity market of the objective labour 
‘embodied’ in the commodity.
3 The theory of crises in both of its versions (the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall and the realisation crisis) underestimates the possibility of a capitalist 
way out.
To overcome these limits, we believe that Marxian critical political economy 
has to engage in a dialogue with the two great ‘heretics’ of the Walrasian and 
Marshallian traditions: Schumpeter and Keynes. Both authors share with Marx a 
vision of the capitalist economy as a system of production of money by means of 
money. In the case of Schumpeter, this is complementary to a dynamic vision of 
capitalist competition that is very similar to Marx’s. In Keynes’s case, the break 
with orthodoxy originates from a rebuttal of Say’s law on which a continuity line 
with Marx may again be constructed. Indeed, both Schumpeter and Keynes break 
with the neoclassical tradition on points on which Marx distanced himself from 
Ricardo. What is novel in Schumpeter and Keynes is that they depicted the mon-
etary sequence of the capitalist process following the lead of an author who was, 
in his ‘real’ analysis, a thoroughgoing neoclassical adherent, Knut Wicksell. From 
him, Schumpeter and Keynes took the idea that the nature of money is neither that 
of a commodity nor that of a bilateral credit instrument, but that of a three-party 
debt–credit relationship as in bank money. Both believed that money is a ‘claim 
ticket’ to real resources that precedes the production of commodities, and not only 
a ‘receipt voucher’ following it. The banking system, creating money ex nihilo, is 
a kind of centralised social system of accounts whereby the differential distribu-
tion of the claim tickets affects the command and distribution of real resources. 
We want to stress two important aspects of this redefined cycle of money 
capital:
1 Since money circulates in a closed universe, a crisis resulting from lack of 
liquidity in the monetary system as a whole is impossible. Nevertheless, ‘indi-
vidual’ national banking systems can find themselves in deficit or in surplus 
at the inter-bank clearing house. In this event, there are three ways out: a true 
world bank that produces the final means of payment to be utilised among 
national central banks; bilateral credits granted by national central banks to 
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each other; or the alienation of commodities. The third solution recalls the 
role of money as a commodity at the world level, which Marx refers to in 
Capital.
2 Since money is the necessary means to have access to real resources, the 
entrepreneur who wants to innovate needs bank credit first of all. This is the 
point stressed by Schumpeter. Dynamic competition among firms is made 
possible by the non-proportional distribution of the new purchasing power 
created by banks. Banks have the task of selecting potential entrepreneurs. 
Asymmetric information occurs here. On the one hand, entrepreneurs benefit 
from a ‘micro’ information advantage, related to a more realistic knowledge 
of their investment projects. On the other hand, banks benefit from a ‘macro’ 
information advantage, related to their better knowledge of the economic 
system at the different levels (local, national and global).
In this framework, bank money is two things at the same time. First of all, 
it is a centralised symbol of the social nexus, which can be politically managed 
at macro level in order to avoid excessive instability. Second, it is the monetary 
complement to innovation, essential for dynamic competition at micro level. 
Within this analytical framework, relations among the macro subjects (the 
banking system, the firm sector, the working class) take priority over individual 
behaviour. Bank finance is essential to the firm sector as a whole, which has to 
advance the money wage bill to workers. In a closed economy without state inter-
vention this is actually the only buying that takes place outside the sector; and this 
is, at the same time, the only way that workers can obtain money to buy the means 
of subsistence. Privileged access to money implies that firms have power over the 
allocation of the labour force among the production of commodities that will go 
back to workers and the production of those surplus goods that are appropriated 
by firms and banks. Despite the fact that these authors never admit it explicitly, 
the capitalist class autonomously defines the necessary labour (congealed in the 
commodities sold to workers) and the surplus value (the labour congealed in the 
surplus commodities sold for money). The surplus value commodities may be 
realised for an amount of money higher than that anticipated by firms thanks 
to ‘external’ markets (as in Luxemburg 2003 [1913]) or ‘internal exports’ (as in 
Kalecki 1991 [1967]) (i.e. budget deficits financed by a new inflow of money) or 
bank financing of firms’ investment demand.
It is clear that Marx’s two ‘special commodities’ – money and labour power 
– are the object of a political management with not only a ‘state’ but also a ‘local’ 
and ‘regional’ dimension. The Schumpeterian–Marxian dynamic view of compe-
tition fares better than the static neoclassical one because it necessarily implies 
a stratified differentiation of firms within industries from the very beginning. 
This ‘pluralism’ of firms is also different from the one we find in the Marshallian 
districts because of the stress on the destructive side of the competition among 
capitalists. This variety, so to speak, of qualities of firms has its counterpart in the 
attention that can be given to variations in the qualifications of workers. Indeed, in 
the perspective we propose, abstract labour is the living labour of the wage work-
ers ante-validated by bank finance as labour tentatively producing surplus value. It 
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is ‘without quality’ not because it is necessarily poor in skills or qualifications, but 
rather because the quality it has is imposed on workers by capitalist technological 
and organisational innovations. There may be phases in the capitalist accumula-
tion in which valorisation requires partial reskilling and constrained autonomy of 
workers instead of the ‘degradation of work’. Politics and economic policy may 
affect these various factors of the reproduction of capital.
A ‘place’ is defined by a certain coherent set of financial and real characteris-
tics, but industrial dynamic competition can force a radical change in this spatial 
dimension. Also important is the balance between local, national, regional and 
global levels in banking. According to Minsky (1965: 101), the essential role of 
commercial banks in a local economy is the following:
they supply ‘loan’ capital to (a) those local enterprises which must grow at 
least at the same rate as the local economy, and (b) those export enterprises 
which are too small, and perhaps too new, to be able to generate nationally-
acceptable liabilities
Their essential role is thus not to intermediate local savings or to be instrumen-
tal for the import of capital, but to be a source of bank loans for those firms that are 
otherwise financially constrained. It becomes evident that a ‘local’ or ‘regional’ 
banking system, by contrast with a closed ‘national’ or ‘world’ one, can have its 
potential credit constrained by the availability of reserves. 
Endogenous technical change, the essential role of bank money and intra-capi-
talist conflicts at all levels prevent a vision of globalisation as a tendency towards 
homogenisation.
Space and the end of Fordism
The crisis of the so-called Golden Age capitalism broke out in the middle of the 
1970s, although the causes of the exhaustion of the Fordist–Keynesian model are 
probably a decade older. Since the end of Bretton Woods, with the introduction of 
flexible exchange rates and the oil crisis contributing to stagflation, a long series of 
destabilising events have been put in motion, marking the transition to a different 
kind of capitalism. The key turning points at the end of the 1970s and which 
defined the 1980s were the monetarist turn in economic policy by Volcker, the 
neoliberal governments of Thatcher and Reagan, the higher mobility of financial 
capital, the upward jump in nominal and real interest rates, the war against the 
welfare state and its transformation in workfare, the spread of market deregulation 
and the increasingly precarious nature of the labour market and labour process. 
This is a well-known story and we do not intend to tell it again in these pages.
According to some interpreters, at the beginning of the 1990s, a ‘new capi-
talism’ begins to make its appearance (Ohmae 1995, Castells 1996). It is anti-
interventionist as far as economic policy is concerned. It is post-Fordist in the 
organisation of labour. It is global not only in relation to its financial aspects but 
also in production and markets. Manual labour is confined to the new industrial-
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ised countries, where labour costs are lower; in contrast, in the old industrialised 
countries, labour becomes more ‘cognitive’. The advanced capitalist countries are 
said to live in a ‘learning economy’ (Lundvall and Johnson 1994). Higher quality 
at lower cost is required everywhere.
The Marxian prophecy about the globalisation of capitalism seems to have 
come true. Indeed, until the 1980s, the idea that spontaneous capitalist develop-
ment would have resulted in the diffusion of prosperity everywhere appeared to 
be devoid of any sense of reality. According to the neoclassical theory, although 
it is true that growth is at first confined to particular areas, decreasing returns and 
external economies guarantee the extension of advantages to backward countries, 
and then result in territorial and geographical balance through the automatic 
working of the free market. Against all this, the Marxist theory of imperialism 
seemed more realistic. The periphery is seen as a land to be conquered in order 
to open new markets or guarantee new sources of raw materials, or as a place to 
invest capital in order to avoid the low profitability of the centre. The relationship 
between centre and periphery is in fact ruled by an ‘unequal exchange’ (Emmanuel 
1972). These critical approaches also remained vital during the Golden Age. In 
that period, the Marxian collapse theory was proved wrong, but economic growth 
was occurring almost exclusively in the centre. The real challenge to this line 
of inquiry came later. The point was not that the distinction between developed 
and developing areas was going to disappear. The novel fact was that – certainly, 
because of active economic policies contrary to those suggested by neoliberal-
ism – some peripheral countries managed to escape the poverty trap and became 
protagonists of the world economy. Here, a typical example is East Asia from 
the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s. Moreover, demand for commodities and capi-
tal movements were more and more concentrated in the centre of capitalism, 
something that falsifies Luxemburg’s (2003 [1913]) and Lenin’s (1948 [1916]) 
contrasting views on imperialism.
The end of Fordism also meant the crisis of a kind of ‘third way’ between 
the laissez-faire myth of the spontaneous diffusion of capitalist development and 
the Marxist theory of imperialism. We refer to authors such as Myrdal (1957), 
Nurkse (1953), Prebisch (1950) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1976). According 
to these authors, state economic direct action for infrastructures and investments 
is necessary in order to promote a balanced development. ‘Planning’ in public 
expenditures and/or incentives should be designed to guarantee, through the cor-
rect calibration of demand and supply interventions, a proportionate expansion of 
the structure of the economy, in order to make national growth independent from 
the international demand trend. Yet, what happened during the Golden Age was 
very different. After the end of the Second World War, public expenditure was 
not implemented according to some general interest, but instead followed a path 
partly imposed by some lobby groups (principally, the military and oil lobby). 
Moreover, state intervention went along with, but did not replace, the rapid growth 
of international trade, which was the prime mover of capitalist expansion. The 
primacy of foreign demand increasingly created imbalances rather than balanced 
development, and paved the way towards the globalisation that occurred at the 
end of the twentieth century.
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Labour in curent globalisation
The literature on globalisation very often stresses its antinomies. The relationship 
with space is not an exception. It is common to read about globalisation as a 
process of diffusion of labour on a planetary scale. At the same time, the 
increasing polarisation in favour of more developed areas is well known. Financial 
globalisation has produced a huge concentration of money capital, so the flexibility 
made possible by the new technology in transport and communications does not 
cancel out but, instead, deepens the territorial anchorage of the big ‘growth poles’. 
What is new is that the connection within networks of distant poles reinforces 
technological integration and communication among a few megalopolises, rather 
than between them and their hinterland. The dichotomy between centre and 
periphery, and the consequent increasing inequality, is no longer just between the 
north and south of the world, or between the advanced countries and many Third 
World countries. Now the periphery is within the centre, and the centre is partly 
within the periphery. The resulting urban and territorial structures have sometimes 
been depicted by the happy image of an ‘archipelago’ (Veltz 1996).
Labour is the more ticklish paradox among the many regarding global economy. 
On the one hand, there is no doubt that workers in the last few decades have lost 
their bargaining and conflictual power. On the other hand, slow growth, market 
uncertainty, replacement demand for consumer goods and new needs make the 
‘quality’ of products – and therefore also the ‘quality’ of labour – a competitive 
asset.
Labour under pressure: the macro changes
The renewed importance of territory and the attention towards the district model 
also come from this peculiar context. With such an astonishing reduction in 
transport costs, quality and relational competences come to assume a strategic 
importance. There is, indeed, a great deal of ideology in all this, but there is also 
some truth. Within the labour process, partial requalification and some autonomy 
of labour are real requirements of the new capitalism. How to account for all this? 
We believe that the theoretical framework, developed in the previous sections, can 
cast some light on the debate.
Capitalist accumulation systematically causes a variety of productive condi-
tions, that is a different ‘quality’ of the units of production. The degree of higher 
or lower ‘quality’ of labour depends upon a set of technical conditions together 
with social and market conditions. What happened between the mid-1960s and 
the mid-1970s was that the potential ‘resistance’ by wage labour was effective in 
controlling the extraction of living labour. All this led to a series of struggles on 
‘how’ to produce (conflicts about the organisation of labour, health conditions in 
the workplace, etc.) and ‘what’ to produce (demand for a different composition 
of production, environmental issues, etc.). The crisis that followed the conflict 
in the social relationships of production, as well as the inter-imperialist conflicts 
between capitalist areas, and the conflict between manufacturing countries and 
raw materials-producing countries, determined a slowing down of real invest-
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ments. The following financialisation of the capitalist economy further depressed 
aggregate demand, constrained public expenditures and made economies more 
unstable. What was at work was a tendency to stagnation that made the markets 
more competitive. Competition becomes ever more destructive because the global 
players in manufacturing and in service sectors carry out an aggressive strategy of 
investments, aiming to crowd out other producers. It is precisely when demand is 
low and unstable that productive capacity grows and thus the unused productive 
capacity increases further.
This tendency, however, has been opposed by a counter-tendency centred on 
the USA. Whereas Asia and Europe are mostly net export areas, the USA has 
consistently, for many decades, maintained a negative current account deficit in 
the balance of payments. The US domestic currency is still the pseudo-world 
money, and its financial centre is still the heart of global financial intermediation. 
It is mainly this country that has created effective demand for the whole world 
through an autonomous economic policy. Thus, the most visible paradox occurs: 
a unipolar world around a ‘centre’ experiencing a long crisis in its hegemony, and 
its nation-state gaining an almost absolute power while other nation-states are 
increasingly constrained by ‘globalisation’. The leading position in the hierarchi-
cal order in the global economy has been kept through the active management of 
the privileged position in world monetary and financial markets. Global balance 
is then held together by a forced ‘cooperation’ around the USA, always at the risk 
of dissolving in the anarchy of inter-imperialistic conflict.
The same ‘irrational exuberance’ of the New Economy in the second half of 
the 1980s has been built around a kind of paradoxical financial Keynesianism. 
The boom of Wall Street was possible thanks to the expectation that the Federal 
Reserve would always act in such a way as to support it. The rise in financial 
wealth prompted an increase in consumption financed by household debt. The 
‘miracle’ years of the New Economy are indebted more to this than to any tech-
nological factor – rather, it was the other way round, the rise in demand for some 
years permitted the exploitation of new possibilities, and the mechanism of expec-
tation fuelled the expansion. The crisis did not occur because of exogenous events 
(i.e. September 11) or the constraint of a too-high deficit in the current account of 
the balance of payments. The terrorist attacks came when the crisis had already 
begun, and the USA has always escaped the rules it imposed on other countries, 
through the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The last world slump was mainly 
due to the internal unsustainability of both the US growth process as the pillar of 
globalisation and the New Economy. The crisis has been controlled and partly 
reversed thanks to the return of state expenditure in deficit, last but not least in 
the form of ‘military Keynesianism’, and to the consumer expenditure financed 
by banks. 
Within this international setting – a reduced and unstable world growth rate, a 
composition of demand increasingly dependent upon an unequal distribution of 
income and an increasingly heightened financial instability – the partial reskill-
ing of labour, the reduction of direct control, the flattening of hierarchical levels 
and the increased autonomy granted to workers went hand in hand with market 
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uncertainty and with more flexibility in the labour market. The control of workers 
was guaranteed by the ‘macro’ mechanisms.
Labour under pressure: the micro changes
The ‘casualisation’ and ‘precarisation’ of labour within the labour process led 
to the same results exposed in the previous section. The radical uncertainty that 
became a structural characteristic of the system after the crisis of the Golden Age 
forced a radical change in firms’ corporate governance and in the management of 
units of production and, consequently, in the forms of control of the workforce. 
There is a shift from procedures and norms which are defined ‘a priori’ in a stable 
organisational and technological context – production as a plan to be implemented 
– to a performance which is checked ‘a posteriori’. Different fragments of the 
production cycle are considered as independent firms. In the 1980s, the main 
form taken by this process was outsourcing as externalisation; in the 1990s, the 
qualitative novelty was in-house outsourcing.
Thus, the market logic extends itself within the organisation of production. 
Even within wage labour, job performance becomes similar to formally independ-
ent labour, and formally independent labour is subjected to the same pressures as 
wage labour. Capital control over labour is now the control of workers over them-
selves. The high returns asked by financial capital constrain firms to reorganise 
their labour processes along this path. 
We thus have two sequences leading to a heightening of control over labour: 
the increasing uncertainty and instability of the ‘macro’ markets and the inter-
nal destructuring of firms. Both present themselves as the automatic result of an 
increased power of market over production, when in fact the latter is a means 
to subject workers to the needs of the valorisation of capital within the labour 
process. 
The real subsumption of labour to finance
Together with the two previous sequences, there is a third one, what may be dubbed 
the real subsumption of labour to finance. A new form of capitalism is taking shape, 
the ‘pension fund capitalism’, whereby workers’ savings are channelled towards 
financial markets (Blackburn 2002). This is something already established in the 
USA, while it is still only a tendency in Europe and in most of the rest of the 
world. The premise is that a reduction in the real wage, together with an increased 
uncertainty of labour, typical of contemporary capitalism, can be compensated, in 
the present and in the future, by the financial returns of a pension fund. Moreover, 
in this way, developed countries, with an ageing population, can contribute to 
an acceleration in the growth of developing countries, with a relatively younger 
population. It is not our aim to criticise this suggestion here, which both the right 
and the ‘third way’ left have assumed during the 1990s. What is relevant here is 
that, once this institutional innovation is implemented, workers hold interests in 
exploiting other workers, and profit-making cannot but be dominated by short-term 
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financial expectations. The working class is fragmented in separate households, 
which feel unified only as part of capital. 
From this point of view, the processes of partial reskilling of labour and diffu-
sion of networks and the vitality of districts cannot conceal increasing universal 
instability and uncertainty on the one hand and the disintegration of the working 
class on the other hand. It is typical of some literature about post-Fordism not 
to recognise the mutual links between the ‘positive’ and the ‘obscure’ sides of 
current globalisation. This literature is blind in the face of the unacceptability of 
the model, and wants to isolate some ‘acceptable’ parts which are, in any case, 
inseparable from the whole.
The remaking of the working class
The dynamics presented here contribute to explain both the relevance of space 
in globalisation and the irrelevance of workers in space. This may be the real 
epochal shift, the defining feature of a new globalisation. In a sense, we experience 
the synchronic presence of realities which belong to different past moments of 
capitalism. The financial globalisation of the end of the twentieth century determines 
a return to the cyclical instability of the nineteenth century. The resulting macro 
and micro changes in capital accumulation lead, in the long term, not to the end 
of labour or to the end of wage labour, but to a fragmentation and precariousness 
of any kind of labour which, from this point of view, takes capitalism back to the 
end of the eighteenth century. That was the time of the ‘making of the English 
working class’, to borrow the expression from E. P. Thompson (1963). Now is the 
time of the ‘remaking’ of the working class worldwide.
The fact that this tendency is powerful does not mean that it can be neither chal-
lenged nor defeated. The US hegemony is doomed to be crushed, the supremacy 
of finance leads to a succession of crises, labour flexibility ends up by undermin-
ing the same quality and productive power of labour. At the same time, this does 
not mean that social and economic contradictions will automatically lead to a 
collapse of capitalism in its new form. It is possible that the new mode of flexible 
accumulation and disintegrated labour may find some new form of regulation, 
making it sustainable in spite of its intrinsic instability. The fact that this world 
is not a necessary fate depends upon the subjective intervention of human beings 
once more. What is true is that this economic and social model cannot be made 
‘just’ only with redistributive interventions. A radical reform must deal with both 
the ‘macro’ aspect of economic policy as well as the ‘micro’ aspect of the nature 
of labour.
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Economic geographers have devoted much effort in recent years to contesting the 
idea that under globalization a ubiquitous neoliberal capitalism entails the death 
of distance and the end of geography (Cairncross 1997). They have argued that 
territory and scale still matter, albeit in novel ways, challenging the belief that 
globalization is overriding the distinctive characteristics of places. A dominant 
metaphor here is that of “glocalization,” whereby transnational production systems 
require specific local place-based features (such as low wages), and seek to exploit 
differences between places in order to reduce the regulatory influence of territorial 
state institutions on capital mobility. Places with the right characteristics, such 
as the Third Italy, are seen as capable of “holding down the global” by creating 
attractive local conditions that are functional for the profitability of local and 
multilocational firms (Amin and Thrift 1994, 1995).
Others have critiqued the very terms of globalization, arguing that to equate 
globalization with the currently widespread neoliberal capitalist variant is to join 
its proponents in masking alternative, anti-capitalist forms of globalization – such 
as envisioned when Marx and Engels penned the immortal “workers of the world, 
unite!” (Marx and Engels 1952). In this view, the realization that other worlds are 
possible is necessary to deconstruct the argument that neoliberal globalization is 
inevitable. Some argue for the importance of non-capitalist modes of economic 
activity, occupying neglected spaces within those of capitalism (Gibson-Graham 
1996), whereas others highlight the globalization of anti-globalization move-
ments, such as the World Social Forum (Fisher and Ponniah 2003).
Yet, although critical of proponents of contemporary globalization, economic 
geographers tend to share one belief with their adversaries. They accept that a 
shrinking world implies that, if geography still matters, it is primarily because of 
place. David Harvey (1982), for example, notes the imperative under capitalism 
to speed up the circulation of commodities and capital. Globalization has acceler-
ated time–space compression, making relative location within the global economy 
less vital to capital accumulation, and place characteristics more important. The 
result is a politics of place whereby cities and regions compete intensively to offer 
attractive local conditions to geographically mobile capital, making place-based 
inter-class alliances more important relative to class struggle (Harvey 1989a,b). 
46 Sheppard
He has even argued that uneven development can now be conceptualized in 
terms of scale and place-based differentiation, rather than space- and place-based 
differentiation (Harvey 2000). In short, as Ron Martin (1999: 15–16) has writ-
ten: “Globalisation may well have eliminated space . . ., but it has by no means 
undermined the significance of location, of place.” Places are usually represented 
as territorial spaces, and debates about place and globalization have focused on 
whether and how territories still matter in a space of flows (Castells 1996).
In this chapter, elaborating on previous arguments, I contest the assumption 
that globalization has marginalized the significance of relative location (Sheppard 
2002). I will suggest, instead, that positionality within the capitalist space econ-
omy matters – both theoretically and practically. The following section develops 
the idea of positionality, conceptualizing how both social and geographic location 
shape the conditions of possibility faced by economic agents.1 I then analyze why 
close attention to positionality matters theoretically, calling into question some 
common presumptions in economic geography inherited from aspatial economic 
theory – such as those of the new geographical economics (Cairncross 1997, 
Fujita et al. 1999, Ottaviano and Thisse 2004). The third section suggests why 
positionality still matters in today’s seemingly small and fast world, and sketches 
its shifting geography. The fourth section seeks to exemplify the persistence and 
significance of positionality through the example of international trade, and the 
conclusion draws out some implications for thinking about and responding to 
globalization.
Positionality and globalization
Geographers use a variety of terms to describe how places occupy different 
locations, the commonest of which are distance, relative location, accessibility, 
and situation. None of these is adequate for my purposes. Distance and relative 
location too often connote a Euclidean geometry, in which the connectedness of 
two places is approximated by a continuous mathematical transformation of their 
Cartesian coordinates. Accessibility and situation connote more complex ways 
of measuring connectivity or closeness, but tend to be envisioned as fairly static 
spatial attributes of a place, with less attention to time (but see Janelle and Hodge 
2000). I propose the term “positionality” to describe how different economic 
agents are positioned with respect to one another in space–time.
In feminist theory, positionality describes the situated positions from which 
subjects come to know the world. The positionality of subjects is emphasized both 
to challenge the proposition that there is objective knowledge and to sensitize 
investigators to how analysis is shaped by their “social situatedness . . . in terms 
of gender, race, class, sexuality and other axes of social difference” (Nagar and 
Geiger 2006, forthcoming). Positionality is a relational construct: the conditions 
of possibility for an agent depend on its position with respect to others – as in 
network theory. Positionality also involves power relations, in the sense both 
that some positions tend to be more influential than others and that emphasizing 
the situated nature of knowledge challenges the power of all claims to objectiv-
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ity. Third, positionality is dynamic; it is re-enacted in ways that simultaneously 
reproduce and challenge pre-existing configurations, a process that Judith Butler 
has termed “citation.” Positionality is simultaneously durable, as re-enactments 
reproduce previous configurations, while also being vulnerable to unexpected 
change, because each repetition is imperfect (Rose 1997, Valentine 2002).
Geographic space has been missing from this area of feminist theory, an over-
sight that I seek to redress here by extending positionality to include how agents 
are situated in space–time. Space cannot be examined independently of the social 
aspects of positionality emphasized by feminists. It is now broadly accepted that 
space and time are social constructs, shaped by, but also influencing, social proc-
esses. This is best expressed through a dialectical conception of space–time (Soja 
1980, Harvey 1996, Massey 1999a). As with any dialectical process, societies con-
struct concrete places and spaces whose persistence makes them seem immutable 
or natural. The materiality of these places and spaces in turn has real and concrete 
influence over trajectories of economic change. Applying this conceptualization 
to positionality in space–time, it can be argued that the positionality of a place 
influences future possibilities there; core locations tend to be advantaged relative 
to peripheral ones in a space economy. At the same time, however, positionality 
can be reshaped through such spatial economic dynamics. While differences in 
positionality (e.g., cores and peripheries) are quite persistent, historical economic 
geography is littered with examples of long-standing patterns of uneven develop-
ment, followed by key moments when those positional hierarchies are disrupted 
as peripheral regions find a way to join the core, or vice versa. These occasional 
but dramatic shifts in positionality exemplify the contradictions that characterize 
a dialectical analysis of space–time. As in feminist theory, the persistence of pre-
existing sociospatial inequalities in position and power is never immutable. Our 
understanding of the exact conditions under which this reshaping of positionality 
occurs is imperfect, but is key to better explanations of the out-of-equilibrium 
dynamics of uneven development.
Positionality cannot be separated from more territorial aspects of spatiality, 
such as place and scale. Place, as Massey (1991) argues, cannot be adequately 
understood without considering the complex positionalities that link people and 
the places they reside in with one another. The heterogeneity of any place reflects 
the different positionalities of its residents (Massey 1991). The construction of 
scale also inevitably involves shifts in positionality. For example, processes of 
globalization that more closely connect geographically distant places both reduce 
differences in their positionality and enhance the importance of more aggregate 
scales. Yet our understanding of the spatiality of globalization will be impoverished 
if our concern for place and scale leads us to neglect positionality. Positionality 
calls attention to how connections between places play a role in the emergence 
of geographical inequalities within the global economy. Positionality also implies 
that the conditions of possibility for a place to prosper depend not only on local 
initiative, as suggested in the industrial districts literature and structural adjust-
ment policy, but just as much on its interdependencies with and dependence on 
other places. 
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Positionality and economic theory2
Detailed attention to positionality has led economic geographers to question 
some standard principles of non-spatial economic theory that have been taken as 
axiomatic by neoclassical and Marxian economic geographers and geographical 
economists.3 I restrict my analysis here to mathematical economic theories, 
using the accepted basis of critique in this theoretical language of mathematical 
consistency (Longino 2002). I draw from the branch of economic geography that 
I have elsewhere called regional political economy: a research program extending 
mathematical analysis in the spirit of Marx, Kalecki, and Sraffa (Morishima 1973, 
Roemer 1981) to incorporate the space economy (Scott 1980, Marelli 1983, Clark 
et al. 1986, Dunford 1988, Liossatos 1988, Sheppard and Barnes 1990, Webber 
and Rigby 1999). Regional political economy entails different assumptions about 
space, time, economic structure, and social agency than those popularized in 
neoclassical economic geography (Table 2.1), differences that turn out to have 
substantial implications (Sheppard 2000a).
With respect to spatiality, in regional political economy not only is space 
treated as heterogeneous, thereby making positionality explicit, but, crucially, 
positionality is taken to be endogenous to the evolving space economy: accessi-
bility is produced as a commodity in each region (Sheppard 1990). Geographical 
economists (Ottaviano and Thisse 2004: 34) also note that “one major step on the 
research agenda is the study of a multiregional system whose aim is to understand 
why some regions are more successful than others . . . we need to account for the 
actual geographies of these regions.”4
With respect to time, it is necessary to account for the time lag between when 
capital is advanced for production and when revenues are realized, because profit-
ability depends not only on the difference between revenues and costs but also on 
how long capital has been in circulation. Furthermore, regional political economy 
emphasizes disequilibrium dynamics rather than spatial equilibria, since equi-
Table 2.1 Contrasting assumptions of neoclassical and political economic geography
Assumptions
Neoclassical economic 
geography Regional political economy




Exogenous transportation costs Costs of communication are 
endogenous
Time Instantaneous production Production takes time
Economic equilibrium Disequilibrium dynamics




Agency Fully informed individual 
rational choice
Individual actions based on 
imperfect information
Class interests guide collective 
action
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libria are typically destabilized by conflicts of interest between different groups 
of economic actors over the distribution of the economic surplus. Intersectoral 
interdependencies, detailing the input–output relations describing the flows of 
commodities between sectors and firms, describe the asymmetric mutual depend-
ence of firms and sectors on one another. Attention to these has the important con-
sequence that capital cannot be reduced to a homogeneous and exogenously given 
production factor, but is a heterogeneous bundle of interdependently produced 
capital goods. The destabilizing implications of this for aggregate neoclassical 
production functions and macroeconomic theory have been rehearsed at length 
elsewhere (Harcourt 1972).
With respect to agency, different kinds of economic actors occupy different 
positionalities within capitalism, particularly class positions, defined by the fac-
tors of production they own, their position in the hierarchy of economic deci-
sion-making, and their relative wealth. Positionality differentially conditions the 
possibilities available to social agents.5 Shared economic interests within classes 
and conflicts between them create a potential for collective attempts to increase 
class share of the economic surplus. Thus, social structures condition action, 
making methodological individualism an inadequate conceptualization of human 
behavior.6 Yet agents sharing the same general class position also differ in their 
positionality in other ways, in terms of geographic location, economic sector, 
resources, preferences, technologies, and so forth, implying a potential for intra-
class conflicts that can undermine class-based alliances. Finally, agents possess 
only limited information about the current and future economic landscape.
To explore the implications of these more complex and realistic starting points, 
I briefly examine two cases.
Microeconomic spatial price competition
Consider the consequences of including positionality of the most basic sort; 
differences in the relative location of firms.7 In the location theory pioneered 
by Lösch and Christaller and reinvigorated by Krugman, all firms competing 
in a spatially extensive market are generally assumed to be identical not only 
in their cost structure, but also in their relative location – they occupy identical 
positions at opposite ends of a line, or are equally spaced across an unbounded 
uniform plain. The challenge is then to explain agglomeration. Ottaviano and 
Thisse (2004) describe this as the principal goal of geographical economics: to 
account for the emergence of “second nature” (the geographical consequences of 
human action), assuming that “first nature” (exogenous geographical conditions) 
is undifferentiated. “Then, it asks what are the forces that can allow a small 
(possibly temporary) initial shock . . . to generate a large permanent imbalance 
in the distributions of economic activities” (ibid.: 2564, emphasis in original). In 
the absence of differences in positionality, agglomeration is explained by home 
market effects (place-based characteristics such as agglomeration economies 
or a larger local demand) or emergent core–periphery structures (accumulation 
of human capital in a place). Firms maximize total profits, and even after the 
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emergence of agglomerations no-one makes excess profits; free entry means that 
profits net of fixed costs are zero (Fujita et al. 1999).
Introduction of exogenous differences in positionality can challenge such 
standard results in microeconomic theories of monopolistic spatial competition 
(Table 2.2). Consider identical firms competing for spatially distributed consum-
ers with inelastic demand functions. Firms occupy fixed locations in a heterogene-
ous space, positioned differently with respect to consumers (i.e., differences in 
locational advantage exist). Consumers are incompletely informed, possessing 
limited choice sets, and stochastically choose to patronize a particular location 
based on its price relative to those of other locations in their choice set (Sheppard 
et al. 1992). In this case, profits, prices, and output differ between firms in spatial 
price equilibrium, as a consequence of differences in their positionality. Except 
for the geographically marginal producer, firms make excess profits reflecting 
their locational advantage.
Second, and in contradistinction to most mainstream economic theory (Dixit 
and Stiglitz 1977, Nell 1992, Krugman 1996), the Marxian goal of maximizing 
the rate of profit dominates the neoclassical microeconomic goal of maximiz-
ing total profits (Plummer et al. 1998, Sheppard et al. 1998). In heterogeneous 
space this results in distinctive equilibrium pricing, profit, and demand patterns 
(Haining et al. 1996). Third, competitive equilibria are only locally quasi-stable, 
with numerical simulations suggesting that small price deviations from equilib-
rium induce price wars (Plummer 1999). Instability is enhanced by more complex 
market structures, such as oligopolists seeking to serve spatially separated and 
differentiated markets (Plummer 1996a,b).8
Regional accumulation dynamics
When assumptions about distance, vertical integration, and agency are also 
relaxed further theoretical propositions are challenged (Sheppard and Barnes 
1990). Consider the case of a spatially extensive multiregional economy in 
which commodity production is undertaken in interrelated economic sectors 
located in functional economic regions (metropolitan regions). Suppose we 
know the geography of production, with sectors employing different production 
technologies and real wage scales in different regions (Rigby and Essletzbichler 
1997). Economic agents include capitalists, workers, and landlords, each with 
competing claims on the monetary surplus produced by the economy. Capitalists 
seek to increase rates of profit on capital advanced, workers to increase real 
wages, and landlords to increase rents per acre. Each class is also differentiated. 
Table 2.2 Positionality and spatial price competition
Neoclassical monopolistic competition Variations in positionality
No net profits; identical prices and outputs Profits, prices, and outputs vary with 
positionality
Firms should maximize total profits Firms should maximize the rate of profit
Stable Nash equilibria exist Quasi-stable “knife-edge” equilibrium
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For example, different firms in the same sector and region use different production 
technologies and mixes of differentially skilled workers.
Transportation produces a special commodity, accessibility, which is consumed 
whenever another commodity or person moves across space. It is produced in every 
region not as a direct input to production, but as an intermediate good necessary to 
bring products to market. Production technologies dictate the quantities of other 
goods required as inputs, but the amount of transportation needed will depend on 
the positionality of a firm with respect to suppliers. The price of transportation 
(freight rate), endogenously determined like the prices of other commodities (and 
unlike the iceberg model used in economics), shapes positionality and influences 
decisions about where to purchase inputs. Technological change in the commu-
nications sector is key to reducing the turnover time of capital and increasing the 
rate of capital accumulation, through a historical attempt to annihilate space by 
time that literally produces positionality as a by-product of the spatial dynamics 
of commodity production.
A self-reproducing dynamic equilibrium can be described for any such space 
economy, i.e., a distribution of relative production levels across regions, deter-
mined by wage levels, technologies, and transport costs, which entails an equal 
average profit and growth rate in all regions and sectors. Yet the existence of such 
equilibria is of little interest, since they are generally unstable. It is always in the 
interests of capitalists, workers, or landlords to destabilize them in their struggle 
for a greater share of the surplus. Thus, a major issue of contention is whether 
equilibrium conditions are of any relevance for understanding out-of-equilib-
rium dynamics. Webber and Rigby (1999) argue that equilibrium conditions are 
smuggled into many of the basic price and output equations used in economic 
geography. They reject price-based calculations in favor of labor values because 
the latter do not presume equilibrium.
Furthermore, standard neoclassical conclusions about regional specialization, 
trade, and growth cannot be assumed to hold (Sheppard and Barnes 1986) (Table 
2.3). Individual entrepreneurs’ rate-of-profit-maximizing choices of production 
technologies or specialization strategies may eventually reduce average rates of 
profit (a form of unintended consequences that, as Harvey (1982) notes, is equiva-
lent to Marx’s idea of the falling rate of profit). The free movement of capital and 
labor in response to wage and profit differentials may enhance, rather than reduce, 
uneven development. Finally, allocation of land through the land market need not 
maximize the efficiency of land use: the “highest” use need not be “best”, because 
land rent need not equal the marginal productivity of land.
There are thus complex potential conflicts of economic interest between and 
within classes, conditioned by their positionality in social and geographic space. 
This is reinforced by the endogenous spatiality of the economy, making for such 
complexity that even fully informed rational agents cannot calculate the indirect 
consequences of their actions. Strategies that maximize landlords’ rents or work-
ers’ real wages need not maximize capitalists’ profits, and there is no distribu-
tion of income (between wages, profits, and wages) that is efficient in a Nash 
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to their advantage (Clark et al. 1986), labor organizes to enhance its share of the 
surplus (Herod 2001), and state regulation is continually necessary to negotiate 
these conflicts (Aglietta 1979). Strategies by one fraction of capitalists to enhance 
their mean profit rate may also reduce the mean profit rates of other fractions, 
locally or non-locally.
Unstable equilibria and unintended consequences, undermining rational 
expectations, mean that the space economy becomes an arena of constantly shift-
ing competitive advantage, reflecting the economic and political strategies of dif-
ferently situated actors. Firms’ profits, a result of previous production decisions, 
current demand in different spatial markets, and competitive advantage in those 
markets, may be invested in higher output, technical change, relocation, or finance 
markets (from which money may also be borrowed). Finance markets smooth 
out the redistribution of funds, but interest rates must vary between regions of 
different sizes in order to maintain dynamic equilibrium (Webber 1987). Regional 
technological change depends on processes of innovation, imitation, and the entry 
and exit of firms using different technologies (Webber et al. 1992, Webber and 
Rigby 1996). Pricing strategies will depend on supply and demand (competitive 
advantage), sunk costs (Clark and Wrigley 1995), and planned technological and 
growth strategies (“strong competition”; Storper and Walker 1989). The resulting 
fluctuations in wage and unemployment rates affect labor costs and migration 
(Goodwin 1987, Plummer 1999).
The above arguments indicate a variety of ways in which consideration of 
positionality, along with other relaxations of the neoclassical framework, makes 
it possible for regional political economy to call many of the standard results of 
neoclassical economic geography into question. Yet Marxian political economy 
is also not immune to critique, once positionality is taken seriously (Sheppard 
and Barnes 1990, Sheppard 2004). Labor values cannot be taken as foundational 
for Marxian theory, because they are dialectically related to exchange values. 
Geographic differences in positionality imply that labor values generally vary 
across space (Sheppard and Barnes 1990, Webber 1996), profoundly complicat-
ing the plausibility that common class interests, let alone identity, can transcend 
spatial difference. As Harvey (1982) has also argued, workers in competitively 
advantaged regions may be motivated to increase their real wages by allying 
with local capitalists, as long as wages are low enough elsewhere to guarantee 
that local production remains profitable (Hudson and Sadler 1986). Fordism in 
Western Europe and North America benefited from such arrangements, in which 
unionized workers allied with corporate capital and the state to promote national 
development, until the increasing north–south wage gap exceeded the declining 
communications costs of global commodity chains, making it profitable to relo-
cate production to Mexico, Thailand, and now India, China, and Vietnam.
Positionality and contemporary globalization
Notwithstanding the hype of globalization, the broad geographical contours 
of positionality within the global economy show a remarkably persistent path 
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dependence. Enormous effort has been put into lowering communication costs, to 
deliver commodities to spatially separated markets and to recoup investments as 
quickly as possible, and into harmonizing state regulation and opening national 
markets worldwide. The last two decades of globalization can indeed be described 
as a period of accelerated, broader-ranging, and more intense and influential global 
interdependence (Held et al. 1999). The world is smaller, and faster, in absolute 
terms. It does not follow, however, that space is being annihilated by time. Whether 
one examines the global mobility of commodities, people, capital, or foreign aid, 
the geographical structure of international interdependencies still carries a strong 
post-colonial shadow (Figure 2.1). Even cyberspace, poster child for the death 
of distance thesis, shows a geography that still bears strong resemblance to the 
global geography of communications in the 1950s (Figure 2.2) (Graham 1998).
The general acceleration of space-transcending technologies and flows has 
always been unevenly applied geographically, enhancing the positionality of 
some places relative to others. The steamship, airplane, and telegraph enhanced 
transoceanic mobility, but the first to be transformed were the routes along which 
large shares of commodities and information already flowed – linking major mar-
kets. For example, the early efforts at intercontinental telegraphy were aimed at 
directly linking the New York and London stock markets very soon after the first 
successful transatlantic cable was laid in 1851. By 1890, British influence had 
placed London at the center of global telegraph and wireless networks, offering 
a decisive economic and geopolitical advantage shaping the outcome of World 
War I (Hugill 1999, Mattelart 2000). Today, direct telecommunication and air 
flights within the global south can still be difficult: New York and London remain 
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positioned very close to one another in communications space, by comparison 
with Lagos and Cape Town. In the space of airline flight times, Los Angeles is 
much closer to Tokyo than is Guam (Figure 2.3). America’s strategic position 
at the center of the production and organization of global telecommunications 
systems remains key to its military influence.
The altered experiences of and expectations about time associated with tele-
communications also shape positionality. As time moves faster, small differences 
in timing matter more. The currency speculation that broke Barings Bank was 
based on small temporal differences in futures prices in Osaka and Singapore. 
Expectations about what constitutes an adequate time for financial information to 
be transmitted from New York to London have fallen dramatically over the last 
200 years, from weeks to milliseconds. If the speed of communication linking 
two other places has only fallen from weeks to minutes during this time frame 
then, by comparison with New York and London, those places now would be 
relatively further away from one another than before. In this space, Frankfurt 
and Los Angeles are as close as Nairobi and Johannesburg. Thus, differences in 
positionality may increase even as time–space shrinks in an absolute sense.
Recognition of the durable importance of geographical positionality signifi-
cantly affects our understanding of the complex spatial dynamics of capitalism. 
If we theorize on the presumption that geographical differences in positionality 
are not important, it is natural to conclude that the fate of territorial economies 
depends on local conditions. This is the basis for arguing that the prosperity of 
Figure 2.2 Global internet traffic, 1993. Source: http://reid.org/brian.
Figure 2.3 Differences in positionality with respect to airline flight. Note that, in the right-hand panel, distance is measured in scheduled airline flight 
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industrial districts is a reflection of local conditions, perhaps shaped by larger-
scale territorial processes such as national policies. Promoting the informal com-
munications and learning associated with economic dynamism is then assumed 
to depend on getting the place right. At the national scale, structural adjustment 
policies are based on the parallel assumption that “good governance” (enhancing 
competitiveness, opening national economies to global markets, reducing the size 
and inefficiency of government, and promoting US-style democracy) is necessary 
and sufficient for national economic success.
Once we accept, however, that differences in positionality remain, such argu-
ments become insufficient. Europe’s positional proximity to the New World gave 
it a decisive advantage in the struggle over where capitalism agglomerated in 
the Old World after 1492, contra the popular accounts that explain this success 
in terms of such regional characteristics as climate or the protestant work ethic 
(Blaut 1993, Hausmann 2001). It follows that the now neglected arguments of 
dependency theory, that underdevelopment was a consequence of declining terms 
of trade between the Third and the First Worlds, rather than an original local 
condition, should be reassessed. The possibility of national economic growth in 
the former Third World, and indeed throughout much of the former Soviet Union, 
is surely still shaped by their dependence on and position within global networks 
of trade, finance, migration, and know-how. Similarly, as it has become more 
difficult to definitively pin down the local factors accounting for the success of 
industrial districts, researchers are beginning to re-examine the validity of the 
proposition that learning and trust are local, pointing instead to the many ways in 
which positionality within non-local networks may be as important to the success 
of a local economy as place-based factors (Amin and Cohendet 1999, Sheppard 
2000b, Amin and Thrift 2002, Malmberg and Maskell 2002, Oinas 2002, Oinas 
and Malecki 2002, Simmie 2002, Bathelt et al. 2004).
Neglect of real geographical differences in positionality also has an important 
policy consequence. The assumption that both success and failure in a globalized 
world are in the hands of localities leads to a blaming of the victim. The economic 
stagnation of a territorial economy is explained as a failure of local capitalists and 
politicians to be sufficiently entrepreneurial. This, of course, was how colonial-
ism was and structural adjustment still is legitimated: as a necessary intervention 
by external experts to overcome a failure of entrepreneurial ability. Orientalism, 
social Darwinism, and racism were also legitimated by this belief in the responsi-
bility of the residents of a territory for their own prosperity. I do not wish to argue, 
of course, that local conditions are unimportant in a positionally differentiated 
world; economic geography has abundantly shown that they can be crucial. Yet 
it is necessary to critically re-examine the obsession with local factors in recent 
explanations of uneven development.
Social network theory has long stressed the relational nature of power, and the 
unequal conditions of possibility that this entails. Positionally advantaged agents 
are at the center of, and control, networks of relationships that simultaneously 
position others in a present and possibly future state of compliance or depend-
ence (Van Tulder and Ruigrok 1997). It follows that unequal positionality can 
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also be central to the reproduction of power hierarchies. As Johan Galtung (1971) 
has explained, positionally advantaged territories can shape the space economy 
to their advantage, reinforced by place-based alliances between local elites and 
other residents in such territories whose local inequalities and differences seem-
ingly pale in comparison with their shared gains from uneven development. At the 
same time, differences within positionally disadvantaged territories may become 
enhanced, as local elites profit from the highly unequal geographical and social 
impact of dependent development (Marini 1973, Cardoso and Faletto 1979). A 
de facto alliance between peripheral elites and hegemonic territories may well 
reinforce the power of positionally advantaged territories. The willingness, since 
the 1980s, of positionally disadvantaged nation-states in the global south to adopt 
the Washington Consensus reflects their more marginal positionality. Elites (often 
trained, along with their advisors, in academic institutions of the global north) 
stand to gain from neoliberal open-border policies (Glassman 1999: 691).
Although this symbiotic relationship between positionality and power may 
suggest a global economy with persistent core–periphery relations, positional-
ity demands a more nuanced account. Butler (1993) notes that all attempts at 
repetition of power–positionality relations are imperfect, creating the possibility 
of occasional dramatic and unexpected reworkings. Examples abound, from the 
emergence of Germany, Japan, and the USA to successfully challenge Britain 
during the twentieth century, to the more recent successes of a select few newly 
industrializing countries, and the rise to prominence of regions such as California, 
Seoul, and Shanghai. Local initiative was important in each case, but the trans-
formation also required a reconfiguration of the positionality of that place within 
the global system. Too often, attempts at transformation founder on the difficulties 
of overcoming a disadvantaged positionality. Yet marginal positionality creates 
conditions for resistance and struggle, and it is sometimes remarkable to see 
seemingly unassailable power hierarchies collapse overnight.
The fact that positionality shapes the conditions of possibility for agents, at 
scales ranging from the body to the world region, requires close attention to its 
multiscalar nature. Positional differences within families are nested complexly 
within those differentiating neighborhoods, cities, regions, and countries. The 
Americanization of economic ideology, financial systems, music, and movies, 
worldwide, positions Boston and Washington (for neoliberal economics), New 
York (finance), Detroit (techno music), and Los Angeles (movies) at the center 
of globalization – or, more precisely, Cambridge, MA, the District of Columbia, 
downtown Manhattan, black Detroit, and Hollywood. These are not regarded as 
typically American places, and indeed are seen by many as places from which 
mainstream American values are being undermined. So when the USA success-
fully promotes its global positionality, the form that Americanization takes differs 
greatly from conventional constructions of the American way of life – small-town 
and suburban white America – as right-wing opponents of globalization are quick 
to emphasize. But the geography of positionality is more complicated than this 
(Mohanty 2003). The global north is constituted through a network of political 
and economic elites occupying privileged localities, networked together across 
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the globe (Castells 1996). By contrast, the global south – whose population is 
disproportionately made up of “indigenous” communities, people of color, and 
women – is to be found everywhere: foraging the forests of South Asia, undertak-
ing the double burden of housework and paid work, toiling in sweatshops within 
the USA, and living in urban quasi-ghettoes worldwide. These fractionated geog-
raphies of the global north and south, with poverty and disadvantage at times just 
across the street from wealth and privilege, mean that national boundaries do 
not even approximately separate development from underdevelopment. Indeed, it 
can be hypothesized that contemporary processes of globalization are making the 
geographies of global north and global south progressively fractal and geographi-
cally interleaved.
Geographies of positionality
Any abstract discussion of socially constructed space–time is fraught with a 
fundamental paradox for cartographic representations of the world. If space–time 
is a social construct, which coordinate system can be invoked to describe it? 
Coordinate systems are social constructs, and to invoke any particular such 
system as the basis for analysis contributes to its reification.10 For the purposes of 
discussion, I will take the spherical coordinate system approximating the shape of 
the globe as my reference point. In doing this, I am asserting not that it is natural, but 
that it is commonplace. Maps are a commonly understood technique for depicting 
the geographical organization of society, notwithstanding the problematic nature 
of any cartographic representation of the world (Harley 1989).
As a relational characteristic, positionality is best represented by the inten-
sity and nature of the interdependencies connecting economic agents through 
space–time (an insight from geography’s spatial science tradition of gravity and 
hierarchical diffusion models – notwithstanding critiques of this tradition’s spatial 
fetishism; see Sheppard 1995). It follows that similarity in terms of positionality 
correlates with the degree to which two agents are collocated within the social net-
works that these interdependencies create. It is reasonably straightforward to map 
positionality in social space using this principle (as in social network analysis), 
but mapping positionality onto the earth’s surface is far more complex because 
there may be little relationship between positionality and geographic proximity. In 
addition, whereas geographic proximity is assumed to be symmetric, positionality 
generally entails asymmetric relationships: core agents exert more influence over 
peripherally positioned agents than vice versa.
The space-transcending technologies and institutions of contemporary globali-
zation are compounding the complexity of mapping social relationships in geo-
graphic space. The telegraph first made it possible for information to move more 
rapidly than the body, severing the space–time movement of information from 
that of humans (Marvin 1988). Telecommunications technologies have taken this 
much further, allowing individuals both to communicate almost instantaneously 
with geographically remote people and places, and to be co-present in distant 
locations (by means of web-cams, television, and the cinema) (Virilio 1995). Such 
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connections are unevenly developed, however, because the economic, political, 
and cultural forces creating and reinforcing presence-at-a-distance are highly 
selective geographically (Figure 2.3).
The multiscalar nature of positionality introduces a distinct challenge, as it cre-
ates difficulties for attempts to generalize from bodies to places. If the residents of 
a territory share a similar positionality, then this property can also be attributed to 
the place where they reside. Yet, as Massey (1991) insists, places are heterogene-
ous: their residents differ dramatically in their positionality, both within the place 
itself and through their distinct interactions stretching beyond the place (Amin 
and Thrift 2002). As feminist theory has shown, even households incorporate 
significant differences in positionality, reflecting gender, age, and power asym-
metries amongst their members.
There is much anecdotal evidence that differences in access to the means of 
transportation and communication are increasing disparities in positionality among 
people and within the places where they live (Sheppard 2001, 2002, Aoyama and 
Sheppard 2003). Within any place, some residents have been able to exploit the 
fluidity of the global economy to dramatically improve livelihood possibilities, 
even as the majority has not, in ways that make noticeable differences to the 
trajectory of globalization. Differences in positionality from one household to the 
next may in fact be increasing, depending on who has access to telecommunica-
tions, as suggested by the digital divide thesis. Indeed, some have gone so far as 
to suggest that the internet is making place redundant, as well as space, whereas 
others vigorously contest this. At present, however, there is too little evidence to 
determine the validity of such generalizations.
Implications: geographies of trade
In this section, I will attempt to indicate how positionality both reflects and shapes 
the spatiotemporal networks of economic interdependencies, using the example 
of trade.11 International trade has long been one of the principal interdependencies 
shaping and differentiating the positionality of places within the global economy, 
but has received relatively little attention from economic geographers. Trade is also 
a useful case through which to explore how positionality entails both discursive 
and material processes. Over the last 200 years, the free trade doctrine (i.e., that 
unrestricted commodity exchange between places is the best way to advance their 
mutual prosperity) has attained the status of “a scientific fact as indisputable as 
gravity” (Trentmann 1998: 226). At the same time, the material effects of trade 
frequently contradict this doctrine, with a history of more positionally powerful 
trading partners accumulating the lion’s share of gains from trade.
Rhetorically, the free trade doctrine envisions a space–economy in which posi-
tionality does not matter, while place-based differences intensify. Places overcome 
unequal endowments of labor, capital, knowledge, and resources, by specializing 
in and exporting the commodities that exploit local comparative advantage. 
The distinctiveness of each place forms the basis of its comparative advantage, 
and is reinforced by specialization. In a fully globalized world, where transport 
Positionality and globalization in economic geography 61
costs are insignificant and trade barriers are eliminated, creating a level playing 
field with no geographic variation in positionality, the doctrine asserts that every 
comparative advantage offers the same possibilities for economic growth through 
specialization and trade. The principal obstacles to this are argued to be the high 
transportation cost burdens of geographical remoteness or unwise national trade 
barriers, although some economists have recently added tropicality to this list, in 
arguments reflective of environmental determinism (Hausmann 2001). In today’s 
global world, the free trade doctrine has become so taken for granted that we have 
ceded its implementation to a bureaucracy (the World Trade Organization).12
The beginning of free trade as a global practice is conventionally assigned to a 
particular conjuncture in space–time: London on June 25, 1846, when Robert Peel 
repealed the British Corn Laws.13 Agitation for Corn Law repeal was organized 
by the Anti-Corn Law League, a group of largely Manchester-based cotton textile 
capitalists led by Richard Cobden (Pickering and Tyrrell 2000). Manchester was 
a logical home for this social movement, as it had become the center of European 
textile manufacturing, at a time when textiles represented the major internation-
ally tradable manufacture. Manchester’s positional advantage was itself created 
by British mercantile trading policies during the eighteenth century, when the 
British government used its control over international shipping and a series of 
tariff policies to undermine, in turn, the competitiveness of continental European 
and Indian textile manufacturers.
Manchester boosterists and British trade officials each felt that they could take 
advantage of free trade to advance their positionality, advancing capitalists’ class 
interests over those of landlords (and organized labor, the Chartists) in Britain, 
while relegating continental Europe and India to specializing in agriculture. They 
advanced and implemented a free trade doctrine that could be justified by influ-
ential contemporary texts in political economy: Adam Smith’s arguments about 
how trade expands the market and David Ricardo’s recently published principle 
of comparative advantage. These provided apparently rational grounds, rooted in 
the Lockean private property liberalism that currently was all the rage, for arguing 
that free trade is good for everyone (Sheppard 2005).
Britain practiced free trade as official policy until 1914, using its geopolitical 
clout as the pre-eminent global economic power to take the free trade doctrine to 
the supranational scale. Beginning in France in 1860, the doctrine diffused rapidly 
through Europe, where political and economic elites were either convinced by 
the rhetoric or used free trade to advance other partisan interests. France reversed 
course in 1875, however, initiating a counter-reformation. With the exception of 
the Netherlands, all European countries increased their tariffs. Germany was the 
last to do so, but eventually adopted Friedrich List’s infant industry argument 
(now known as import-substituting industrialization). This return to protectionism 
was stimulated by distinct national economic experiences with trade. The grain 
invasion from Eastern Europe had undermined domestic agriculture, and import-
substituting industrialization proved effective. German manufacturers prospered, 
and were competing successfully even in English markets by the first decades of 
the twentieth century. This also was a period when private property liberalism was 
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being replaced by social liberalism, legitimating state intervention into the market 
(Polanyi 2001 [1944]). In this context, national sovereignty and freedom came to 
be associated with protectionism rather than with free trade.14
Free trade was not practiced outside Europe during this nineteenth-century 
boom. In Europe’s white settler colonies and former colonies, notably the USA, 
protectionism to catalyze domestic manufacturing was practiced and preached 
from the 1840s to the 1940s. By contrast, other colonies were required to trade 
with their colonial mother countries, creating a group of trading cliques. In the 
British empire, the colonies signed “unequal treaties” stipulating that colonies’ 
tariffs could not exceed 5 percent of the value of imports (Bairoch 1993).
It was only in the negotiations leading to Bretton Woods that the USA shifted 
its rhetorical position to support the free trade doctrine, using its power over 
Western Europe and Japan to break down pre-war colonial trading cliques.15 This 
led to a second boom in the popularity of the free trade doctrine, which has proven 
more robust than the first phase a hundred years earlier. All major nations are now 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to which, as signatories, they 
delegate the power to override territorial policies deemed inimical to the practice 
of free trade.
Falling transportation costs and the gradual elimination of barriers to interna-
tional trade have not created a level playing field, however. Different nations con-
tinue to occupy unequal positions in global trading networks, with consequences 
for their conditions of possibility to prosper from specialization and trade. This 
can be seen particularly clearly for nations of the former Third World, for which 
the free trade doctrine, combined with political independence after colonial-
ism, seemed to promise so much. First, in contradistinction to this doctrine (but 
consonant with the beliefs of British free traders in the 1840s), specialization 
in primary commodities has amounted to a positional disadvantage. Between 
1950 and 2000, with the exception of members of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s, the terms of trade have declined stead-
ily for Third World countries specializing in primary commodity exports in order 
to finance manufactured imports (Figure 2.4). Even Third World manufacturing 
exports have been disadvantaged by comparison with First World manufacturing 
exports (Sarkar and Singer 1991). The import-substituting industrialization that 
worked for Germany and the USA was unsuccessful in many Third World nations, 
where the domestic production of consumer goods that emerged behind trade bar-
riers generated unsustainable demand for other manufactured capital good inputs 
imported from the First World. Declining terms of trade pushed Third World 
nations to specialize further in primary commodities for export to finance their 
import bills, constituting a vicious cycle. This has been exacerbated by progres-
sive First World tariff and non-tariff barriers, creating selective disincentives for 
Third World nations to move their specialization up the commodity chain from 
raw materials to manufacturing (Table 2.4). Between 1968 and 1988, the cost of 
manufactured imports for the Third World increased twelvefold, whereas Third 
World purchasing power only doubled, despite a threefold increase in primary 
product specialization and export (Figure 2.5).




Cotton, raw 6.2 0.0 0.0
Cotton yarn 25.0 32.9 6.8
Cotton fabric 24.6 19.1 17.8
Cotton clothing 35.4 20.8 27.5
Bauxite 0.0 0.0 0.0
Alumina 0.0 11.1 0.0
Aluminum, unwrought 6.0 5.6 11.4
Aluminum, wrought 11.5 29.3 29.0
Sources: UNCTAD (1981), Colman and Nixson (1986).
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The geography of global trading networks both reflects and reproduces such 
differences in positionality. First, trade remains dominated by north–north trade, 
in specialized manufactures. By contrast, former Third World nations are minor 
and peripheral players, whose trade with the First World still reflects colonial 
connections; linking Western Europe with Africa and the Middle East, the USA 
with Latin America, and Japan with South-East and East Asia (Figure 2.6). This 
is reinforced by an asymmetric mutual dependence on trade between the First 
World and the Third World: Third World nations rely heavily on First World mar-
kets for their exports, but First World nations send less than 5 percent of their 
exports to the Third World. Second, nations of the former Third World rely more 
on specialization and trade, specialize in far fewer (and more easily substitutable) 
products, and export products with smaller shares of the world market. Under 
the hypothesis that market power increases with market share and diversifica-
Figure 2.5 Third World purchasing power, 1955–93 (Porter and Sheppard 1998).
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tion (enhancing flexibility in the face of negative price trends on an exported 
commodity), the bargaining power of former Third World nations is tendentially 
lower (Figure 2.7). This reflects and reproduces the difficulty that Third World 
nations have faced in repeatedly trying to change global trading regimes in their 
favor, from the Group of 77 in 1964 to the Group of 21 at the October 2003 WTO 
meeting in Cancun.
In summary, the historical geography of international trade has been one in 
which the free trade doctrine promises equal opportunities for growth for all, 
particularly as transportation costs and institutional barriers fall and differences 
in positionality thereby supposedly dissipate. In practice, however, differences in 
positionality persist and are reproduced despite such developments. Positionally 
advantaged countries, initially Britain and more recently the USA, Japan, and the 
European Union, have taken advantage of their ability to both control discourse 










and shape material conditions of possibility to promote free trade, while violating 
its principles in practice whenever expedient (most notably, recently, refusing to 
eliminate the subsidies for agricultural production that undermine Third World 
agricultural exports). Positionally disadvantaged countries have been compelled 
to follow the logic of relying heavily on specialization and free trade, despite 
consistently receiving a disproportionately small share of the global surplus that 
trade has created.
These unequal conditions of possibility deriving from differences in positional-
ity are persistent, and in some cases (notably sub-Saharan Africa) are increasing. 
Yet, as stressed above, positionality is not immutable. This has been shown by the 
experience of certain South-East and East Asian nations, such as South Korea and 
Taiwan, which drew on national state-led strategies mixing import substitution 
and export-oriented industrialization, combined with external support from the 
USA due to their strategic importance in struggles with the People’s Republic of 
China, to embark on a successful strategy of industrialization. They have been 
able to improve their positionality in global trade networks (Figure 2.6), despite 
ongoing vulnerability in global financial markets. There is much evidence to sug-
gest that China is now on a similar path, one that enables selected Third World 
nations to benefit from trade even as others are left behind. The mutability of 
positionality offers hope to each place, but the persistence of positional inequali-
ties even under such mutations implies that capitalism thrives on geographically 
uneven development, not a level playing field.
Conclusion
Close attention to positionality challenges some current thinking in economic 
geography. For theoretical economic geography, it calls into question prevailing 
Figure 2.7 Trade bargaining power index, 1993. Note that the index equals the average 
world market share of the three largest exports, divided by the proportion of 
these three products in total exports (Porter and Sheppard 1998).
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presuppositions about the efficiency, stability, and potential equity of unrestricted 
spatial competition. This suggests that the capitalist space economy is, instead, an 
out-of-equilibrium system of creative destruction, compounded by complex and 
overlapping conflicts of interest between economic agents. Even for those agents 
with the power to advance their self-interest, the complexity of spatiotemporal 
dynamics implies that their actions can have the unintended consequence of 
undermining their own interests.
Practically, recognition that differences in positionality persist despite power-
ful forces of globalization has important consequences for how we think about 
globalization and its consequences. First, unequal positionality implies that spa-
tial competition is always plagued by a potential race to the bottom, in which 
positionally disadvantaged localities reduce wage levels and environmental and 
other regulatory standards for all, in their desperate attempt to attract capitalist 
investment. Second, the success or failure of different localities lies in the hands 
of political economic forces operating at scales beyond the control of those locali-
ties, raising questions about the degree to which local agency actually shapes local 
economic performance. Third, it no longer makes sense to theorize development 
as a series of stages that all places go through. Globalization’s proponents oper-
ate within such an impoverished space–time imaginary (Massey 1999b), which 
eliminates spatial difference in favor of a universal narrative of change – a new 
modernization theory.
Recognition of the positionally differentiated nature of our world creates space 
to imagine other possibilities. The same practices will not have the same con-
sequences in differently positioned places. Instead, places need the freedom to 
pursue different political economic strategies, in pursuit of their own visions of 
the good life. Attention to positionality suggests the importance also of translocal 
strategies for overcoming disadvantage. Local actions to improve the business 
climate have little chance of improving the positionality of disadvantaged places. 
Collective actions across space, such as south–south collaboration by states and 
civil society, are more likely to have the desired transformative effect. In this 
sense, civil society can also learn from corporate strategies, which have long 
prospered from translocal networking.
Notes
 1 I use agent here in the broadest possible sense – to refer to any entity with causal 
power.
 2 This section draws extensively from Sheppard (2000a).
 3 This is not the only aspect of spatiality that can disrupt economic theory. Others have 
made similar arguments with respect to place and scale.
 4 For a treatment of realistic geography in trade theory, showing how relative location 
affects gains from trade, see Eaton and Kortum (2002).
 5 Gender, race, etc. are also important, particularly once the non-monetary spheres of 
capitalism, such as household labor, are recognized. I do not have space to treat these 
here, but they further complicate spatial economic dynamics.
 6 In this context, methodological individualism is the position that economic agency 
can be reduced to the rational choices of individuals with given preference functions 
and resource endowments (Barnes and Sheppard 1992).
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 7 This is a minimalist version of positionality because it neglects difference in social 
location or power, and treats positionality as if it were exogenous to the economic 
system.
 8 The neglect of “first nature” in geographical economics stems from a belief that 
pre-existing inequalities have entirely predictable, and thus not very interesting, 
consequences, i.e., favored locations perform better. Geographic research questions 
this. First, our research suggests that spatial price and profitability patterns are 
actually quite complex, even for simple non-isotropic geographies. Second, some of 
the truly interesting insights of economic geography address why some places prosper 
despite geographic disadvantage, moving from the periphery to the core. Third, 
“first nature” is not first in the sense that it is exogenous to and logically prior to 
uneven development. Rather, inequalities in relative location (and in the biophysical 
environment) are in part endogenous to spatial economic processes, an endogeneity 
that needs to be understood.
 9 There are always agents who stand to gain by disrupting the equilibrium.
 10 This paradox is common in social theory, such as debates in feminist theory about 
how any discussion of gender is in danger of reproducing the very social conventions 
about gender that theorists struggle against; or concerns in postcolonial theory that 
“postcolonial” reifies the historical categories it seeks to challenge (Butler 1990, 
McClintock 1992).
 11 I artificially restrict discussion here to international trade. Similar arguments could be 
made with respect to geographical flows of capital, labor, knowledge, discourse, and 
power (notably, in economic geography, geographies of direct investment).
 12 The doctrine also has an ethical dimension, that free trade entails the peaceful 
exchange of products, customs, and ideas between nations, a great improvement over 
the violence of interstate war and colonialism. This view dates back to Greek writings 
on trade, and was central to the arguments of the radical liberal Richard Cobden, who 
catalyzed the globalization of free trade.
 13 The Corn Laws imposed a ban on wheat imports whenever the price fell below 
80 shillings, offering a substantial state subsidy to large British landowners, and a 
penalty to British industrialists who had to pay higher cash wages. Parallels to today’s 
agricultural subsidies in the European Union, North America, and Japan are very 
close.
 14 Only in Britain were such arguments not extended to embrace trade protectionism, 
despite attempts to introduce an imperial preference system by Joseph Chamberlin, no 
doubt reflecting the belief that Britain was positioned to benefit most from free trade.
 15 Note, however, that the US Senate refused to ratify the creation of the International 
Trading Organization to oversee freer trade, as it was not seen to be in the national 
interest.
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3 A systemic approach to 
territorial studies
 Deconstructing territorial 
competitiveness1
Sergio Conti and Paolo Giaccaria
A narrative about complexity
The profound changes in the world economy in the last few decades have 
deeply changed the way geographers think about the world, bringing “new” 
economic geographies to the forefront in the Third World, as a consequence of the 
displacement of considerable segments of production, as well as in the peripheries 
of North America and Western Europe. Alongside these significant shifts, the 
developed world has seen the emergence of numerous new industrial spaces, the 
expression of both the consolidation of high-tech areas (such as Silicon Valley or 
Route 128) and the revitalization of areas with a manufacturing tradition (Third 
Italy, Denmark, Baden-Württemberg). The rise of the “world cities,” around 
which intense interdisciplinary debate has developed, is part of this process. These 
phenomena, accompanied by the weakening of the old industrial cores which had 
expressed and sustained the mass production system, cannot be isolated from a 
dual and dialectical process, which Markusen (1996) defines as the paradox of 
“sticky places within slippery spaces”: on the one hand, the hypermobility of 
financial capital and technology; on the other hand, the strength of the clustering 
(agglomeration) of industries and companies. The duality between deterritorializing 
and territorializing forces is a question that the economic sciences and geography 
have examined at length: significant contributions have been made recently by 
geographers, and also by political economists, sociologists, and international 
business scholars (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992, Storper 1995, Veltz 1996, 
Enright 1998, Becattini 2000, Dunning 2000, Gilly and Torre 2000, Hudson 2001, 
to cite just a few).
The debate about the status of territory and its relationship with economic 
process has seen two main contrasting arguments that deal with the broader issue 
of globalization. According to the first, the processes in question are echoed in 
an increasingly placeless economy, in which the economic development process 
“is passing from territorial institutions such as states to deterritorialized institu-
tions such as intra-firm international hierarchies”’ that are said to be gaining on 
territorial barriers, specificity, and frictions (Storper 1997: 19). The second case, 
instead, stresses the fact that economic development is combined with continuing 
specificity in development patterns. Accordingly, faced with the liberalization of 
both internal and cross-border markets and the growing globalization of asset-
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exploiting activities by multinational enterprises, the further concentration of 
economic activities in dynamic agglomerative regions represents a fundamental 
feature of the new world economic map, against which regional authorities and 
practitioners must measure themselves (Saxenian 1994, Dunning 2000).
This new wave of geographical imagination about the links that connect space, 
places, and economic processes has brought to the forefront new concepts, which 
have rapidly increased their theoretical and empirical fortune. It is not by chance, 
in fact, that one of the fundamental terms in contemporary economic and social 
research is local development, a synthetic concept that underlies a multitude of 
other terms around which there has been heated debate, such as industrial districts 
(Sabel 1989, Pyke et al. 1990), industrial clusters (Porter 1990), learning regions 
(Florida 1995, Maskell 1998), innovative milieu (Aydalot 1986, Maillat and Perrin 
1992), local production systems (Abdelmalki and Courlet 1996, Pecqueur 2000), 
“regional motors,” and so on. The concept of local development implies some-
thing that is both truly complex and at the same time fuzzy: against a background 
of growing awareness of the incapacity of the traditional regional development 
models of analysis, the aim is to give meaning to the central role in contemporary 
development processes of an intermediate entity between the actor (the company, 
in particular) and the system as a whole, in respect of which the local system 
expresses both a space for cooperation between actors and their embeddedness 
in a given territorial context, from which they draw specific competitive and not 
easily reproducible resources and solutions.
Another concept that escalated to a large critical mass in contemporary debate 
is “territorial competitiveness,” with its various scalar understandings – from 
local and urban to regional and up to the national scale. The idea that territories 
compete with each other has matched with the expectations of policy-makers and 
local administrators, establishing a broad body of arguments and praxis where 
territories are increasingly treated like economic agents, often outshining their 
social, cultural, and political dimensions. As a consequence, the debate about 
territorial competitiveness has been extremely varied in positions and perspec-
tives; while some give a quite positive account of the process (Begg 1999), others 
vehemently deny that it is of any theoretical importance (Krugman 1996a), while 
yet others put forward a broad range of more cautious interpretations and caveats 
(Kresl 1995, Foss 1996, Cheshire and Gordon 1996, Budd 1998, Sharp 1998, 
Conti and Giaccaria 2001, Camagni 2002). 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that these concepts were well received by policy-
makers and practitioners, they grew up “too fast too furious,” through a huge 
range of interpretations, perspectives, and judgments, which are quite difficult to 
bring together into a consistent framework. Moreover, concepts such as “territorial 
competitiveness” and “local development” show many ambiguities that cannot be 
solved without a comprehensive and systematic reflection on the conceptual basis 
they stand on. For instance, most of the contemporary arguments in economic 
geography draw on a sort of personalization and reification of territory and place, 
which are assumed to be person-like collective agents, able to express common 
representations and wishes and therefore to compete in some sort of market. Also, 
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all the literature focusing on cognitive interpretation of territorial processes – such 
as the innovative milieu stream or the learning region approach – ends up by 
setting an holistic comprehension of territories that is highly problematic: What 
about dissonant voices in the milieu? Are they just noise?2
In our perspective, similar questions must be addressed in an epistemological 
way, looking for a comprehensive understanding of territories that re-establishes 
a balance between economic and territorial processes, without reducing the lat-
ter to the former. The arguments expressed here follow an explicitly systemic 
perspective (Morin 1977, Le Moigne 1992, 1994), within the broader realm of 
complexity studies (Wiener 1956, Atlan 1972, von Foerster 1982). One condition 
of complexity – and this needs to be recalled here, even if briefly – lies in the 
acknowledgment that reality cannot be reduced to the methods of simplification 
typical of orthodox modern economic and social science, in which reality is bro-
ken down into simple components that are easier to study and understand. With 
the theories of complexity, attention is now shifted to more complex mechanisms 
of interaction between elements. In particular, it is maintained that the unpredict-
ability of the system stems from precisely the fact that the subsystems interact 
with each other through different types of relations and that they cannot therefore 
be analyzed separately.
In this chapter, we would like to focus on how territories can be conceptualized 
from a systemic perspective and to exemplify how systemic territorial theories 
can be applied to address some of the open issues of the contemporary debate 
in economic geography, specifically with reference to the concept of “territorial 
competition.” The reference here is to the mechanism of autopoiesis, through 
which it is possible to characterize the organization of a system, as (it has been) 
elaborated by the Chilean scholars Maturana and Varela (1980, 1987). The start-
ing point is the clear distinction between heteronymous and autonomous systems: 
while the former are characterized by an evolution according to the structure of 
the external world, autonomous systems are, instead, endowed with organizational 
closure, with the external world acting purely as a factor of disturbance. They thus 
appear to be independent from the forms of the outside world, with the exception 
of the flows that assume importance for the self-reproduction and survival of the 
system. In a system characterized by organizational closure, network interconnec-
tion between its components is the basis of the fundamental property of autonomy, 
which defines the closure and cohesion of the system with respect to the environ-
ment. The local system will thus be distinguished on the basis of its own rules of 
operation, which, instead of being dictated from the outside, represent invariants 
through which the system reproduces its own autonomy in its constant openness 
to the environment. These rules are dictated by the way in which the network of 
its constituent relations is represented internally, by a rather complex structuring 
of economic, political, cultural, social, etc., relations.
The key concepts are organization and structure. Although both concepts are 
of a relational nature, the sense is profoundly different. The organization is, in 
fact, given by the ensemble of relations between elements of the system that make 
the system what it is and not something else. The structure is, instead, given by the 
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material and historic qualities of these relations. It is the structure that modifies 
itself more rapidly, following stimuli from both outside and inside the system. 
The organization instead maintains a greater degree of rigidity, in that a radical 
modification of the relations that compose it can lead to the disintegration of the 
system. Obviously, an organization evolves over time, according to its own laws 
(it is in this sense that the system is autonomous and autopoietic).
Territorial systemic interactions
Basically, there are two possible perspectives: the first one is to say that the 
territory is the environment where different systems evolve and interact, while the 
second is to model the territory itself as a system. For different reasons both these 
paths are impracticable. If the territory is just the environment of some systems 
(such as the firm, the class, the cluster, the state, a species, etc.), we are faced with 
two viewpoints, the choice of either of which would abruptly stop our reflection:
1 Either the territory has only an ancillary function with respect to the function-
ing of other systems, offering the material support for the (re)production of 
capitalism or representing just a rather uninfluential means of production. 
This is a functionalist approach to the territory, saying that it possesses some 
sort of function and that concepts such as identity and cohesion are unneces-
sary in order to understand and define the function. Or
2 It represents the environment in a truly systemic view, but in this case it is 
something that cannot be described and treated as a system. In fact, in sys-
tems theory environment is assumed to be something that is too complex to 
be consistently treated. Better put, a system increases its complexity in order 
to face and, somehow, reduce environmental complexity. Therefore, if sys-
tems are conceptualized because we cannot deal directly with environmental 
complexity, considering the territory as environment in a systemic meaning 
is equal to asserting that little or nothing can be said about it.
In both cases, there are no real advantages in adopting a systemic perspective 
to conceptualize territory as in the first case we can use simpler models to explain 
it, while in the second it is too complex even for autopoiesis theories.
On the other hand, representing the territory as an autopoietic system raises 
some theoretical and practical issues that cannot be addressed here. To cite only 
the main one, a system is an object that possesses a high degree of cohesion and 
organic oneness represented by its organization, while even the simpler territory 
has manifold facets that are not easy to draw back to a univocal interpretation. 
More specifically, the territory, unlike a generic autopoietic system, is not the 
outcome of a single internal process that creates a sort of organic harmony among 
its components: too many social, economic, and cultural groups act within a ter-
ritory in order to drive its transformation according to their desires and strategies. 
Even if we can be influenced by the continuity in time of certain territories, to 
A systemic approach to territorial studies 77
say that this continuity is prevailing over change and that it is produced solely by 
territory’s organization is a strange statement to be defended.
Our position will somehow be intermediate. In generic terms, we shall con-
sider territory as an environment where different elementary systems intermingle 
and we will represent it as the outcome of this systemic interaction. Secondly, 
and more importantly, we will consider the prospect that particular systems exist 
which can be considered good proxies for the territory. These systems – which 
we will term productive territorial local systems (PTLS) – must have the property 
of being more complex than the elementary systems that live in the territory but 
be less complex than the whole territory. In other terms, our aim is to build up an 
analytical object that is a non-exhaustive representation of the territory but which 
possesses some of the features that are related to the territory and cannot be found 
in the individual systems that are part of the territory.
Systems in the territory
Before describing the PTLS and their relationship with the territory, we must 
spend some time describing what we call elementary or individual systems. 
Our hypothesis is that the different collective actors (people, groups of people, 
associations, firms, clusters of firms, etc.) that play a role in the social game 
can be usefully described as systems. They can be either private (firms and 
businesses of various kinds) or public (e.g., the local administration), or a mix 
(like the education system or some development agencies). Some of them will 
be codified in organizations (e.g., trade unions, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), churches, or entrepreneurial associations), whereas others are based on 
more informal institutions, such as ethnic groups or sexual or social identities. 
The territory influences all of them and, vice versa, all of them play a role in the 
making of a territory.
In considering the nature of elementary systems, we must limit ourselves to 
setting a small number of systemic features that these systems seize. First of all, 
with respect to Maturana and Varela’s framework (1980, 1987), we simply set as 
a fundamental the distinction between organization and structure.3 In other terms, 
we just assume that every system is made up of some relationships between its 
components which are essential to define its identity, organization, whereas other 
relationships are merely the contingent expression of this identity. As to how these 
systems are built, we can think of them as “black boxes.” This is not to say that 
how they are constructed is not important or cannot be investigated. It just means 
that:
1 how they are made is less important than how they interact;
2 a specific hypothesis about their internal processes can be designed according 
to the specific questions the observer is asking;
3 many of their characters are contingent and therefore related to their structure 
rather than to the organization.
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For instance, how an ethnic group’s culture is built or how trade unionism 
shapes the representations and the strategies of the working class are, no doubt, 
important issues, but they cannot take into consideration the model building, as 
these explanations would dramatically increase the complexity of the overall 
account. In other words, we do not have to define for each system what is inherent 
in its organization and what in its structure. This is because it is only an intermedi-
ate stage toward the construction of the real analytical object we are going to use, 
that is the PTLS.
The second hypothesis we make about these elementary systems is that their 
organization is defined in terms of proximity. Proximity is what gives each system 
its own cohesion and makes it distinct from other analogous systems and therefore 
recognizable. In this perspective, we can say that every system is a local system. 
This is equivalent to saying that, as a system must possess an “inside,” it must 
be characterized by some form of proximity. Therefore, all systems are logically 
local. We have to note that this proximity can be institutional, geographical, or 
both. Subsequently, “local” is not a synonym for “geographical” or “territorial.” 
Local is to be interpreted – closely to its mathematical meaning – as a property of 
a set which emerges from some sort of proximity which can be only institutional 
and not necessarily physical. Let us think about a transnational corporation (TNC): 
it is composed of a set of plants, sites, and people that share some features of insti-
tutional proximity, even in the absence of physical proximity. As a consequence 
of that proximity, we can also argue that the TNC possesses an identity that is 
not just juridical, but also cognitive and emotional – see for instance the broad 
literature about institutional learning (Gertler 2001) and the process of identifica-
tion between a Japanese corporation and its workforce (Nakamura et al. 1997). Of 
course, there are some relationships with material territories, not least because the 
plants occupy a portion of land and can cause a huge crisis in the territories they 
are located in when they move away, but these links are not fundamental to that 
system’s identity. To express it in autopoietic system terminology, we might say 
that for entities such as an archetypal TNC the relationships with a given territory 
are related to its structure rather than to its organization.
Therefore, there are some emergent properties in the systemic organization that 
depend solely on institutional proximity and others which rely on geographical 
proximity. Let us consider cohesion within a community or an association, which 
can be either geographical and local or just local, comparing rockers with free-
masons. In fact, we can easily admit that cohesion is an emergent property of the 
system and not of the set of individuals belonging to it (Bunge 2004). Moreover, 
cohesion is a constitutive feature of the organization of a community as a system 
(what makes a community a system) and, second, particular forms of cohesion 
– based on different kinds of proximity – distinguish a community’s organization 
from the others. In our specific example, both rockers and freemasons have a 
relationship with the territory, but for the latter – as freemasons – it is likely that 
geographical ties are just a matter of structure, while for a rockers’ community the 
proximity relationship with their territory is organizative, that is, it is constitutive 
of their identity. This feature will affect the kind of cohesion that characterizes the 
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organization of rockers versus freemasons: in the case of the former, organizative 
cohesion is both geographical and local, while for the latter it is only local.
A taxonomy of systemic interaction
The two properties of the systems that we have highlighted in the previous 
paragraph – the distinction between organization and structure and that between 
institutional and geographical proximity – can be used to analyze how systems 
interact and therefore how territory is produced. To this aim we can distinguish a 
taxonomy based on two variables:
1 The kind of proximity ruling interaction, which can be purely institutional 
– when interaction happens without strong reference to the territory – or ter-
ritorial – when both institutional and geographical proximity play a role in 
the interaction.
2 The nature of interaction, which can be structural or organizative. Structural 
coupling, that is the “contamination” of part of the system’s structure to 
maintain its own organization while adapting to some extent to other systems 
, is probably the typical way through which different systems interact. We can 
nevertheless hypothesize that, in some cases, interaction occurs at the level of 
organization, through what we might term “organizative synthesis,” produc-
ing a new system whose components are the individual original systems.
By crossing the kind of proximity with the nature of the interaction, we can 
distinguish four possible types of systemic interaction: the first two give rise to 
aterritorial outcomes, while the last two express different types of territorializa-
tion (Table 3.1).
Let us start with the aspatial forms of interaction: the most interesting outcome 
is that what are often considered to be the fundamental institutions of capitalism 
– that is, market and hierarchy – can be explained and differentiated in terms of 
the nature of interactions among systems. In fact:
1 Structural institutional interaction refers to a situation that affords institutional 
proximity among systems but which does not cross the boundaries of the 
structure and does not affect the deeper organization of the systems involved. 
A typical example is the market relationship described in Williamson’s 
(1985) account, in which economic agents exchange goods all at once in an 
instantaneous moment. Another good example is an international fair, where 
sellers and buyers converge for a short period in order to quickly update their 
knowledge about recent product and/or process innovation. In addition, the 
concept of a global commodity chain can be a meaningful example of this 
kind of interaction (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994, Henderson et al. 2002).
2 When we are facing a deeper interaction at institutional level, one that involves 
not only the structures but also the systems’ organization, we can talk about 
organizative institutional interaction. Many forms of economic hierarchies 
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can be interpreted in this perspective. The establishment of a transnational 
corporation (TNC), such as Ford, which is organized in three different bodies 
with a large degree of autonomy but which at the same time are closely tied to 
each other, is an example of this kind of interaction. In addition, the function-
ing of the contemporary global stock market can be assumed as an instance: 
different systems – that is, different national financial systems – have been 
so intensively tied in the last decades that the outcome is a global system of 
financial exchange, with its own organization and emergent properties – for 
instance, we might consider the contemporary speculative financial crisis as 
an emergent property of the global stock market.
If we move on to consider the interaction based on territorial proximity we find 
the last – but not least – two categories:
3 The third form of interaction is structural territorial interaction, in other 
words the fact that systems interact territorially – that is, according to both 
institutional and geographical proximity. When we are in the presence of a 
location process or simple geographical agglomeration, we can discern an 
ongoing process of structural coupling between various systems (one or more 
firms, the local labor force, the public administration, etc.) where they just 
share some part of their structure. Typically, a TNC’s localization process 
reflects this kind of territorial interaction, searching for specific structural ele-
ments – resources – that are present in the territory and which the corporation 
wants to exploit. Also, most territorial competitiveness strategies fall into this 
category: policies to attract footloose foreign direct investment (FDI) – such 
as a call center or an assembly plant – are aimed solely at finding some sort of 
temporary structural coupling with international capital flows. This structural 
coupling will be described by the local administration as “low unemploy-
ment” and will be called by TNC managing board “low cost of labor.”
4 The final type can be named organizative territorial interaction and it occurs 
when the interaction involves both structure and organization and with 
reference to both institutional and geographical proximity. It occurs when 
different systems mix their organization to such an extent that it becomes 
difficult to establish clear boundaries between them. In other words, a new 
system – what we will call a productive territorial local system (PTLS) – is 
territorially produced. Industrial districts and milieux innovateurs4 are prob-
ably better-known examples of PTLS: in such territories, institutional and 
Table 3.1 A taxonomy of systemic interaction
Nature of interaction
Kinds of proximity Structural Organizative
Only institutional Markets Hierarchies
Territorial (institutional and 
geographical) Agglomeration PTLS
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geographical proximity are so tightly linked that there is a strong intercon-
nection between the different systems. For instance, the network of firms’ 
organization becomes closely related to the organization of the labor system: 
in that context, social mobility ceases to be an element of structural cou-
pling between capital and labor and becomes an emergent property of a new 
system’s organization. The network, rather than the market or the hierarchy, 
becomes the predominant arrangement among different systems (Grabher 
1993).
Before outlining some consequences for our representation of the territory, we 
must introduce more precise statements about this taxonomy of systemic interac-
tion:
1 In our opinion, the passage from structural to organizative interaction always 
implies the emergence of new properties. Therefore, the passage is not just 
quantitative – more relationships – but to a greater extent qualitative and 
ontological – the emergence of new relationships that define a new system’s 
organization.
2 A system does not belong exclusively to one category. For instance, the exist-
ence of a PTLS does not exclude the possibility that in that territory there are 
ongoing processes of mere agglomeration or even simpler loose localization: 
a TNC might be interested in localizing in an industrial district merely to try 
to take advantage of some locally embedded resources. It is also possible 
for a PTLS to be part of a global commodity chain, or to buy raw materials 
or specialized services on the market, without engaging in an organizative 
interaction. In addition, we can conceive that some systems might undergo 
systemic interactions in all four realms simultaneously. Consider a global 
player such as Motorola: it can buy intermediate goods directly from the 
market – such as silicon, microchips, and software – or locate manufacturing 
plants in a developing country to take advantage of cheap labor, embedding 
some research facilities into Silicon Valley PTLS without losing its corporate 
identity.
3 Also, the same event can have different implications depending on the con-
text in which it occurs. The closure of a Ford plant somewhere in Europe 
would most likely rupture a structural coupling with that territory, but the 
dismantling of the main plant in Detroit would probably trigger changes not 
only at the structural level, but also at an organizative one, causing a deeper 
identity crisis in the city.5
4 Finally, we have to point out that systemic interaction is a dynamic ongoing 
process and is therefore reversible. Consider any PTLS: a change in even a 
small process of structural coupling outside the boundaries of an industrial 
district – for instance the decision to relocate some low-quality part of the 
production process to Turkey or Romania – might have catastrophic effects 
on the strength of the territorial organizative interaction on which the very 
existence of the district is based. Consider, in contrast, the GM–Fiat agree-
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ment: technically this is no more than a joint venture involving a minority 
share exchange and therefore it can be considered, for the time being, an 
institutional structural interaction with some effects on territorial structural 
interaction – such as rationalization of component production. However, if 
this agreement had been transformed into a full merger, something like an 
institutional organizative coupling, a new system would have been generated 
– physically a new corporation.
According to the aims of this work, our interest will necessarily be focused 
mainly on processes of territorial systemic interaction, that is, those interactions 
that occur in the presence of both geographical and institutional proximity and 
which consequently emphasize the ability to consider territory itself from a sys-
temic perspective.
Toward productive territorial local systems: different kinds 
of territorialization
According to the taxonomy developed in the previous section, we can distinguish 
two different processes of interaction between systems and territories.
Structural territorialization: the territory as environment
The first process considers territory as the outcome of a structural coupling 
between different systems, some of which are manifestly geographical in their 
organization (for instance the labor system, the education system, or the public 
administration) while others are based on disembedded forms of institutional 
proximity (international agencies, world-class research centers, transnational 
corporations, sectors, etc.) (Figure 3.1). We can imagine having several systems 
– in our example {A, B, C, D} – all of which are “local” but not necessarily 
“geographical.” Each of these four systems is based on a set of internal 
relationships that guarantee its organizative cohesion and by a set of both internal 
and external ties that represent its structure. In order to co-evolve with the other 
systems, each of them is involved in processes of structural coupling, that is, some 
of the structural features are shared with the other systems. For our purposes we 
can imagine territory as the outcome of many processes of structural coupling 
overlapping in time and space.
Figure 3.1 expresses only the spatial dimension of this process of multiple 
structural coupling, that is, the structure of structural couplings in a given moment 
i. To get the full picture of how territory emerges from intersystems interaction, 
we should add the temporal dimension of the process: structural change, in fact, 
occurs over time in order to match stimuli to change with organizative closure of 
the system. As a consequence, the processes of structural coupling will also be 
affected by the changes occurring in the single systems’ structures and, therefore, 
that specific structural coupling that produces the territory will also be changing 
over time.6
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If we accept this broad interpretation of territory as an environment in which 
different systems live and evolve, there is room for different theoretical and meth-
odological approaches, which will be in charge of opening and dismantling the 
systemic black boxes. For instance, the new industrial geography (NIG) explana-
tion of embeddedness and flexible specialization (Storper 1995) as well as the 
new economic geography (NEG) models on agglomeration and urban economy 
(Storper and Venables 2004) will offer useful insight about the structural coupling 
between economic activities and the other systems that are present in a given 
territory. The former focus more on the relational institutions while the latter draw 
attention to the role of market- and hierarchy-related institutional proximity. At the 
same time, this notion of territory as the outcome of structural coupling between 
different systems can offer a useful framework for more cultural approaches to 
territorialization and territorial transformation, analyzing, for instance, how dif-
ferent social or cultural groups – systems – shape their identity – organization 
– with reference to a given territory and to other systems interacting in that envi-
ronment.
Organizative territorialization: the territory as productive 
territorial local system
As we have seen, in certain cases, besides the geographical structural interaction, 
there is a second process of systemic coupling where organization – and not only 
structure – is somehow mixed together leading to a new system, that we have 
named PTLS. If we think about our initial set of systems {A, B, C, D}, we can 
imagine that among a subset of them {B, C, D} there is a process of organizative 
synthesis, that is, the three systems become involved in some sort of organizative 
interaction. A is still part of the population of the territory but it does not share any 
feature of its organization with the newborn PTLS.
Figure 3.1 Territory as the outcome of multiple structural couplings.
■ 
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For instance, by looking at Figure 3.2, we can suppose that (i) “A” is a TNC, 
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}, 
(iii) “C” is the local pool of labor, and (iv) “D” is the local higher education sys-
tem (secondary schools and university). When we say that the subset of systems 
{B, C, D} is organized into a PTLS we mean that a synthesis occurred among the 
single systems’ organizations and it produced the organization of a new system, 
the PTLS. What it is important to notice is that we do not have to think that the 
single systems {B, C, D} ceased to exist or that they lost their autonomy; nor can 
we say that the PTLS’s organization is determined by its components. In both 
cases we would not be looking at systems. We can therefore imagine that a given 
PTLS can survive as a system even in the presence of changes in its elements. 
For instance, a given PTLS might continue to exist even if part of the system of 
SME “B” delocalizes part of the production. What is more important is that we 
do not have any a priori guarantee that the PTLS will survive a dramatic change 
in the interaction between the composing systems. At the same time we have to 
consider that the single elements {B, C, D} maintain their systemic autonomy and 
are therefore involved in other processes of systemic interaction, for instance in 
some structural coupling with system “A”: the cluster of SMEs could be suppliers 
of the TNC localized in the territory, the labor system will supply the workforce, 
and the education system will contribute to train the workers of both the PTLS 
and the TNC.
What is more important here is the relationship between PTLS and territory. 
The PTLS is not, of course, the whole territory, as there are other systems in 
the territory that are autonomous from the PTLS. At the same time, the PTLS’s 
organization can be assumed to be a good proxy of the territory as it is character-
ized by emerging properties, which are territorial, defined in terms of both geo-
graphical and institutional proximity. In other words, the PTLS is not the territory 
but it behaves like a territory. We have to remember that there is not a bi-univocal 
Figure 3.2 From structural to organizative territorial interaction.
■ 
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relationship between a given territory and a PTLS: every PTLS identifies a ter-
ritory, but a territory can host a number of PTLS, which either coexist or are in 
competition with each other. As we have argued above, there is no feasible way to 
rigorously theorize something like a “territory” as an autopoietic system, because 
it is in fact too complex. Take, for instance, Prato and London. As the former is 
small and relatively non-complex, we might assume that just considering one 
PTLS (the industrial district) would be a good proxy for the whole territory, that 
is, we might accept the simplification that by comprehending Prato’s industrial 
district we also grasp the wholeness of Prato itself. In the case of London, it 
is evident that its complexity is so great that we cannot reduce its “identity” to 
particular processes ongoing, for instance, in the City or in Brixton. Better put, 
the City, which is just one of London’s various PTLS, is not an exhaustive proxy 
for the whole city. Moreover, there are changes and challenges even in smaller 
localities like Prato, questioning that such an identification between PTLS and the 
whole territory is sustainable and can be taken for granted in the long run.
Consider, as an example, the consequences of huge immigration flows from 
China into all the major Italian industrial districts. In the beginning, the immi-
grant communities were integrated in the “basement” of the PTLS’s structure, 
being functional to the price competitiveness of the industrial district but without 
substantially altering its systemic organization. Subsequently, these expatriate 
communities seemed to constitute autonomous PTLS, with their own organiza-
tion and structure, coming to represent a competitive challenge from within the 
industrial district. Thus, it might now be the case that a bag and leather wholesaler 
in east London will buy low-quality, low-cost bags and wallets from Chinese 
communities near Florence, without making any connection with the original 
PTLS hosting this enclave. Therefore, it is likely that in Prato or Valenza7 there 
are now at least two PTLS, each with its own specific organization and struc-
tural coupling with that particular territory. If we go on accepting acritically the 
full identification between the PTLS and the territory in industrial districts, we 
will never understand what is going on. For instance, we will be unable to grasp 
why, despite many claims that the tacit dimension of knowledge was the basis of 
their competitiveness, in many districts the focus has now shifted toward forms 
of codification – for instance establishing brands and trademarks that secure the 
originality, the recognizability, and the uniqueness of local production. The fact is 
that the challenge is not just from overseas imitator rival firms, but it is internal, 
from embedded vanguards.
The opposite can also be true: not every territory has one or more PTLS. One 
of the main weaknesses of territorial competitiveness and, more generally, of 
local development literature is to infer from the experience of highly cohesive and 
successful territories – such as Baden-Württemberg, the Italian industrial districts, 
or Silicon Valley – that each locality can be the protagonist of a local development 
path, based on trust, shared values, untraded relationships, and creative entrepre-
neurship. In fact, such a risky inference is barely sustainable on scientific grounds. 
Therefore, by distinguishing PTLS from territories we explicitly admit that not all 
territories can be interpreted through the lens of PTLS. Nor does this mean that, 
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from an elitist perspective, local development and territorial competitiveness are 
exclusively a matter of luck. It simply implies that:
1 some territories are better viewed as the outcome of territorial structural 
interaction;
2 there are no policies that can automatically guarantee the success of local 
development as, in a genuinely complex situation, the emergence of a PTLS 
is largely unpredictable.
Distinguishing organization and structure: an institutional 
approach
Introducing our interpretation of territorial systems as an autopoietic system we 
made a clear statement about the internal differentiation between organization and 
structure and we said that both of them are characterized by “productive” processes: 
organization produces itself through the production of a structure. Producing a 
structure implies, in turn, the production of both goods and meanings that allows 
the structural coupling with the environment and/or with other systems. Here it 
is necessary to develop a brief but effective description of how an organization 
works out its autopoietic process and how this interacts with structural change.
An institutional approach to organization and structure
From the introduction of the autopoietic systems theory in the previous section, 
we have seen that a system is made up of components and relationships. In 
particular, the organization is made up only of relationships, whereas the structure 
is composed of both relationships and components. As a consequence, the specific 
features of the components are just contingent and not necessary to the definition 
of that particular systemic organization. It is clear that such a position is antithetic 
to methodological individualism, in which all the individual features are sufficient 
to explain the properties of the whole.
In translating the systemic approach to social and territorial phenomena, we 
must therefore clarify how to emphasize the ontological differences between 
PTLS’ organization and structure. In the following pages, we will try to do so by 




Let us start with institutions. As many commentators have noted, the word 
“Institutions” is not univocal. We therefore adopt a simple definition of 
“Institution” as “a stable and shared way of organizing relationships.”9 Thus, 
“Institution” denotes a broad set of laws, habits, rules, praxis, routines, and 
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values through which a social system tries to reduce the complexity of human 
relationality in order to make decisions more easily and quickly. In the process 
of institutional production, some institutional fixes also arise, which are usually 
named Organizations: the church, the family, the market, the firm, the rugby club 
are all forms of “institutionalized Institutions,” which are mainly based on a set 
of Institutions that are crystallized in a formal set of relationships. This confers on 
the Organizations a sort of collective agency or, even more explicitly, a juridical 
personality. Of course, even if they rely on a limited set of formal Institutions, 
organizations get involved in a broader set of formal and informal Institutions, 
exactly as individuals do.
From (3.1) and (3.2) we can establish a further step in our comprehension of 
PTLS:
organization = {Institutions} (3.1)
structure = {Institutions; Organizations} (3.2)
By merging systemic and institutional approaches we can say, in a first 
approximation, that the PTLS’s organization is made up of Institutions, whereas 
the structure is composed of both Institutions and Organizations. This distinction 
has two important consequences. First, we must be able to distinguish between 
organizative Institutions and structural ones. Second, the presence of a specific set 
of Organizations in a PTLS must be considered as contingent to a particular stage 
of the structural change. This is because the PTLS must be able to reproduce its 
organization even in the presence of a dramatic change in its components. This 
principle is also applicable to the need to distinguish between Institutions: which 
are the organizative and which the structural ones? We can think of organizative 
Institutions as a set of fundamental Institutions that are characterized by a longue 
durée, quite apart from the fact that they are crystallized in formal organizations. 
The Braudelian idea of longue durée is central (Braudel 1974): organizative 
Institutions have a longer duration than contingent structural ones, but they do not 
possess the characteristics of universality, necessity, and eternity that are proper 
to reductionist sciences such as Newtonian physics and neoclassical economics.10 
The spatial interpretation of longue durée, we believe, echoes the concept of 
institutional thickness introduced by Amin and Thrift (2003). In this framework, 
new industrial geography (Bathelt and Glückler 2003) has now produced a broad 
account of institutions that are territorially thick: trust, untraded interdependen-
cies, producer–supplier relationships, shared values, quality of life, and familism 
are just some examples of institutional arrangements which, when territorially 
concentrated, enhance the success of clusters, industrial districts, milieux inno-
vateurs. Nevertheless, these institutional approaches are biased by an excess of 
optimism and are good narratives only for certain kinds of PTLS: what about 
systems in which mistrust, competition, and hierarchy supply the adhesive? And 
what about the mafia, where familiar relations and reciprocal trust are fundamen-
tal and opportunistic behavior is so damaging that it is punished by the death 
penalty?
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The role of knowledge and learning
In order to generalize the application of systemic theories and to identify the specific 
relationships that make up organizations, our position is that the organization of 
a PTLS is given by its specific knowledge and that its autopoietic activity can be 
thought of as a specific process of learning. This process is elaborated through 
a particular set of structural institutions and organizations in what we might 
name institutional learning. This solution mirrors Luhmann’s (1995) approach to 
social systems, but with a fundamental difference: whereas in Luhmann the main 
content of social systems was information, and the autopoiesis therefore consists 
in a communication process, in the case of PTLS the organizative substance is 
knowledge and the autopoietic process is therefore learning. The point now is 
“which kind of knowledge are we talking about?” The answer depends essentially 
on the kind of PTLS we have constructed, that is, on the questions the observer 
is asking a territory. If we are investigating the premodern Siberian shaman 
community, the knowledge in question will likely be a sort of magic gnosis about 
the relationship between mundane and supermundane realities. In contrast, if 
the object of the analysis is a manufacturing system such as an Italian industrial 
district, the knowledge in question might be some technical know-how combined 
with esthetic values inherited from the past. If, instead, we are dealing with a 
milieu innovateur, we will probably be interested in identifying a scientific high-
tech knowledge.
Moreover, we do not need to push our reasoning too far to hypothesize that a 
PTLS, by producing knowledge, also produces meanings. Meanings are produced 
by psychic systems, like individuals, eventually interacting with other individuals 
within a group: PTLS do not necessarily have to possess psychic properties in 
order to process knowledge – in fact, they are not minds. In a cybernetic per-
spective PTLS are like computers, which possess only syntax and not a mind. In 
other words, the process of organizative synthesis is simply syntactic and com-
putational: individual systems – such as the education system or an ethnic group 
– produce cultural meanings, PTLS do not.
At the same time, we must recognize that the knowledge we are talking about 
is not inside component systems but is an emergent property of the PTLS itself.11 
In other words, the knowledge we are talking about is never fully possessed either 
by individuals or by particular organizations. As a consequence, organizative 
knowledge is always characterized by a strong component of tacit knowledge, 
which is implicit in routines and habits and therefore not fully expressed in 
codes and texts (Polanyi 1966). As has been largely recognized by NIG, it is 
the tacit dimension that keeps this knowledge rooted in territories and impedes 
the direct and exclusive appropriation by individuals and organizations (Maskell 
and Malmberg 1999, Amin and Cohendet 2004). As a consequence, the learn-
ing process is also affected by the tacit dimension of organizative knowledge: 
institutional learning is different from the account of learning organizations,12 a 
concept that became widespread in management studies following the seminal 
work by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). There are, of course, many assonances and 
a conceptual similitude between the two, but the perspective is quite different: 
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most learning in Organizations is about appropriation of tacit knowledge from 
the PTLS, whereas organizative learning is about embedding tacit knowledge. In 
addition, in the learning Organization approach increasing emphasis is placed on 
forgetting obsolete knowledge (Noteboom 2000), whereas organizative learning 
is primarily concerned with maintaining continuity with the inherited knowledge 
changing the structure: for PTLS forgetting is broadly equal to disintegration.
Thus, we can summarize the content of our analysis in a set of five new propo-
sitions:
organization = {Knowledge} (3.3)
structure = {Institutions; Organizations} (3.4)
organization = f (organization | structure)  (3.5)
organization = f ({Knowledge} | {Institutions; Organizations}) (3.6)
f = institutional learning (3.7)
This set of propositions can summarize the whole argument we have developed 
about PTLS. First of all, we have identified the core of organization as knowledge 
(3.3), whereas the structure is given by a set of institutions that bond together a 
number of Organizations (3.4). Proposition 3.5 expresses the autopoietic principle 
that organization results in the production of a structure. Given (3.3) and (3.4), 
therefore, the autopoietic process can be declared by saying that a core knowledge 
is reproduced through the establishment of a contingent asset of both Institutions 
and Organization (3.6). This autopoietic process is what we called “institutional 
learning” (3.7).
From the ongoing argumentation, the relationship between knowledge and 
specialization and why the former refers to a PTLS’s organization whereas the 
latter is inherent in structure should be clear. In particular, the establishment of a 
specialization can be interpreted as the outcome of a structural coupling between 
the PTLS and the environment – which from time to time can be represented as 
the sector, the international division of labor, the global economy, etc. In different 
periods, therefore, the same organizative knowledge13 can be “structurally applied” 
in different sectors: when dealing with a former Fordist system, let us say Turin 
engineering PTLS,14 a specific knowledge focused on mechanical engineering, 
which goes back to the presence of Savoia’s arsenal in the eighteenth century, has 
been reproduced through an endless process of learning and applied subsequently 
to different production and specialization, from weapons to stagecoaches, from 
car bodywork to automotive components, from machine tools to robots.
Analogously similar knowledge in different territories can lead to different spe-
cializations because of unpredictable divergences in the learning process through 
which organization reproduces itself. Consider, for example, Turin’s and the Swiss 
Jura’s engineering PTLS: both have their roots in preindustrial techniques and 
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know-how, but, whereas Turin’s PTLS evolved through specializing mainly – but 
not exclusively15 – in mass production and developed a Fordist regulation system, 
the Jura is historically specialized in micro-engineering workmanship performed 
in small workshops. With a simplification, it is possible that these divergent struc-
tures are the outcomes of deep differences in the process of institutional learning: 
whereas Turin witnessed the emergence of just one large car producer adopting 
the Fordist division of labor (out of more than 100 independent competitors exist-
ing at the end of the nineteenth century) and therefore a strong class conflictuality 
hegemonized by the Communist Party, the Swiss Jura’s institutional learning has 
probably been influenced by the presence of an outstanding anarchist self-reflex-
ivity, embodied in the Proudhonian watchmakers (Vuilleumier 1988).
Some epistemological and theoretical implications for 
economic geography: the case of territorial competitiveness
When it comes to the issue of territorial competitiveness – that is the realm where 
we would like to offer some evidence of the consequences of the framework 
we have adopted – it should be clear that the systemic approach we developed 
has major implications. The first consequence is extremely important: we are 
questioning not whether a territory as whole can be assumed to be competitive, 
but how specific PTLS are competitive. Second, a PTLS is productive at both the 
organizative and structural level:
1 The organization produces itself: in this perspective, productive means 
autopoietic.
2 In producing itself, the organization also produces a structure.
Therefore, when talking about territorial competitiveness, we must distinguish 
between the ability of the system to reproduce its organization (organizative terri-
torial competitiveness) and the success of contingent competitive phenomena that 
occur at the level of the structure, such as selling manufactured goods or attracting 
FDI or new inhabitants (structural territorial competitiveness). Moreover, such a 
systemic standpoint can help us to clarify some of the ambiguous features of the 
competitiveness debate.
Identity and personality
One of the first and mainly unsolved issues that has arisen from the growing debate 
on territorial competitiveness is the question of whether talking about territorial 
competitiveness necessarily implies that territories possess a clearly identifiable 
identity that bestows on them some form of collective agency. This problem has 
been summarized by questioning whether or not territories hold something like a 
personality, like firms, which are said to have a juridical personality. Following 
what has been said in the previous sections, we can try to briefly address the 
question consistently with the systemic approach we have adopted.
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The first point, here, is to recall the distinction between territory and PTLS. 
The first, in fact, has been conceptualized as the outcome of reiterated processes 
of structural coupling among different local systems – both territorial and ater-
ritorial. In other words, we have adopted a skeptical position with reference to 
the possibility of speaking about territories’ systemic organization: the process of 
territorialization – that is attributing a meaning to territories – is so complex that 
there is no feasible way of assessing whether territories do have a clear and univo-
cal organization, that is, an identity, that is, a personality. The first conclusion 
is therefore that the concepts of identity and personality are such controversial 
monolithic concepts that they cannot be applied easily to the territory as a whole.
The second step is to consider how the concept of PTLS can be characterized 
through the metaphor of personality. At first glance, because of the conceptual 
proximity between systemic organization and identity, we might infer from the 
existence of PTLS’ organization that PTLS possess a full personality. Nevertheless, 
if we consider the real implications of our approach we have to consider several 
issues:
1 The first and probably most important issue is about the nature of the PTLS’s 
organization itself: as we have seen from the beginning, the organization, 
and therefore the identity, of the PTLS should be interpreted, in a cyber-
netic framework, as a syntactic process, rather than a semantic one. Thus, 
the PTLS lacks one of the main features that would allow us to speak about 
a full personality: it does not produce emergent meanings, but it holds only 
computational processes of a combination of meanings produced at other 
levels in order to produce a specific form of knowledge. More radically, 
when considering systemic organization, we are interested not in the set of 
contingent meanings, but in the cognitive process of learning. Contingent 
meanings are important to evaluate the processes of structural coupling and 
structural change, but with respect to the systemic organization these are just 
signs processed in a computational procedure.
2 Moreover, unlike individual firms or associations, the PTLS is a system whose 
components are other systems rather than individuals. This implies that there 
is a higher level of both organizational and reflexive complexity, which, in 
the absence of a linear and univocal causation chain, makes it impossible 
to move from the individuals to the PTLS maintaining the personality’s 
properties, which we can find at the individual level and eventually at the 
associational one.
3 Autopoietic systems are not teleological in their functioning, whereas follow-
ing determined scopes and strategies is one of the main features of being a 
person. Strategies and scopes can be present, but they are always secondary 
in that they are attributed by an observer, which can be external (a scholar, a 
consultant, or a national policy-maker, just to give a few examples) or inter-
nal (an association, a trade union, or a Schumpeterian entrepreneur).
4 Finally, even in the presence of an organization that seems to be legitimized 
to speak and act on behalf of the PTLS (for instance a local development 
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agency or an export-oriented consortium as in many industrial districts), we 
must bear in mind that the existence of such actors is simply a structural 
feature of the PTLS and not an organizative one: they are instrumental to 
the organizative closure and therefore they are not part of the organization. 
In designing policies for local development, it should therefore be clear that 
this kind of collective agency is just interpreting, and not standing in for, the 
organization of the system.
As a consequence, it seems inappropriate to talk about the juridical personality 
of territories: for sure, they must possess an identity, but, for the reasons pointed 
out, this identity must be conceived in cognitive, computational, and syntactic 
terms rather than in vitalistic, semantic, and idealistic ones. Recognizing that ter-
ritories are important for the human spirit does not necessarily imply that they 
have a spirit (Buttimer 1993). Even more importantly, the way we address the 
issue of territorial competitiveness seems to allow us to reduce the importance 
of the personality issue: as autopoietic systems are characterized by organizative 
closure, the competitive issue is related to maintaining the organization, that is, to 
reproducing the fundamental knowledge that distinguishes the PTLS from other 
systems. Competitiveness toward other territorial systems becomes secondary 
when considering the contingent processes of structural coupling and change, 
through which the organization closure is maintained.
Path dependence and emergence
The second issue we have to address relating to territorial competitiveness 
concerns the character of path dependence, which is traditionally associated 
with agglomeration and competitiveness, and how it interacts with the ideas 
of emergence and novelty, which are central in complexity and systemic 
epistemologies. We will argue that the shortcut to explain the coexistence of both 
continuity (that is, path dependence) and emergence (that is, invention of new 
paths) is given, once more, by the distinction that Maturana and Varela (1980, 
1987) introduced between organization and structure. There are, in fact, some 
similarities between how we defined the operationality of the autopoietic system 
and the emphasis that both NEG (Krugman 1996b) and NIG (Malmberg 1997) 
put on path dependence. More precisely, the application of autopoiesis to social 
systems and territories allows us to distinguish two kinds of path dependence, a 
structural one and an organizative one:
1 Structural path dependence refers to the concept of structural determined 
change, that is, the fact that the changes in a system are changes in the struc-
ture, which depend on the previous states of the structure itself.
2 Organizative path dependence, that is, the fact that the PTLS maintains con-
tinuity in the basic set of relationships that define its identity. In other words, 
organizative path dependence can be assumed to be a synonym for organiza-
tive closure.
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At the same time, both structure and organization can change over time, but in 
different ways. More precisely, the structure has a broader range of possible vari-
ation, as long as the organization remains relatively still and maintains its internal 
consistency. From a theoretical perspective, we might admit also that the organi-
zation changes over time without substantial alterations. Nevertheless, in practical 
terms, it is very difficult to set a boundary beyond which the PTLS has changed 
its organization so much that it becomes something different. Therefore, we can 
hypothesize that the organization either changes dramatically and catastrophically 
– and therefore that the PTLS becomes something completely different – or stays 
mainly unchanged over time.
This systemic account of emergence and path dependence allows us to address 
some of the open questions we have inherited from the literature. We can briefly 
consider three of them here: Krugman’s account of history and path dependence; 
the emergence of innovation within a PTLS; and the problems of lock-in, inertia, 
and creative destruction:
1 Krugman’s account of path agglomeration and path dependence refers mainly 
to the structure of a PTLS, in that he focuses his explanation on the two con-
cepts of increasing returns and monopolistic competition, which are actually 
features of the contingent structure, rather than the immanent organization. 
As a consequence, NEG seems to fail in addressing long-term continuity, 
which is (un)explained using the concepts of QWERTY or pure chance. In 
a systemic perspective, what Krugman sees as “chance” is instead a spe-
cific learning process with a relatively clear beginning and development. Of 
course, at the very beginning, we agree that a random fortuitous event might 
be the spark that leads to the birth of a PTLS, but focusing on the learning 
organizative core, rather than just on structural mechanisms, might help us to 
shift the boundaries of our interpretation and comprehension.
2 The second issue is about the emergence of innovation. In a systemic perspec-
tive, given that the organization will preserve PTLS closure, innovation will 
occur in the structure, either internally as a result of the process of autopoiesis 
or internalized from the environment, through the process of structural cou-
pling. Even in the presence of a “catastrophic” account of innovation, such 
as the Schumpeterian reworking of Kondrat’ev’s innovation-led economic 
cycles, we can maintain that even scientific revolutions affect only a PTLS’s 
structure and not its organization: organization can still be imagined as a sort 
of Braudelian longue durée that lies beneath such epochal and epic transfor-
mations, just finding some form of structural coupling with them.16
3 NEG and management scholars involved with the knowledge-based and 
institutional learning approach share some worries about the lock-in trap. 
Path dependence and continuity, as well as tacit forms of knowledge, imply, 
in fact, a certain degree of inertia, which might prevent the adaptation of the 
economic system to changing times.17 In fact, in an autopoietic perspective, 
this is largely a fake problem: as far as structural change is concerned, the 
troubles of lock-in can be avoided without sacrificing the organizative conti-
nuity.18
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As a consequence, we do not have to face a trade-off between path dependence 
and emergence, as the systemic distinction between organization and structure 
implies that both dependence and emergence vary in amplitude and scope and 
therefore that they can coexist in different layers of the PTLS.
Cohesion and power
In considering the implication of systems theory for understanding territorial 
competitiveness, the third and last issue we would like to address relates to 
cohesion and power. The territorial competitiveness literature often emphasizes 
internal cohesion among groups and classes within the territory, whereas conflicts 
are seen as favoring competitors, making the territory unattractive for FDI and 
wealthy inhabitants and decreasing productivity. On the other hand, its critics 
have stressed that territorial competitiveness policies often hide neoliberalist shifts 
in the national power balance (Brenner 2004) or, at least, that there are specific 
shareholders who benefit more than others (Cheshire and Gordon 1996). This 
issue is particularly sensitive within the theoretical framework we have adopted. 
Since Menemio Agrippa’s (in)famous apologue in Ancient Rome, organicism 
– and, broadly speaking, the use of biological metaphors in social science – has 
been seen as teleological and therefore aimed at maintaining existing power 
relationships among social groups and classes. More recently, Luhmann’s social 
systems theory has been repeatedly accused of being intrinsically conservative, 
if not reactionary (Zolo 1986, 1990). The misunderstanding is also possible 
when considering the “political” implications of PTLS. Saying that the variety of 
meanings refers to the structure and not to the organization – and that therefore 
they are contingent – might be interpreted as a neglect of power relationships and 
conflicts. The criticism of the application of a systems theory in social studies 
is also partially substantiated because of its apparently strong anti-individualist 
inspiration. Nevertheless, we claim that this judgment depends on the confusion 
that is often made between organization and structure.19
The idea that power and struggle are fundamental in shaping important systemic 
processes – such as structural coupling – is, in fact, quite self-evident. Moreover, 
our point is that power and conflict are important not only in regulating the exter-
nal relationships between different systems,20 but also in defining territorial and 
local assets. In fact, power relationships and conflictuality are central to defining 
both the territory and the PTLS:
1 Territory has been conceptualized, in fact, as the outcome of iterated structural 
coupling processes and therefore is, by antonomasia, produced by different 
systems that are not necessarily harmoniously committed to each other.
2 PTLS itself is produced by a process of organizative synthesis that is not 
necessarily and intrinsically peaceful: the interaction between the systems 
that form the PTLS entails an emergent order, and thus some form of cohe-
sion, but there is no specific need to make this synthetic process easier.
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A corollary to this is the fact that a PTLS’s organization must be stable in 
order to keep the system itself in existence, but we cannot take it for granted 
that the system will last for ever and ever: conflicts can increase and produce an 
irreversible crisis (deterritorialization) that will lead to a new organization and 
therefore to a new PTLS (reterritorialization). Moreover, we have insisted that the 
process of organizative synthesis is a syntactic procedure that processes different 
meanings and knowledge in a unique knowledge, which represents the core of the 
systemic organization. In this process, new knowledge is computed but no new 
meaning is necessarily produced, so that there is no automatic moral judgment 
about the goodness of what is produced: the Italian mafia might also be described 
as a PTLS that reproduces itself by producing institutional knowledge.
Conclusions: needs for rethinking local development
Taken together, these argumentations emerge from the conceptual framework that 
we have constructed so far: if reality is complex and multidimensional, every 
interpretation of it will be a point of view in a single process of understanding 
phenomena which, to be comprehended, must be observed in their many facets. 
It follows that knowledge is no longer conceived to be predetermined, but can be 
developed only through interaction between the subject-observer and the object 
of knowledge. 
Local policy as the mere expression of a development ethic that accepts the 
laws and dynamics of contemporary capitalism produces nothing other than a 
simple – local – specification of standardizing processes and forces. In this case, 
although turning attention to places modifies our vision of the development 
process, it cannot change the concept of development itself. To state that places 
(whether they are defined as clusters, industrial districts, milieu innovateur, or by 
any other metaphors) play a fundamental role in the contemporary economy does 
not mean to state that they are central.
The thesis that now emerges is fundamentally different. The systemic perspec-
tive is the bearer of the idea of a PTLS that reproduces its own identity, given by 
the organization of those social, cultural, and economic relations that make up its 
“uniqueness.” In this case, if the arbiter of development is no longer the market but 
the local system, it follows that the benefits of local development are evaluated in 
terms of the maintenance of the system’s organization. It follows that the political 
solutions possible are those compatible with the identity of the local systems, i.e., 
with their capacity for self-reproduction. Otherwise, as we have seen, there would 
be a shift from a logic of local development to one of mere valorization, and thus 
of possible destruction of the system.
In conclusion, the relationship between the local scale and possible develop-
ment paths and policies appears fundamentally dialectic. A development path is 
not valid on all scales, nor does there exist a temporal succession of hegemonic 
models of development, each of which dominates a given historical period. On 
the contrary, they coexist at the same time and in the same place. This depends on 
the position one takes in order to decide, i.e., on specific institutional assets. It is 
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these, in fact, that define the way in which local actors organize socioeconomic 
relations internally, the exploitation of local resources, and the relationship with 
other scales.
Notes
 1 Although this chapter is the product of joint reflection and mutual confrontation of ideas 
and methods, the sections “A narrative about complexity” and “Conclusions: needs 
for rethinking local development” are mainly Sergio Conti’s work, while the others 
(“Territorial systemic interactions,” “Toward productive territorial local systems: 
different kinds of territorialization,” “Distinguishing organization and structure: an 
institutional approach,” and “Some epistemological and theoretical implications for 
economic geography: the case of territorial competitiveness”) can be attributed to 
Paolo Giaccaria.
 2 The application of the concept of “noise” from cybernetics and complexity theories 
to social theories is actually quite a disturbing metaphor, even if there is something 
in a positive evaluation of noise itself: noise is necessary, but still powerless and 
functional to the reproduction of dominant relationships.
 3 The focus on the distinction between organization and structure is more important, 
from our perspective, than the emphasis usually placed by systemic social theorists 
– such as Luhmann – on autopoiesis. Autopoiesis is, to some extent, implied by the 
organization/structure dialogic, but stating that all the systems considered are fully 
autopoietic is an arguable hypothesis.
 4 More generically, the reference here is to the so-called “social networks,” in which 
different realms are intertwined and therefore we are facing something more than 
mere geographical proximity.
 5 Of course, the closing down of a satellite factory can also be painful in terms of 
unemployment and therefore induce strikes and protests. For instance, the Fiat 
restructuring produced more vigorous street riots in the south of Italy than in Turin. 
The fact is that here we are considering wider long-term effects than simple “structural 
adjustment.”
 6 This account of territory might show some superficial similarities with localities 
studies and specifically with Massey’s geomorphological metaphor of territory as a 
stratification of different layers left as “tangible” residues of subsequent stages of 
capitalistic development (Massey 1995). Nevertheless, the differences are deeper 
and more important than the assonances. The most important dissonance is that in 
the localities explanation external influence predominates – specifically, successive 
stages of capitalism determine territorial structures, by processes that are neither 
local nor territorial, at least in their consequences. In contrast, in our opinion, even 
if territories are not systems, they are nevertheless defined through the interaction 
of local and supralocal, territorial and aterritorial systems. Moreover, the proposed 
systemic account is also more dynamic, in that there is a continuous change in the 
boundaries and in the outcomes of territorialization, with a process of reciprocal 
cross-fertilization between the territory and the systems that live in it.
 7 Valenza, in Piedmont, is probably the most important industrial district worldwide for 
jewelry making. Recently, many producers and associations have reported a growing 
Chinese community progressively becoming autonomous from the original district 
and competing by design imitation as well as cheap prices.
 8 This is not the place to discuss the history of economic institutionalism. We simply 
accept the distinction between old and new economic institutionalism in order 
to distinguish between Veblenian revival among evolutionary economists and 
neoclassical institutionalists à la Williamson. For an account of the debate see Amin 
(1999).
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 9 This definition echoes the one by Lawson: “I suggest that the term ‘institution’ be used 
to designate those systems, or structured processes of interaction (collecting together 
rules, relations and positions as well as habits and other practices), that are relatively 
enduring and identified as such” (Lawson 1997: 318n). Nevertheless we have opted 
for a simpler definition in order to avoid the use of concepts such as “system” and 
“structure” with a different meaning from the systemic one.
 10 In his latest book, Wallerstain (2004: Ch. 5) praises a marriage between Braudel’s 
longue durée and Prigogine’s arrow of time. He also preaches for a convergence 
between the two main opponents to Newtonian physics – complexity theorists and 
post-structuralist ones – under the Braudelian – and his own as well – systemic flag: 
nevertheless, we think that world-system theory will continue to be disregarded by 
post-structuralist scholars as hidden structuralism and general system organicism.
 11 There is a strong intellectual proximity between this cybernetic account of diffused 
knowledge and von Hayek’s latest reflections on the nature of knowledge (von Hayek, 
1983). It is therefore no surprise to note that Hodgson (1999: Ch. 6) introduces the 
“second Hayek” among the precursors of NEAR (novelty-embracing anti-reductionist) 
evolutionary economics.
 12 For a complete review of the learning organization framework see the Handbook of 
Organizational Learning and Knowledge (Dierkes et al. 2001), in which learning 
organization is presented almost as a new paradigm investing not only management 
studies, but also economics, sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences.
 13 By organizative knowledge we simply mean the knowledge that represents a given 
PTLS’s organization.
 14 For a general account of Turin production in a systemic perspective see Giaccaria 
(1999) and Conti and Giaccaria (2001).
 15 In Turin there are still some small workshops where the shells of cars are worked by 
hand, with heavy hammers and wooden shapes, in order to produce tailor-made Rolls 
Royces for Arab sheiks. 
 16 For a theoretical account of the contemporary implications of Braudel’s systemization, 
with particular reference to the concept of “longue durée,” see Wallerstain’s most recent 
work (Wallerstain 2004), in which Braudel’s account of duration is reinterpreted in 
the light of complexity theorist Ilya Prigogine’s thought. For some empirical evidence, 
see Porter’s narration of how competitive advantage changed in Sassuolo’s industrial 
district (Porter 1990): tiles production, in fact, started in premodern times and evolved 
mixing local knowledge produced within the PTLS with epochal innovations such as 
engines and electronics. Not only has the traditional knowledge been preserved, but it 
also has been used to create a competitive advantage in emergent sectors, such as the 
production of machine tools related to tiles production.
 17 Hence, the revival of the Schumpeterian emphasis on “creative destruction” as part of 
the innovation process which keeps capitalism alive.
 18 We cannot in any case exclude a priori the possibility that a PTLS can face such a 
deep crisis that even its organization risks becoming obsolete – that is, in systemic 
terms, there is no possible structural coupling with the fast-changing environment and 
therefore that particular organization will implode. Nevertheless, this represents the 
last ratio.
 19 Luhmann himself fostered the ambiguity of his interpretation, misrepresenting 
the distinction between organization and structure – which is seminal in Maturana 
and Varela’s (1980, 1987) original theory – and focusing only on the process of 
autopoiesis.
 20 Considering purely external conflictuality – implicit in the notion itself of territorial 
competitiveness – would, in fact, be consistent with the alleged accusation of excessive 
emphasis on internal consistency.
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4 Place is what we think with
 Or spatial history, intellectual 
capital and competitive distinction
G. M. Peter Swann
Introduction
The title of this chapter is derived from a poem by one of Britain’s outstanding 
poets, Roy Fisher (1994), which starts: ‘Birmingham’s what I think with’. That 
captures the theme of this chapter very succinctly, as I shall show in a moment. 
But, first, let us be clear what this chapter is not about. It’s not about the idea 
that creative people need space. Nor is it about the idea that, ‘new ideas need 
new space’ because they conflict with existing orthodoxies, or because innovators 
locate apart from the cluster to avoid risk of information loss.1 The chapter is 
about the idea that, even if space loses one part of its economic meaning through 
globalisation, it may acquire another economic meaning. With the growth of 
globalisation, place may no longer be the source of economic distinction that it 
was in the past. However, traders may find new sources of competitive distinction 
from their spatial history.
The chapter is organised as follows. The second section addresses what I call 
the four ages of space. The first, the medieval age, is one in which the cost of 
transport and communication over distance is sufficiently high that space is an 
enduring source of competitive distinction. Moreover, economies of agglomera-
tion and scale, such as they are, are not sufficiently strong to lead to any ‘cluster-
ing’. The second, the industrial age, is one in which transport and communication 
costs have fallen and economies of agglomeration and scale are sufficiently strong 
that clustering of production (plus transportation to local markets) is more cost-
effective than local production at point of consumption. The third age, the age 
of global clusters, is one in which transport and communication costs decline 
towards zero, but economies of agglomeration and scale remain very important, 
so production is clustered into a small number of global clusters, which trade their 
outputs with the whole world. This is the world of today, and it is possible that 
this age will develop further and further without fundamental change. Another 
possibility is that there will be a fourth age. This could be called the new global 
village, where transport and communications costs decline to zero, and economies 
of agglomeration and scale fade away. Traditional economic forces lead to the dis-
persion of clusters, and product activity is once again dispersed with population.
At first sight, the third age and the fourth age may look similar, but they are 
very different in character. This chapter is concerned with the fourth age – if 
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indeed it is ever to be seen. In this, space may not seem to have an important 
economic role – when compared with the first, second and third ages – but I shall 
argue that it does have such a role. In this apparently placeless world, spatial 
history shapes human capital, and hence economic distinction. Distance may have 
died, but location is not irrelevant.2
Then in the third section of this chapter, I examine why traders may need to 
turn to their spatial history as a possible source of competitive distinction when 
place itself no longer offers such distinction. This section uses some key results 
from the measurement of product competitiveness (Swann and Taghavi 1992). 
One of the most important of these is the assertion that, as the number of char-
acteristics distinguishing a product from the competition falls, so also does the 
probability that a product will achieve sufficient competitive distinction to remain 
competitive. This is highly relevant in the context of globalisation. Geographical 
space is an obvious source of competitive distinction when transportation and 
communication over distance is costly. But space-shrinking technological change 
erodes this source of competitive distinction, and hence reduces the probability 
that a trader remains competitive.
The fourth section of the chapter then examines the issue of ‘endogenous 
dimensionality’ in economic models of product competition (Swann 1990). A key 
concept here is the assertion that traders seek to expand the dimensions of char-
acteristics space when the existing space becomes congested, but if the existing 
space is not congested then there is less incentive to expand dimensions. Again, 
this is highly relevant to globalisation. If space-shrinking technologies remove 
the competitive distinction provided by location per se, then traders will need to 
seek other sources of competitive distinction to increase the dimensionality of 
characteristics space. However – and this is the key point – they do not do this 
until the existing space is congested.
The fifth section gives some examples of how spatial history may yield a 
source of competitive distinction when place in itself does not. The discussion 
in this section relates to the fourth age of place – a world in which the costs 
of transport and communication are zero and economies of agglomeration have 
vanished. If place no longer matters for producer–customer interaction, or as a 
source of agglomeration economies, then why should place matter at all? Here I 
consider two ways in which place can still matter in the fourth age. First, place 
may become a product/service characteristic in the eyes of the customer – when it 
was not previously a characteristic of any importance. Second, the history of place 
(or spatial history) shapes and enhances the intellectual capital of the trader: place 
is what we think with. The sixth section concludes.
The four ages of place
Building on Swann (1999, 2003), I find it helpful to identify four ages of 
place. These are distinguished by reference to two factors: first, the general 
costs of transportation and communication over distance; second, the extent of 
agglomeration economies.
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Figure 4.1 provides a simple summary. As Swann (2003) shows, when trans-
portation and communication costs are high and economies of agglomeration are 
low, then activity tends to be dispersed. As transportation and communication 
costs fall, then activity tends to become more clustered. Equally, as economies of 
agglomeration increase, then activity once again tends to become more clustered. 
When transport costs fall and economies of agglomeration rise together, then 
there is a strong tendency towards clustering. Figure 4.1 superimposes a path 
describing the four ages of place. These are labelled 1–4 in the figure, and are 
joined together in a curve to represent the possibility that some industries and 
economies at least will evolve along that hypothetical curve.
The first age: a medieval age
The first age is marked by a 1 in the top left-hand corner of Figure 4.1. In this 
age, costs of transport and communication are very high while agglomeration 
economies are very low. As a result, two producers, X and Y, located in distant 
towns are really no competition for each other. Geographical separation is a 
sufficient source of competitive distinction.3 In this age, place clearly matters 
because a customer will generally buy from local producers, and hence distant 
producers are generally no competition. Place is a direct source of competitive 
distinction for that reason. However, there is also a sense in which place does 
not matter: agglomeration economies are not location specific, because there are 
indeed no agglomeration economies.
Figure 4.1 The four ages of place.













The second age: an industrial age
The second age is marked as point 2 in Figure 4.1. In this second age, transportation 
and communication costs have fallen somewhat and economies of agglomeration 
have grown somewhat. As a result there is some clustering, though not on the 
scale seen in the third age. Activities tend to crowd together in towns and cities 
that serve their region. But this is not yet the age of superclusters that achieve 
global dominance in their chosen industry. Inter-regional and international trade 
is higher than in the first age, but not as high as in the third age. Here place 
matters too, but for a different reason. In this second age, location is not such a 
strong source of competitive distinction as in the first age, and distant producers 
may be a threat to our local producer. However, place now matters as a source of 
agglomeration economies. The agglomeration economies are location specific.4
The third age: global clusters 
The third age is marked as point 3 in Figure 4.1. Transport and communication 
costs have declined to a much lower level, but economies of agglomeration are 
even more important. For these reasons, clustering is now very strong. This is 
the age of global clusters and extensive international trade. In one sense place is 
irrelevant. In terms of access to customers, a local supplier enjoys no advantages 
over distant suppliers. In another sense, place is more important than ever. 
Agglomeration economies are highly location specific. Producers in a specific 
industry may find that there are only a few places worldwide where they can 
locate and remain competitive. This is where the economy is today, and it may 
be that this age will develop further and further without fundamental change. 
Alternatively, there may be a fourth age.
The fourth age: the new global village
The fourth age is marked as point 4, in the bottom left-hand corner of Figure 
4.1. Transport and communication costs decline to zero and economies of 
agglomeration also disappear. As a result, there are no obvious reasons for 
clustering and, indeed, the normal economic force of the price mechanism will 
tend to dissipate clusters. In this fourth age, place does not appear to matter. It 
does not matter to the customer where the supplier is located. And it does not 
matter if a producer is located outside any cluster, because there is no loss of 
agglomeration economies. In short, the role of place in these four ages can be 
summarised in Table 4.1.
However, I shall argue below that, even in this fourth age, location may matter 
indirectly, because place is what we think with. Traders’ locational history shapes 
their intellectual capital, and hence can be used to provide competitive distinction. 
Place matters because different locations shape their residents’ intellectual capital 
in different ways. I return to this point later.
The outcome of the third age may seem surprising. Crude intuition suggests 
that as the costs of transportation and communication fall to zero then place 
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becomes irrelevant. But this is a misunderstanding – partly right, of course, but 
also partly wrong. Customers may not care where their supplier is located. But 
place matters because producers located in the wrong place do not enjoy the same 
agglomeration economies as those located in the cluster, and hence will not be as 
efficient. This crude intuition fails to see the difference between the third age and 
the fourth age. The eradication of transport and communication costs leads only 
to the third age. To reach the fourth age, where place does not seem to matter, 
agglomeration economies must also be eradicated.5
It could be that the eradication of transport and communication costs would 
also eliminate agglomeration economies. And indeed, if this were true, then the 
third and fourth ages would be the same. But the eradication of transport and 
communication costs need not necessarily eliminate agglomeration economies. 
As will be clear in a moment, some economies of agglomeration are nothing to do 
with costs of transport and communication, and will remain even when the latter 
decline to zero.
Agglomeration economies here mean all the reasons why the collocation of 
production activities may entail lower production costs than if that production 
were dispersed. Some of these agglomeration economies may be sensitive to the 
costs of transport and communication. For example, one much discussed source 
of agglomeration economies is the ease with which employees from different 
organisations meet and exchange tacit knowledge. This requires face-to-face 
meetings, and hence will indeed be sensitive to the costs of transport. The advent 
of space-shrinking technologies can be expected to undermine these economies 
of agglomeration. But many plant-level economies of scale and scope are not 
influenced in this way by transport and communication costs. Rather, they derive 
from physically bound fixed costs. For example, economies of scale in a major 
semiconductor fabrication plant derive from the very large fixed costs incurred 
in installing the necessary capital in that plant. These scale economies are not 
destroyed by reducing transport and communications costs between two smaller 
(collaborative) plants.
A necessary condition for the eradication of all types of agglomeration econo-
mies would be that production processes are infinitely reducible, and without any 
economies of scale in the production of components. In general, it would take 
much more than the eradication of transport and communication costs to achieve 
that.
Take the example of PC manufacture. PC manufacture is highly reducible – it 
is split into many steps. But the process is not infinitely reducible, and there are 
Table 4.1 The role of place
Age Producer–customer interaction Agglomeration economies
First Important Not important
Second Moderately important Moderately important
Third Not important Important
Fourth Not important Not important
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strong economies of scale in the manufacture of each component. As a result, clus-
ters are found which specialise in the production of particular components, and 
these are dispersed across many countries (Table 4.2). However, this is certainly 
not the sort of dispersion envisaged in the fourth age – the new global village.
Competitive survival
Competitive survival requires competitive distinction. It does not require absolute 
competitive advantage. It just requires that there is at least one competitive 
environment in which you have advantage. A zoological analogy illustrates this 
very clearly. In most environments within the UK, our native red squirrel cannot 
survive the competitive battle for survival against the (immigrant) grey squirrel. 
But in the right (mainly conifer) woodland, the red can survive because the grey 
does not find the food it likes. As a result, there are a few areas in England (and 
rather more in Scotland) where the red survives.
As Swann and Taghavi (1992) put it, competitive survival requires that traders 
lie on some part of the frontier of a competitive space. Another way of looking at 
this is to say that a product 0 is competitive if its price (P
0
) is less than or equal to 
the maximum price at which it would find a buyer. The latter is defined as:
Table 4.2 Origin of components for a typical personal computer (2003)
Brand USA
Final assembly and dispatch Ireland
Main box Ireland
Chips on motherboard USA, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines
Battery on motherboard Philippines
Power supply China
CD ROM drive China (assembled from Japanese parts)
CD-R (consumables) Germany
Hard disk drive Singapore
3.5" floppy disk drive Philippines
Modem card Netherlands (chips from USA, Korea, Taiwan)
Graphics card China (chips from USA, Korea, Taiwan)
Specialist video card USA






Inkjet printer Spain 
Zip drive Malaysia 
Scanner Taiwan
Web-cam China
Power supplies (peripherals) Taiwan, China, Malaysia, Mexico
Manuals Scotland, Ireland, Wales, Germany
Environmental certification Sweden
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where a describes the tastes of a consumer and A is the set of different consumer 
tastes to be found in a market; R
0
 is a (dummy) price variable, to be maximised; 
V(.) is a direct utility function, describing the value consumer a places on a product 
with characteristics defined by Z; and P
i
 defines the price of good i (from the set 
of all competing goods, I). Equation 4.1 defines the maximum price for product 0 
such that the surplus on product 0 (as enjoyed by the ideal consumer, a) exceeds 
that surplus which consumer a could attain on any other product. Or this can be 
rewritten as:
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In this formulation, the solution values for a* and i* define (respectively) the 
tastes of the ideal consumer and the closest substitute to product 0 in the eyes of 
that ideal consumer. Swann and Taghavi (1992) show that P* – P increases (or at 
least, does not decline) as the number of characteristics (k) is increased. That is:
P* – P = φ(k) (4.3)
where φ(.) is non-decreasing in k. It can be shown that the scope for traders to find 
sufficient competitive distinction for survival increases with k.
Prob{P* – P ≥ 0} = π(k) (4.4)
where π(.) is non-decreasing in k. Swann and Taghavi (1992) show that, when 
φ(.) is sharply increasing as a function of k, this means that the competitiveness 
of the product is highly dependent on its distinctive characteristics. But when φ(.) 
is barely increasing as a function of k, this means that the competitiveness of the 
product derives mainly from its low price, and is little affected by any distinctive 
characteristics.
These results are highly relevant to the present context. Space-shrinking 
technologies remove or reduce the effectiveness of geographical dimensions as 
a source of competitive distinction. As such, the chance of a trader achieving 
competitive distinction is likely to fall. In particular, those traders who previously 
survived because they offered a standard product/service at a standard price but in 
a new location will no longer survive. They have to introduce innovations in the 
product or service to achieve that. Figure 4.2 illustrates this quite clearly.
The first quadrant (upper left) shows an arbitrary distribution of products/serv-
ices along a one-dimensional geographical space. The vertical axis measures value 
for money. The second quadrant (upper right) shows how all of these products/
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at distant locations. The V-shapes in this quadrant represent indifference curves 
for consumers located at particular points on the line. The apex of the V describes 
the value for money that is acceptable from a trader located at the consumer’s 
home, so to speak. The consumer would be willing to travel to buy products from 
a distant trader, but these would have to offer better value for money. The V-
shapes describe the trade-off between distance and value for money. Each of the 
different V-shapes represents the indifference curve for a consumer whose home 
is at the same location as a trader. As drawn, each of these consumers prefers to 
buy from their neighbourhood trader rather than travel to another trader – even if 
that trader offers better value for money. In each case the benefits of travelling to 
find better value for money are more than offset by the extra costs involved. Here, 
all traders are competitive.
The third quadrant (lower left) shows the relevant indifference curve when 
space-shrinking technologies reduce the cost of transacting over distance to nil. 
This indifference curve is flat. Here the only issue on the consumer’s mind is 
value for money. The location of traders no longer matters. In this case every 
consumer will seek to buy from the trader offering the best value for money, and 
none of the other traders will make any sales. It is as if the dimension represent-
ing geographical space no longer exists so that competition between the different 
products is summarised as in the fourth quadrant (lower right). There is just one 
dimension, and in this one dimension only one trader is competitive. Compare this 
with the second quadrant (upper right), where all seven products could achieve 
sufficient competitive distinction to survive.
Dimensions of product space
What happens when one of the dimensions offering competitive distinction 
disappears? One common possibility is that traders will seek to add new 
dimensions by which they may – once again – distinguish themselves from the 
competition. In this context, much can be learnt from the analysis of ‘endogenous 
dimensionality’ – as summarised in Swann (1990). That source contains a number 
of generalisations from simulation studies, but these do not have the status 
of formal theorems. I shall just use one of these results here, which refers to 
innovative entry and non-innovative entry. The former describes market entry by 
a trader who increases the dimensions of product space (by adding one or more 
new characteristics). The latter describes entry by a trader who does not add new 
characteristics but finds a niche within the existing dimensions of product space.
Innovative entry becomes relatively profitable when any particular dimensional 
space becomes congested. But when the space is not congested, then the limited 
additional returns to innovative entry do not warrant the additional cost, and non-
innovative entry is more profitable. Or, to put it another way, traders introduce 
new dimensions only when there is crowding in existing dimensions. Traders do 
not bother to differentiate themselves in new dimensions until they are unable to 
differentiate themselves in existing dimensions.
While this generalisation is couched in terms of congestion, it is also relevant 
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to the case that one of the dimensions along which products are differentiated no 
longer serves as a source of distinction. This is relevant to the ‘death of distance’ 
that results from space-shrinking technologies. When space provides enough 
competitive distinction, traders will not necessarily find it worthwhile to seek 
distinction through product differentiation. But when space does not provide dis-
tinction – either because it is congested or because of the ‘death of distance’ – then 
traders will find it necessary to seek competitive distinction in other ways.
These new dimensions may be related to place. If they are, they can perhaps be 
of two sorts. First, the trader finds that he can turn place directly into new product 
characteristics, e.g. ‘local’ becomes a desirable characteristic for food. Second, 
the trader finds that his spatial history leaves a legacy in intellectual capital, and 
the trader can exploit this to generate competitive distinction. Place is what you 
think with.
Place in the fourth age
The discussion in this section relates to the fourth age of place – a world in which 
the costs of transport and communication are zero, and economies of agglomeration 
have vanished. I suggested above that such an age is not easily achieved, and is 
indeed a very different world from the third age. However, it is an important 
possible world within the context of this book, so I shall focus on it hereafter.
If place no longer matters for producer–customer interaction, or as a source of 
agglomeration economies, then why should place matter at all? But there are at 
least two ways in which place can still matter in the fourth age. First, place may 
become a product/service characteristic in the eyes of the customer – when it was 
not previously a characteristic of any importance. Second, the history of place (or 
spatial history) shapes and enhances the intellectual capital of the trader:6 place is 
what we think with.
The examples that follow are only a few from the many possible. Moreover, in 
this short chapter, these are rather cursory and sometimes superficial. However, 
they are enough to demonstrate our main argument.
Place as a product/service characteristic
The experience of the holiday resort in the UK gives an excellent introduction to 
this phenomenon. Some holiday resorts have had to redefine themselves in the 
face of international competition. Or, to paraphrase a view that seems to be held 
by many in the tourism business: ‘Bournemouth discovered it had a history when 
tour companies started to offer cheap packages to the Costa del Sol’. With the 
holiday resort, does place really matter? If a resort offers sunshine, clean beaches 
and warm water, does it really matter where it is? Judging from the way such 
resorts marketed themselves in the 1950s and 1960s, the answer would appear 
to be ‘no’. The resort is a collection of product and service characteristics – and 
the three listed above are the key ones. If these are adequately supplied, then 
place does not matter. However, two factors have changed this emphatically in 
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the subsequent forty to fifty years. First, the growth of international competition: 
cheap air travel led to competitive holiday packages in warmer climates, which 
could easily beat UK resorts on the three characteristics listed above. Second, 
the holiday has become for ever more of us an item of consumption in which 
distinction plays an important role. The customer does not want only the three 
characteristics described above: (s)he wants something more distinctive. Those 
on the producer side of tourism have tried to reinvent themselves so that place 
does matter. They do not just sell beaches; they sell place as history. Because 
international competitors can dominate UK resort X on each of the dimensions 
which X has to offer, X must reinvent itself as X plus something else.
Textbook economics tends to treat some foodstuffs (such as wheat) as the clas-
sic example of a commodity. After all, there exist commodity exchanges where 
standardised items are traded in million-dollar deals by traders who do not see 
the foodstuffs in which they are trading, certainly never taste their foodstuffs, 
and probably do not even know where their tonne of wheat is actually located, 
let alone where it was produced! Moreover, as Marx (1983 [1859]) observed: 
‘We cannot say from the taste of the wheat whether it was raised by Russian serf, 
French smallholder or English capitalist.’ However, amongst some consumers at 
least, there is a revolt against the idea of foodstuffs as commodities. Partly this is 
a revolt against food miles (or food kilometres) and the attendant environmental 
damage. Partly it is a response to the sharply declining economic circumstances of 
farming as an industry. Suddenly the place in which food was produced becomes 
important.7 That food is locally produced is a merit in its own right and/or it 
may be an indicator of quality (freshness, flavour, etc.). The supermarket chain 
Sainsbury label all its organic food with an instruction telling you how to find out 
about its origins. Increasing numbers buy their food from local farmers’ markets. 
You can visit the farm, the vineyard or the distillery! The desirability of a particu-
lar foodstuff cannot be detached from the means of production.
Place is what we think with
Stewart (1997), amongst others,8 has argued that intellectual capital is fast 
emerging as the principal source of competitive advantage – not natural resources, 
machinery or even financial capital. How can place shape that intellectual capital? 
I shall examine a number of examples below. In some of these cases, variety 
in spatial history and interaction is a virtue, while purity of spatial history and 
isolation is a hazard. But in other cases, purity of spatial history and isolation is a 
virtue, while variety in spatial history and interaction is a hazard. 
The call centre looks like the ultimate virtual operation. The customer need not 
know where the centre is based, and (so it was thought) would not care. While 
there are presently some plant economies of scale in the call centre, it is possible 
to envisage a future call centre in which that is no longer true. The call centre is 
surely an organisation from the fourth age of place? And yet, perhaps not! Even 
for a call centre, location matters. It matters because of the small matter of local 
accents. In the UK, it was found that many callers responded best to regional 
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accents from the periphery (north-east of England, parts of Scotland, south-west 
of England). More recent research found that callers were quite responsive to a 
wider range of regional accents,9 but not, on the whole to accents from the south-
east of England10 or West Midlands. This is a simple but non-trivial example of 
the general phenomenon. Competitively speaking, accents are not neutral, and 
accents evolve from spatial history.11 Hence spatial history shapes our intellectual 
capital – here our spoken voice and understanding of local culture – and thus 
competitive distinction.
Some studies of the success of Silicon Valley as a cluster (e.g. Saxenian 1994) 
have stressed the role of high job mobility in promoting the performance of the 
cluster. Mobility is important, so the argument goes, because mobile staff are the 
best mechanism for technology transfer. The fruitful exchange of tacit knowledge 
may be something of a myth in some so-called ‘clusters’, but if it is to happen, 
mobile labour is an essential component. The importance of mobile labour to the 
high-tech cluster can also be assessed by the salaries commanded by such labour. 
Some time ago, Forester (1980) commented on the extraordinary growth rates in 
earnings that could be achieved by the most mobile forms of labour in the Silicon 
Valley semiconductor industry. In the same fashion, many have commented on 
the extraordinary cultural richness and creativity to be found in New York City, 
and how that derives in large measure from the diverse cultural backgrounds 
and spatial histories of its inhabitants. Admittedly, Glazer and Moynihan (1970) 
and Steinfield (1973) have shown that the original conception of the ‘melting 
pot’ – a place where individuals from many different nations are ‘melted’ into a 
new race – is something of a myth. Strong ethnic divisions persist in New York. 
Nevertheless, the collocation of these diverse groups creates a diversity of cultures 
and spatial histories of substantial importance in cultural and economic life.
The division of academic labour becomes ever more specialised as compe-
tition increases. Most ordinary faculties can achieve a niche only in any one 
subdiscipline. Moreover, cross-disciplinary work generally brings low returns in 
short-term professional advancement. Nevertheless, the literature on creativity 
recognises that intellectual mobility can create some of the greatest advances. The 
recent creativity literature sees combination and reorganisation as fundamental to 
the process of creative thought. People create new knowledge or ideas by combin-
ing and reorganising existing concepts or categories (e.g. Mumford and Porter 
1999). Koestler (1964) coined the term bisociation to describe what happens in 
creative thinking. Koestler’s aim was to ‘make a distinction between the routine 
skills of thinking on a single “plane” . . . and the creative act which . . . always 
operates on more than one plane’. Bisociation is about perceiving an idea or 
situation, ‘in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference’ 
(Koestler 1964: 35).12
Bisociation is a combinatorial activity. It need not be a social activity. However, 
the scope for bisociation may be greatest when there can be creative social inter-
action in heterogeneous groups. Group interaction is important because it brings 
together individuals with different experience and backgrounds to exchange 
ideas. The more diverse the group, the greater the potential for creative bisocia-
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tion because the group can in principle combine many different knowledge sets. 
This becomes increasingly important with the ongoing division of intellectual 
labour, and the attendant growing complexity of disciplines, because that makes 
it hard for any one individual to master more than one discipline, or at best a very 
small number of disciplines (Paulus 1999, Paulus et al. 1999).
A hybrid scholar is a researcher who transgresses the accepted boundaries of 
his/her home discipline and integrates concepts, theories, methods and results 
originating from other disciplines (Dogan and Pahre 1990, Dogan 1994, 1999). 
Disciplines vary in the reaction to hybrid scholars: some are highly suspicious and 
often very hostile towards scholars who have travelled to other ‘lands’ and seek 
to return. The hybridisation of disciplines means that elements from overlapping 
or adjacent disciplines are recombined into new specialised fields. Dogan (1994, 
1999) goes further to argue that much of the invention in each discipline depends 
largely on exchanges with other fields. From this point of view, the marginal 
scholars play an especially important role in intellectual invention. These scholars 
are marginal in the sense that they live at the margins of their discipline. They may 
also be marginal in a social sense. Indeed, Dogan (1999) and Dogan and Pahre 
(1990) write of ‘creative marginality’, and go as far as to suggest that progress in 
academic disciplines is concentrated at the periphery, where there is cross-ferti-
lisation with other disciplines. By contrast, the core of the discipline can become 
stagnant.
There has been much rhetoric to the effect that, with the growth of global 
telecommunications networks, internet companies above all could indeed start up 
anywhere. In fact, as Zook (2002) has shown, internet start-ups are quite highly 
clustered. Zook pays particular attention to the role of venture capital in this phe-
nomenon, and finds that the uneven spatial pattern of internet companies reflects 
the uneven distribution of venture capital. In the same way, Virginia’s Center for 
Innovative Technology (2000) found that internet companies in Virginia are highly 
clustered, often near major research universities. Golden (2000: B1) describes the 
experience of Lexeme, a company based near Harvard Square in Cambridge, MA, 
which provides natural language processing systems that can help to improve 
customer service. The unexpected key to their success was to recruit PhD gradu-
ates in linguistics. As Golden (2000: B1) puts it, ‘traditionally, a linguistics degree 
has been among the least marketable of academic credentials’. Until very recently, 
very few software companies hired linguists at all. Lexeme, by contrast, has found 
these skills and recent developments in linguistics research indispensable to mak-
ing some thoughtful advances in search engines. Lexeme succeeded because it 
was well placed to recruit graduates who had stayed around the Cambridge area 
because they originally hoped for an academic career. Place is what provides the 
skills necessary for creating imaginative software applications.
The novelist Virginia Woolf wrote of the famous Reading Room of the British 
Library (here quoted from Caygill 2000: 4): ‘There is in the British Museum an 
enormous mind . . . hoarded beyond the power of any single mind to possess it’. 
This refers not just to the excellence of the book collection, but also to the fact 
that such a distinguished cast of great writers and statesmen had read and thought 
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in that library. It is as if the reader can tap into this accumulation of historical 
thought, not just the written word. Even in the fourth age – when technology 
means that collocation is no longer required for access to the written word – a 
public reading space could still have this characteristic of an enormous mind.
This last example is rather different. It is about the advantage that arises from 
purity and isolation rather than variety and interaction. For the British academic 
today, a continuing source of criticism from our friends in business and govern-
ment is that university people still live in an ivory tower – despite all the efforts 
made by successive governments to make us more business relevant. Many aca-
demics would dispute this, but my aim here is not to evaluate these claims, but 
rather to ask a different question. Is the ivory tower such a bad idea after all?
Some governments see an essentially instrumental role for the university: to 
support business in wealth creation. From that perspective, the research agenda 
should be designed by business, and hence demand led. This is a rather limiting 
perspective. From this point of view there would be little room for the linguistics 
research described in the previous example. Nor would there have been any room 
for Mendel’s early research on what subsequently became genetics. Moreover, 
this perspective shows a splendid disregard for the long-established argument that 
the role of the university is not purely instrumental. This last view is best sum-
marised by Ruskin (1996, vol. 22: 135):
the object of University teaching is to form your conceptions . . . It is to give 
you a notion of what is meant by smith’s work, for instance, but not to make 
you blacksmiths. It is to give you a notion of what is meant by medicine, 
but not to make you physicians. The proper academy for blacksmiths is a 
blacksmith’s forge; the proper academy for physicians is a hospital. Here 
you are to be taken away from the forge, out of the hospital, out of all special 
and limited labour and thought, into the ‘Universitas’ of labour and thought, 
that you may in peace, in leisure, in calm of disinterested contemplation, be 
enabled to conceive rightly the laws of nature, and the destinies of Man.
The ivory tower (or indeed the monastery) is actually quite a good way to 
achieve this objective. And, indeed, this cannot be dismissed purely as an out-
dated, nineteenth-century piece of elitism. For indeed, just as the creativity litera-
ture stressed the role of bisociation in creativity, so also it lays great emphasis on 
a degree of autonomy. Research on creativity has identified several characteristics 
of personality that are regularly correlated with creativity. These include (Amabile 
1996, Abra and Abra 1999, Feist 1999): introversion; self-directedness and self-
sufficiency; independence of mind and judgement; intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) 
motivation; no desire to conform for the sake of it; liking for solitude. I can perhaps 
summarise these in the term autonomy. Creative people are either autonomous by 
nature (or have it forced on them) or have to create such autonomy.
Sheldon (1999) argues that ‘conformity and creativity don’t mix’. Creativity 
of its very character involves breaking rules and disobeying norms. Sheldon 
argues that pressures to conform, broadly defined, have negative effects on 
creative effort. Sheldon makes a distinction between informational and normative 
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social influences. Informational influence should be constructive if people use 
the information gained to sharpen their perception. In contrast, normative social 
influence can be destructive to the extent that it deters the creative person from 
his or her creative quest, back towards the conventional, flawed view. Those with 
a well-developed sense of autonomy are better able to take all external influence 
as informational – whether the intention was informational or normative. In short, 
the autonomy of the university is essential for the university to play the role for 
which it was designed. Reductions in that autonomy make the university less, 
rather than more, effective.
Conclusion
I can summarise the chapter very briefly. The chapter has talked of the four ages 
of place. In the fourth age, if it ever appears, place would in principle be of no 
relevance to economic activity. However, I have argued that place may take on a 
new economic function during that fourth age. Place is what we think with. Or, 
to spell it out, intellectual capital is what we think with, and intellectual capital is 
our source of competitive distinction. Our spatial history shapes our intellectual 
capital, and hence place is (still) a source of competitive distinction – even in the 
fourth age. This will continue until all experiences are virtual – unconnected with 
place – if such a future ever occurs.
One implication of the chapter is this. The question about the space-shrinking 
technologies discussed in this chapter is not ‘do they make place irrelevant?’. The 
answer to that is, surely, ‘no’. The right question to ask is, by contrast, ‘how do 
such technologies change the economic role of place?’. Place may become unim-
portant for some issues but may become more important (than before) for some 
other issues. In the fourth age, place (of the producer) is on the face of it no longer 
so important to the customer, nor indeed as a source of agglomeration economies 
to the producer. But place may become important for other reasons. As argued in 
the fourth and fifth sections, when space provides enough competitive distinction, 
traders will not find it necessary to seek further distinction. But when space does 
not provide distinction – either because it is congested, or because of the ‘death 
of distance’ – then traders will find it necessary to seek competitive distinction in 
other ways. Some will find this in place, or spatial history.
Notes
 1 David Audretsch argued that ‘new ideas need new space’ at a conference in Cargèse, 
France (September 1995). See also Audretsch (1998). The later paper by Rodriguez-
Palenzuela (1999) provides a fascinating exposition on this theme.
 2 A reference to the book by F. Cairncross (1997).
 3 This is not to suggest that there would be no trade at all, but this will tend to be 
concentrated where the exporter can produce products, or a level of quality, that the 
importer cannot obtain except by trade.
 4 This scenario was especially relevant during the Industrial Revolution (see, for 
example, Deane 1965, Mathias 1983).
 5 The advent of a ‘weightless’ economy would eradicate some, but not necessarily all, 
agglomeration economies. The weightless economy is discussed by Coyle (1997), 
Quah (2001), inter alia.
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 6 One leading example of how place shapes intellectual capital is the history of 
Manchester and its suburbs (see, for example, Chorley 1950).
 7 As indeed, to some consumers, is the question of how it was produced, e.g. organic.
 8 Stewart builds on Reich (1991).
 9 Including some accents from the north-west of England (e.g. Liverpool), previously 
thought to be unsuitable for the purpose (see, for example, Ward 2000, Kahn 2003).
 10 Including received pronunciation, or ‘BBC English’.
 11 Two important recent works on the economics of language are relevant here: 
Rubinstein (2000) and Lamberton (2002).
 12 This idea is also found in areas of the literature more familiar to economists. Simon 
(1985) recognised that it is the process of problem solving and learning from diverse 
knowledge bases that is most likely to yield innovation. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
described the concept of absorptive capacity to capture how well organisations learn 
from their environment. Nelson and Winter (1982) showed us that an organisation’s 
absorptive capacity was a function not so much of the individuals as of the network of 
linkages between individual capabilities.
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5 The boom and the bombshell
 The New Economy bubble and the 
San Francisco Bay Area
Richard A. Walker
In the known world, this 49-square mile patch of land is Ground Zero of the Inter-
net. The whole world is watching what we’re doing.
Derek Gordon, DigitalThink, San Francisco (Seligman 2000: A14)
The attacks of September 11, 2001, that brought the destruction of the twin towers 
of the World Trade Center forever changed the urban landscape of New York. 
That event was sudden, violent, monstrous. Yet the economic forces at work in all 
great cities are just as inexorable in reworking the lay of the land from generation 
to generation. Anyone who lives in the modern world comes to a realization that 
the landscapes we inhabit are built on sand. Known and familiar buildings, streets, 
storefronts, homes, and factories have a way of disappearing without a trace, 
and often memory fails to recreate the image of what used to be. This relentless 
redevelopment of cities moves to the rhythms of capital accumulation. The manic 
logic of capitalism is capable of spectacular bouts of building that surpass anything 
in the past, and equally capable of laying low skyscrapers, blocks, city centers, 
and factory districts in short order (Harvey 1982).
Such was the case in the San Francisco Bay Area in the 1990s. An economic 
boom of unparalleled ferocity hit the place like a bombshell. The city was picked 
up, shaken until it rattled, and then dropped into a new configuration. Although 
other observers have chronicled what took place (Solnit and Schwartzenberg 
2000, Beitel 2003, Carlsson 2004, Olsen 2004), I nonetheless have four reasons 
for plowing the same ground. First of all, most of the attention has been confined 
to San Francisco, when in fact the boom and the bubble was centered in Silicon 
Valley not San Francisco and affected the whole Bay Area. Second, the boom by 
the Bay has been too much interpreted in local political terms and insufficiently 
linked to larger movements of finance capital, which in this instance were vol-
canic. The eruption in the Bay Area was, ironically, linked directly to the financial 
wizards of Wall Street, many of whom were housed in New York’s Twin Towers, 
and who oversaw the greatest financial bubble in history. Third, the connection of 
the New Economy to Silicon Valley has not been adequately appreciated. As the 
world center of high-tech in the emerging internet age, the Bay Area became the 
paragon of the New Economy and the iconic space of the neoliberal 1990s. Finally, 
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all this renders the Bay Area of the 1990s a perfect case study for scholars of the 
geography of the capitalist economy and the dialectics of place (Cox 1997). 
Ground Zero of the New Economy
John Doerr, the venture capital kingpin of Silicon Valley, is credited with being 
the first to utter the phrase “the New Economy” to describe what was going on in 
the Bay Area during the roaring nineties (Miles 2001). The Bay Area’s economic 
strength and innovative energy was the solid base on which the hyperbole of the 
New Economy, American revival, and dot-com dottiness were constructed. It was 
Ground Zero of the New Economy.
The domain of high-tech
Silicon Valley was already the principal global center of electronics when the 
internet age struck. It led the world in electronics and information technology, 
which had become the leading industrial sector at the end of twentieth century. 
Many a book has been written lauding the Valley’s exceptional mix of technical 
talent, business acumen, and openness to new ideas (Hanson 1982, Freiberger and 
Swaine 1984, Rogers and Larsen 1984, Caddes 1986). By the 1990s, the high-
tech economy had come to dominate the whole Bay region (Bay Area Economic 
Forum 1996, 1999). 
Technologically, the new thing of the 1990s was the internet. By the end of the 
decade, everyone was agog about the possibilities unleashed by this astonishing 
system linking up computers everywhere at the blink of an eye. The Bay Area 
was the heartland of the World Wide Web as it became commercially operational, 
with the densest wiring, most domains, and most intensive population of users 
(Zook 2000, 2001, 2002). New York, London, Washington, Seattle, and Los 
Angeles followed. The geography of the network society – so called by Castells 
(1996), the sociological siren of the brave new world of IT – began and ended in 
Silicon Valley. Moreover, Bay Area high-tech companies were seen as exemplars 
of business organization for the new era. They were celebrated for their open, 
diversified, and strategic systems of doing business (Peters and Waterman 1985, 
Peters 1992, Packard 1995). In the early 1990s, “the virtual corporation” became 
the buzzword to capture the ongoing shift from manufacturing to product and 
system design, marketing, and branding that was taking place in the high-tech 
industries (Davidow and Malone 1992). By the end of the decade, no other sector 
better illustrated new methods of integrating global networks of subcontracting 
and contract manufacturing (Dedrick and Kraemer 1998, McKendrick et al. 2000, 
Sturgeon 2005). 
At the same time, the idea of industrial districts was flourishing, with its com-
pelling vision of interactive firms, flexible specialization, and external economies. 
Silicon Valley became the prime example of the post-Fordist industrial region, 
replete with dense linkages among high-tech manufacturers, designers, suppliers, 
and business services (Saxenian 1994, Kenney 2000, Patton and Kenney 2005). 
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Added to this were venture capital and a free-wheeling culture of start-ups, which 
nurtured technical innovation and entrepreneurial liberation (Kenney and Florida 
2000, Zook 2002, 2004). Ironically, the Bay Area had, in the meantime, grown 
more Fortune 500 blockbuster corporations than anywhere else except New York 
City.
The New Economy also rested on new forms of work and employment. 
Silicon Valley has long been noted for its utilization of a highly educated techni-
cal labor force enjoying an exceptional degree of freedom to work and create 
within the capitalist enterprise (Rogers and Larsen 1984). It has sucked in some 
of the world’s best talent (Saxenian 2002) and made the most of their collective 
labor in a consummate “learning region” (Storper 1997). With the rise of the web 
world of the internet, San Francisco came to epitomize the liberty and libertine 
lives of this “creative class” of workers (Florida 2002). Of course, not all workers 
are so favored in high-tech. There are many ordinary workers of modest skill, 
whose wages barely budged in the 1990s despite the boom (Benner et al. 1999, 
Greenwich and Niedt 2001). The new age of labor relations has given companies 
maximum flexibility in hiring, firing, deploying, and overworking all workers. It 
is, furthermore, a place where temporary agencies are used for every type of labor 
and independent contractors offer their skills on the open market – where, in short, 
long-term employment relations are rare. In the 1990s, the use of “contingent 
labor” approached the unprecedented level of one-quarter of the local workforce 
(Benner et al. 1999).
As the USA rebounded smartly in the 1990s, its bounce came, above all, from 
high-tech. Computing and information technology led the USA to a long-awaited 
revival from the profit and productivity doldrums of the 1970s and 1980s (Gordon 
2000, Brenner 20021). High-tech, representing 8 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), accounted for no less than one-third of US economic growth in the 
second half of the decade (Brenner 2004). If you wanted to bet on the future of 
capitalism, the Bay Area was double zero on the roulette wheel.
Firewater in the Valley
Silicon Valley fever is not a new syndrome (Freiberger and Swaine 1984, S. 
Levy 1984, Rogers and Larsen 1984). In the 1990s, however, the “fire in the 
valley” hype surpassed anything previously imagined. The ballyhoo over the 
New Economy allowed enthusiasts far and wide to join in a kind of “imagined 
community of nerds” enthralled by the internet revolution (Bronson 1999, Miles 
2001, Frank and Mulcahey 2003). The Bay Area was the Never-Never Land of the 
New Thing (Lewis 2000). San Francisco became the cultural capital of the virtual 
world. Semidelusional ideas were the ordinary provenance of the young gnomes 
hooked to The Well, Salon.com, and Craigslist in the early 1990s, and spread far 
and wide over the rest of the decade via the city’s new media mavens at Wired, 
Red Herring and The Industry Standard. Soon techno-babble had become the 
everyday cant of the rich and powerful around the country (Perkins and Perkins 
1999, Miles 2001, Henwood 2003).
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People spoke of the New Gold Rush, and they were not far from the mark. 
John Doerr claimed that Silicon Valley was “the largest legal creation of wealth in 
the history of the planet” (Miles 2001: 9). The roaring nineties threw up a whole 
new generation of millionaires at Netscape, Yahoo, and other high-flyers of the 
internet era, thanks to Silicon Valley’s insider trick of granting stock options to 
all its key technical employees.2 The Bay Area zoomed past New York and Los 
Angeles to lead the country in the number of super-rich on the Forbes 400 list 
(forty-three compared with thirty-eight for New York in 2001).3 The super-rich 
were the princes of the New Economy (Micklethwait 1997, Wilson 1997).
The local hype intersected decisively with the nationalist cant of American 
economic revivalism. American business and the state were engaged in a fear-
some competition with Europe and Japan over economic supremacy in the new 
global capitalist order. Things had gone badly for the USA in the 1970s and early 
1980s, and it was eagerly trying to prove that “America is back,” as Ronald 
Reagan put it. Another recession in the early 1990s cost George Bush his job and 
put Bill Clinton in office on the premise that “it’s the economy, stupid” (Pollin 
2003). Fortunately for American boosters, Europe and Japan remained sluggish 
throughout most of the decade, while the USA seemed to be breaking into a run 
(though its performance would later be shown to have been artificially enhanced) 
(Brenner 2002, Henwood 2003).
As the USA peddled its neoliberal wares, proclaiming the wonders of capital-
ism and free markets, governments around the globe wanted to know how to get 
some of that vaunted American technology, entrepreneurship, flexibility, and thrill 
of capitalism. What better model than Silicon Valley? Wherever the myth of US 
supremacy and capitalist renewal went, the legend of Silicon Valley was not far 
behind (Massey et al. 1992, Saxenian and Hsu 2001, Bresnahan and Gambardella 
2004). The New Economy of the Bay Area was the Great White Hope for the 
restoration of American global primacy and for revival of the entrepreneurial 
myth in America. 
Dot-com delusions
If Silicon Valley was the supernova of the New Economy, San Francisco was its 
neutron star twin. Although the city has slipped in economic power vis-à-vis the 
upstart Valley, San Francisco nonetheless retained a thriving intellectual, artistic, 
cultural, and political milieu, of which Silicon Valley – indeed, most American 
cities – could only dream (Solnit and Schwartzenberg 2000, Carlsson 2004). The 
old central city still attracted a dynamic array of young people seeking outlets 
for their energy and imagination. What happened, beginning in the 1980s, was a 
synergy between such people’s talents and the growing electronics wizardry of 
the Valley, with a big dollop of Hollywood thrown in. By the mid-1990s, people 
came to speak of a new phenomenon, “multimedia,” taking place South of Market 
(SoMa), including movie special effects, video games, and electronic publishing. 
By 1995 there was a robust cluster of over 15,000 employees in the new sector. 
Then the era of the “dot-coms” – new internet-related companies – hit, and by 
The boom and the bombshell 125
1999 employment in the sector had ballooned to 40,000, in over 1,000 companies, 
with a payroll of US$2 billion; in 2000 that payroll reach an eye-popping US$5.7 
billion (Saracevic 2000). The workforce was overwhelmingly young, informal, 
and enthusiastic. 
The whole culture of San Francisco was inflected by a rapid influx of young 
“dot-commers” hoping to change the world, or make a million bucks – whichever 
came first (Ledbetter 2003, Lowenstein 2004). The dot-com frenzy raging around 
the Bay Area represented a significant shift in the classic character of high-tech. In 
a few quick years the internet graduated from the fantasy of a few techno-droids 
to a fantasy of mass sales over the World Wide Web. The American technological 
sublime (Nye 1994) embraced America’s money culture, had joyous intercourse, 
and gave birth to the hellspawn of the dot-coms. This commercial castle was built 
on profitless clouds, however, and would ultimately fall to earth (Perkins and 
Perkins 1999, Frank and Mulcahey 2003, Henwood 2003). 
In the meantime, the Bay Area was primed to be the darling of the wheelers 
and dealers of hot-house capital in the 1990s. It would be the primary object of 
affection for the financiers of the American empire as their cups ran over with 
money. Financialization and futurism would collide on the eve of the new millen-
nium, and the resulting stock market tsunami would clobber the heartland of the 
New Economy.
The financial tidal wave hits the bay shore
If the New Economy was being bottled and sold like firewater, the hype would still 
have meant little without a powerful surge of finance capital that made everything 
seem possible. Financial markets run amuck would propel the boom by the bay 
into a bubble of monumental proportions.
Surfing waves of risk capital
The rosy dawn of the New Economy and of the internet bubble was signaled by 
the 1995 launch of Netscape, the most successful launch in stock market history. 
Netscape was the first commercial search engine for the World Wide Web, and 
its financial father-figure was venture capitalist John Doerr. As Netscape went 
ballistic, it minted the first of thousands of New Economy millionaires created 
during the boom (Lewis 2000).
The Bay Area gave birth to the financial means of its own expansion. The 
current form of venture capital developed in the 1960s in Silicon Valley, born 
of a former New York banker and special funds earmarked for start-ups by the 
founders of Intel. Once east coast financiers got wind of what was happening, 
they began pumping money into specialized venture firms located on Sand Hill 
Road behind Stanford. By the 1980s, there was nothing like it in the world – a 
multi-billion-dollar pool of risk-taking capital searching out new ideas (Florida 
and Kenney 1988). In the 1990s, Silicon Valley venture capital became legendary, 
and highly sophisticated in its creation of whole management teams for start-
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ups (Kenney and Florida 2000, Zook 2002, 2004). By the end of the decade, the 
number of venture firms had grown to over 800 and venture capitalists numbered 
over 8,000 (Shinal 2003).
The start-up culture of Silicon Valley also gave birth to the modern fad for 
IPOs (initial public offerings of stock). Although Wall Street dominates American 
investment banking, a trio of specialized investment houses arose in San 
Francisco’s financial district in the 1980s to become major players in moving 
high-tech start-ups into the stock markets: Montgomery Securities, Robertson 
Stephens, and Hambrick and Quist. They specialized in electronics, biotechnol-
ogy, and high-end retailing, developing an expertise that none of the distant Wall 
Street giants could match. By the late 1990s, the local bankers were doing so well 
that the financial giants of New York and Europe crashed the party, buying out 
the boutiques. This opened up new conduits from Wall Street and global financial 
markets straight into the heart of the Bay Area, down which eager investors could 
pour the accumulated wealth of the world.
As a consequence, the Bay Area could tap into an unparalleled amount of 
capital eager to make a killing off the New Economy (Kenney and Florida 2000, 
Patton and Kenney 2005). As total venture capital investment in the USA rocketed 
from US$30 billion in 1998 to US$60 billion in 1999 and to over US$100 billion 
in 2000, the Bay Area went along for the ride, with venture capital peaking at 
US$33 billion in 2000 (Abate 2004). Of all the venture investments in the USA in 
the 1990s, the Bay Area was creaming off one-quarter to one-third, by far the most 
of any place (Zook 2002).4 IPOs were less concentrated on the Bay Area than was 
venture capital; nevertheless, at the peak of the bubble in 1999, one-quarter of all 
IPOs in the USA occurred here, accounting for one-sixth of the total IPO stock 
value. The average gain that year was 350 percent or more, twice the levitation 
of IPOs issued elsewhere in the country, for a total value of over US$300 billion 
(Hua 2000, Sinton 2000).
Riding the NASDAQ
The stock markets began their long rise in the 1980s, propelled by the neoliberal 
revolution of the Reagan administration. After a nasty shock in October 1987 
and the recession of 1989–92, stocks began to soar again in the 1990s. By 1996, 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was already taking public note of the 
“irrational exuberance” of the markets. But the Asian financial crisis of 1997 put 
a scare into the world’s financiers, and led Greenspan to lower interest rates. For 
the next two years, the Federal Reserve continued to fill the stock markets’ sails 
to keep the ship of state moving ahead. The managers of American capitalism had 
been converted to “stock market Keynesianism” to keep the economy buoyant 
(Schiller 2000, Brenner 2002, Henwood 2003, Pollin 2003, Lowenstein 2004).
The NASDAQ was the principal vehicle of stock speculation in the 1990s 
(Figure 5.1). Its rise was more precipitous than that of any other market in the 
world during that decade (Ingebretsen 2002). The NASDAQ index rose from 
around 500 in 1990 to 1,000 in 1995, at the time of the Netscape launch; it sur-
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passed 2,000 in 1998, then skyrocketed above 5,000 in early 2000.5 The venture 
capital and IPO booms closely tracked the rise of the NASDAQ (Zook 2002).
Although the stock market bubble has been much commented on, the radically 
skewed geography of its money flows has hardly been noticed. Economists are 
too wedded to thinking in national units and geographers are unused to thinking 
about stock markets.6 In fact, the Bay Area was the eye of the storm in the stock 
market bubble of the 1990s. The Bay Area was more closely tied to the NASDAQ 
and the world of electronic stock trading than any other region. Most electronics 
companies, such as Microsoft, Oracle, and Cisco, prefer to list on the NASDAQ 
rather than the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). In their early days, these 
companies also liked the NASDAQ because it kept IPOs afloat better than con-
ventional markets. Their rise to prominence among US corporations in the 1980s 
propelled the NASDAQ from an exchange for also-ran companies to a rival to 
Wall Street (Ingebretsen 2002).
Alongside the increasing popularity of the NASDAQ came the low-margin 
stock trading revolution begun by Charles Schwab in San Francisco in 1974 (Kador 
2002). Schwab rode to prominence in national stock trading in part because of 
the widely dispersed wealth of California investors. The first fully internet trader 
was the 1994 start-up, E*trade, in Palo Alto, with eSchwab following in 1996. 
E-trading exploded on the back of the internet (Kador 2002, Henwood 2003, 
Lowenstein 2004).
There are no certain figures on the influx of bubble money into the Bay 
Area, but there are several indicators. The most spectacular might be the way 
in which stocks of individual star companies rocketed into the stratosphere. In 
Figure 5.1 NASDAQ index vs. US venture capital, 1995–2003. Sources: NASDAQ 


































































































































1998, San Jose’s Cisco Systems, maker of internet hardware, became the fast-
est company to reach US$100 billion in total stock value, a record surpassed in 
1999 by Sunnyvale’s Yahoo. More astounding, Cisco Systems overtook Microsoft 
briefly to become the most hyper-valued company in the world – at over US$555 
billion in mid-1999. Overall, Bay Area stock performance was nothing short of 
miraculous. The Franklin 250 California growth index shot up from 250 in 1990 
to 1,300 in mid-1999 to a peak of almost 2,900 in March 2000. The Franklin’s 
gain of 1,200 percent exceeded the NASDAQ’s 1,000 percent and the S&P’s 300 
percent. The Bloomberg San Francisco index gained over 500 percent between 
1995 and 2000 (Figure 5.2). The San Francisco Chronicle report on the top firms 
in the Bay Area for calendar year 1999 defies belief: the total value of the region’s 
500 largest public corporations nearly tripled in one year, from US$1.3 trillion to 
US$3.5 trillion. By contrast, the NASDAQ doubled in the same period, while the 
Dow Jones index rose by only 6 percent (Sinton 2000). 
Wipe-out!
At the same time as the world was discovering the New Economy in the Bay 
Area, surfers discovered that the world’s largest waves were not in Hawaii or 
Australia but just south of the Golden Gate, at a place they called “Mavericks.” 
Winter storm winds blowing across the northern Pacific can push walls of water 
upwards of ninety feet high (similar to the Indian Ocean tsunamis of December 
2004). The waves are wickedly dangerous and have claimed the life of more than 
one world-class surfer. So, too, did surfing the financial mavericks of the 1990s 
turn out to be a risky enterprise for many an entrepreneurial genius.









































































































Figure 5.2 Bloomberg San Francisco index, 1995–2004. Source: Bloomberg LP index of 
232 Bay Area stocks.
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a nonce, then slid below 3,000 by June; after a brief recovery in mid-summer it 
went into a long, steady slide that dragged the index below 2,000 by April 2001 
and on down to a low of 1,119 on October 9, 2002 – putting it back where it was 
in 1997. That comes out as a loss of more than 77 percent of stock values. By late 
2000 the Dow index, too, was falling and would continue downward for another 
two years, losing over 30 percent of its value; the S&P 500 index fell 40 percent 
in the same period. The three-year decline would prove the worst since 1929–32 
in the USA. By the end of 2002, the combined markets had vaporized US$7 tril-
lion out of the US$17.8 trillion gained during the long run-up. The Bay Area was 
Ground Zero of the financial implosion of 2000. The Franklin 250 California stock 
index collapsed, cascading down over 1,000 points in the month of April 2000 – a 
plunge of over one-third. The year 2000 witnessed the pricking of the dot-com 
bubble in an astonishingly short time (Kirby 2000, Saracevic 2000). Nine-tenths 
of the dot-coms in San Francisco would be gone by the middle of 2001. Wags 
began referring to the “dot-gones.” But beyond lay a deeper sickness that would 
lay low the elephants of the high-tech game parks. By the end of the year 2000, 
the Chronicle 500 had evaporated an astronomical US$2.2 trillion, to US$1.28 
trillion. After a calm in 2001, the storm hit again in 2002, and the Chronicle 500 
shrank back to 200, some US$409 billion poorer than before – another annual loss 
of one-third of total stock values, The overall losses added up to a breath-taking 
75 percent since early 2000 (Fost 2003). 
The Bay Area suffered by far the largest hit of anywhere in the country in the 
meltdown. A report in 2001 showed the top 100 corporations in the Bay Area 
having evacuated nearly US$2 trillion in value from their 2000 peaks, compared 
with a national loss for the Wilshire 5000 of US$4.45 trillion (Liedtke 2001). That 
would mean that Bay Area firms accounted for at least 45 percent of all the stock 
losses for the USA in the first round of the markets’ collapse. The Bay Area’s total 
loss of US$2.63 trillion on the Chronicle 500/200 amounted to well over one-third 
of the national total. That is a spatial distribution that should impress even the 
most geographically obtuse economist. Amazingly, it took investors a while to 
wake up to the crisis. Even after April 2000, venture capital continued to flow in 
record quantities to risky San Francisco start-ups (Abate 2004) and IPOs contin-
ued to raise hundreds of millions for Silicon Valley companies (Minton 2001). By 
the end of the year, New York and Boston capitalists had finally seen the light. 
Venture investment fell off the cliff in the first quarter of 2001, dropping by 40 
percent from the previous quarter (Emert 2001); it ended up 60 percent lower for 
the year, at under US$40 billion, and then fell to a pitiful US$7.8 billion in 2002 
(Shinal 2003). The investment banking houses in San Francisco had closed their 
doors by 2002.
Why the great fall in stock values? Certainly not the acts of September 11, 
2001, since the crash had come six months earlier. The reasons lay in the nor-
mal abnormality of business cycles and financial enthusiasms. In retrospect, the 
markets had overshot any reasonable assessment of corporate profits as early as 
1996, and bore no relation to classic evaluations of price–earnings ratios there-
after (Schiller 2000, Brenner 2002, Lowenstein 2004). Electronics and telecom-
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munications were the worst offenders in this regard. When the dust had settled 
by 2003, total losses incurred in those sectors were equal to all the profits rung 
up in the boom years (Brenner 2004). Hence, stock values fell back to where 
they had been in 1996–97, before the absurd run-up of the bubble. But in Silicon 
Valley the debacle was worse: in one year the top 150 companies lost a combined 
US$90 billion, wiping out all the profits they had made in the previous eight years 
(Sylvester 2002).7
Rocketing real estate
So far we have established the Bay Area’s importance in the age of the New 
Economy and its place in the record-breaking financial speculations of the late 
twentieth century. Industrial capital and finance capital are thus accounted for. But 
for the urbanist there is always a vital third piece of the capitalist puzzle: property 
development and real estate markets (Harvey 1985, 2003). The Bay region has, 
overall, the priciest real estate of any metropolitan area in the country, including 
greater New York and Los Angeles (Walker et al. 1990). But the run-up of prices 
that occurred in the time of the bubble exceeded anything previously imaginable. 
Prices take off
Real estate values in the Bay Area started to motor upward in the early 1970s 
and hit their stride in the 1980s, as Silicon Valley roared into prominence and 
downtown San Francisco business and finance thrived. Downturns in electronics 
and banking in 1985 threw the regional real estate market into a doldrums from 
which it did not recover for almost a decade. Then things turned back up and local 
businesses started filling space and bidding up rents on commercial properties. As 
the boom accelerated, vacancy rates fell to microscopic levels and prices spiraled 
ever upward. 
An outrageous spike occurred in commercial rents in San Francisco and Silicon 
Valley in 1999 and 2000 (Figure 5.3). A classic bottleneck had developed as vacan-
cies fell below 1 percent in central San Francisco and buildings were being leased 
before they were off the drawing boards (Seligman 2000). In a CB Richard Ellis 
global survey of class A office rents in late 2000, Silicon Valley’s US$87.48 per 
square foot ranked fourth in the world, behind London, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. 
San Francisco’s US$73.75 per square foot came in seventh, just behind Paris and 
Mumbai – and ahead of midtown Manhattan (Morrissey 2001). Bay Area realtors 
and landlords crowed, and enjoyed a moment of unparalleled power over tenants. 
At the height of the dot.com mania in San Francisco, landlords were being given 
stock options in tenant companies as a move-in bonus!
As commercial real estate skyrocketed, housing could not be far behind. 
Apartment rents hit unprecedented levels, with San Francisco leading the charge. 
Rents rose by more than 225 percent from 1996 to 2000, as the city became the 
nation’s most expensive rental market. The rent on a two-bedroom apartment by 
2000 was typically over U$2,000 per month, or three times what it had been in 
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1993 (Beitel 2003). House price rises also accelerated. The median price of a 
home in the Bay Area rose from US$215,000 in 1995 to US$364,000 in 2000, 
jumping 20 percent at the peak of the bubble in 2000. By 2002, Bay Area hous-
ing was almost three times the national average, that is, the median house sold 
for over US$400,000, compared with a California median of US$260,000 and 
a national standard of US$144,000 (Zito 2002). In 1999 the West Bay (Silicon 
Valley to Marin) had eight towns with median house prices higher than in Beverly 
Hills and Malibu.8 Why such absurd prices? On the commercial side, the Bay 
Area was generating new companies by the score in the boom and filling their cof-
fers with easy money. Office rents tracked the NASDAQ very closely throughout. 
As for residential real estate, the explanation is not that the Bay Area is short of 
land. Most important, the region is filthy rich, boasting the highest per capita 
income and wealth in the country over most of the last generation (Walker et al. 
1990). Second, the Bay Area is saturated with finance capital, so mortgage loans 
are easy to obtain – and became easier in the bubble times (Zito 2002). Third, very 
fast growth creates a bottleneck effect in housing markets that squeezes prices 
upward.9
It is not easy to trace financial flows into the Bay Area for the purposes of 
mortgage lending and property development. Developers were raising fast money 
by turning themselves into real estate investment trusts (REITs), as the Bay Area 
became one of the largest centers of REITs in the country (Shilton et al. 1996). 
Other important sources of finance were insurance companies and pension funds, 
which also favored the region (Kaufman 1998, Rosen and Anderson 1999). The 
scale of property companies grew so fast that they came to be valued in the bil-
lions, and numbered among the largest real estate operators in the nation. Here 
again, the pipelines of capital investment and speculation had been opened wide.
Figure 5.3 San Francisco office vacancies vs. rents, 1987–2002. Source: San Francisco 



































































Building blasters kick in
In every building cycle, rising prices and falling vacancies trigger new 
construction. Normally, there is a time lag of a year or two between price rises 
and new building projects as the time from conception to completion of any major 
commercial project is considerable, time needed to secure options on land, round 
up financing, draw up architectural plans, win city approval, and arrange for 
prospective tenants.
Because the Bay Area had become badly overbuilt in the last real estate cycle, 
peaking in the mid-1980s, there was lots of underused space to absorb before the 
full force of the price wave could be felt. In Silicon Valley, for example, some 
30 million square feet of industrial and R&D space remained vacant in 1990, 18 
percent of its total of 169 million square feet.10 Moreover, new arenas of office 
space were opening up in the former industrial zones in SoMa, in Downtown 
San Jose, and over in Oakland because of intervening changes in the outlook of 
business, which had previously avoided such places like the plague.
But as the economic boom built up momentum, construction took off, creating 
millions of new square feet of commercial space around the region. San Francisco 
would add 10 million square feet of offices, an increase of about 16 percent. Silicon 
Valley would expand its supply of office space from 39 to 47 million square feet 
between 1990 and 2000, a jump of 20 percent, and its industrial/R&D space to 
197 million square feet, an increase of 22 percent in a decade.11
Into the wide open spaces
The real estate bubble was punctured by the same shot that brought down the New 
Economy. Like venture capital and investment banking, it took the commercial 
real estate market a while to see the writing on the wall, so it levitated over the 
NASDAQ crash of spring 2000. Then reality hit realty in 2001. As companies 
withered on the vine, vacancy rates in commercial space vaulted upward and 
prices plunged. ‘For Rent’ signs sprouted like mushrooms on rotting logs. This 
was by far the worse disaster to befall San Francisco real estate since the Great 
Depression. Downtown office vacancies went from 4 to 16 percent in one year, 
and prices fell from US$78 to US$38 per square foot. Vacant class A office space 
remained at over 20 percent from 2002 to 2004, with a peak at around 24 percent.12 
Rents slumped badly, bottoming out at less than US$30 per square foot – more 
than a 60 percent drop from the 2000 peak – about where they stood in 1995 (in 
real terms). South of Market the carnage was worse: vacancies shot up from 10 to 
46 percent and rents fell from US$67 to US$22 per square foot (D. Levy 2001); 
vacancies remained at nearly 40 per cent for the next three years (D. Levy 2002, 
2003a,b, 2004). 
Silicon Valley’s plight was more severe than the city’s. Commercial vacan-
cies soared to almost 30 percent across Santa Clara and San Mateo counties (D. 
Levy 2003a). Prime office space in the Valley fell from US$70 per square foot to 
US$28,13 while industrial/R&D space fell below U$5, and remained at these rates 
as late as 2005.14 The wide open spaces are still easy to spot in the see-through 
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buildings formerly occupied by thriving companies such as Excite@Home in 
Redwood City.
A paragon of New Economy excess was the international terminal at the San 
Francisco Airport (SFO) (Figure 5.4). During the boom, traffic at all three Bay 
Area airports grew rapidly, but none more so than SFO; passenger traffic was the 
fifth highest of any airport in the country. Flights became so numerous that delays 
threatened to overwhelm operations at peak hours. Airport planners, ever ahead 
of the curve, set their sights high and designed one of the grandest of international 
air terminals in existence. Finished in 2002, it boasted a vast canopied space 500 
feet long, 100 feet high, and backed up by sweeping new freeway interchanges, 
two huge garages, an inter-terminal people mover, and a BART (Bay Area Rapid 
Transit) station. But air travel had collapsed – well before 9/11. For its first three 
years, the international terminal felt like a mausoleum – a suitable monument to 
the passing of the New Economy.15
Residential markets behaved more strangely. Apartment rents fell as expected 
in a business downturn. In March 2001, average rents peaked at US$1,628 for 
the central Bay Area and at US$1,956 in Silicon Valley, then both began to sag 
downward with the departure of hordes of dot-commers and their fast bucks. By 
2002, San Francisco rents had fallen 12 percent and those in Silicon Valley by 18 
percent; by 2003, they were down 18 and 34 percent respectively; and both stayed 
flat through 2004 (Rosen and Bishop 2002, Zito 2003a,b, Liedtke 2005). House 
prices, on the other hand, never stopped booming, creating a secondary boom and 
bubble in the midst of recession.16 
Reconfiguring the urban landscape
The face of the city bears the scars of every epoch of capitalist development. 
Urban space is created according to the technologies, tastes, and profit calculus 
of every generation, then reworked into new configurations as the social order 
Figure 5.4 International terminal at the San Francisco airport in 2004.
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changes. One era is layered onto the next, like an artist building up the oil 
paint on a canvas into new forms, colors, and textures. Only the process is less 
clearly thought out or harmonious than that. Instead, greed, conflict, and political 
maneuvering intrude to shape the city into a collective product that no one person 
can ever quite get a grip on (Harvey 1985, 2003). The bubble by the bay put its 
mark all over the urban landscape, with the greatest impact on the inner cities of 
San Francisco and San Jose. Although every business cycle does its work on the 
city, this one was more dramatic than most. As Solnit and Schwartzenberg (2000: 
34) put it, “. . . the earthquake that has come at the millennium has been a temblor 
of capital and its unstable distribution, altering San Francisco more than could 
almost any natural disaster.”
Lofty spaces of San Francisco
San Francisco’s landscape was thoroughly reworked by the bubble. The dot.com 
boom was centered in the SoMa area, achieving at a stroke what had been fought 
over for fifty years: expanding downtown deep into territory along the southern 
waterfront and around Mission Bay once held by industry and the working class 
(Hartman 1984, Walker 1998). The bubble economy unleashed a kind of urban 
bulldozer by means of financial speculation rather than the state, leaving the SoMa 
district radically transformed and the Mission district on the verge of wholesale 
displacement. There were several dimensions to how this urban renewal by 
market means played out. The first element in the transformation of SoMa was the 
conversion of warehouses and industrial space into dot-com offices. This began at 
the foot of the Bay Bridge on Rincon Hill around South Park, the techies’ favorite 
meeting spot, and continued all the way out through the Inner Mission, the city’s 
principal Latino district. The last vestiges of manufacturing were swept aside, 
along with artist spaces, non-profits, and relict bars. By the time the bubble burst, 
the tide of conversions had washed up all the way to the heart of the Mission 
Street commercial district (Cohen 1998, Solnit and Schwartzenberg 2000, Beitel 
2003).
The second facet of SoMa’s makeover was the quick build-out of residential 
lofts, or live/work units (Figure 5.5). Lofts began as an alternative space for artists 
and bohemians in former industrial districts, for which city planners had been 
willing to allow variances from housing standards. But then the hip ran smack 
into the hop in the real estate market and a crowd of young dot-commers with lots 
of cash to spend on nifty digs close to work. Add to the mix the political pop of 
the developers, who saw live–work lofts as a fantastic way to build quickly and 
profitably, and hundreds of new buildings went up (Solnit and Schwartzenberg 
2000, Beitel 2003, Olsen 2004). A third aspect of the reworking of SoMa was the 
high-rise explosion on its eastern flank, east of Third Street. This part of the city 
has been converted into a little Sao Paolo with a radically transformed skyline 
of office and apartment towers. Here, the old city’s landscape has not just been 
made over, but virtually erased. This has been continued to the present because of 
unrelenting demand for housing, which is being met by high-rise apartments and 
condominiums (King 2004).
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Meanwhile, the residential neighborhoods of the Mission district, packed into 
mid-rise Victorian houses and flats, felt the heat of gentrification in the late 1990s. 
Dot-com adventurers were seeking out homes near their warehouse workplaces 
and the trendy clubs and restaurants sprouting along Valencia Street. Tenant 
expulsions for wholesale building conversions were rampant. Simultaneously, 
many locals were losing their jobs as warehouse conversions eliminated blue-
collar manufacturing jobs and social service agencies (Godfrey 1997, Solnit and 
Schwartzenberg 2000, Beitel 2003). The last piece of the conversion puzzle was to 
clear the way for the gigantic Mission Bay project on the southern flank of SoMa, 
on eighty acres of former Southern Pacific rail yards. This is by far the biggest 
new land development in the city in fifty years. Once too far from downtown to 
feel connected, Mission Bay is now accessible by a new light rail system and just 
a shout away from the lofts of SoMa. The key to winning approval was to anchor 
the project with a University of California San Francisco Medical School research 
campus. The hope is that this will attract biotechnology firms (Beitel 2003, King 
2004, Olsen 2004). Thus is the ground prepared for the next New Thing.
Not that all this is bad. Downtown San Francisco is quite small by the standards 
of world cities and the new SoMa developments have added a surprisingly vigor-
ous new layer of density and high style to the urban core. The lofts and warehouse 
makeovers of the late 1990s often feature techno-modern designs, combined with 
a good deal of eclectic retro elements (Lloyd 1997, Sardar 2000, Johns 2004). 
These can be quite good because of the money available to pay for first-class 
architects. Similarly, some of the high-rise offices are better than the post-modern 
edifices of the 1980s because they are fitted out in modernist revival glass and 
metal exoskeletons (King 2004). San Francisco’s dowdy reputation in design has 
undergone a retrofit, as Silicon Valley futurism overtook classically conservative 
San Francisco tastes in architecture. 
On the other hand, the triumphant march of gentrification through SoMa and 
into the Mission District did a lot of permanent damage to San Francisco’s subcul-
Figure 5.5 SoMa loft.
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tures in the arts, politics, and immigrant life, replacing it with a shallower cult of 
techno-capitalism. Beitel (2003: 172) captures the defects of the new city of what 
the locals derisively called “the silicon implants”: 
[The] recasting of entrepreneurialism as a type of transgressive practice . . . 
reach[ed] its extremes in the fantasies of a self-styled avant garde of anarcho-
capitalists . . . [in which] the central city is (re)presented and imagined as a 
site within which these new impulses are circulated through a dense network 
linked by microchips, high speed digital connections, and rapidly formed 
partnerships perpetually dissolved in a fluid flux of change and transition. The 
semiotics of “industrial chic” pervades the living and work environments of 
SF’s digital economy through which the industrial wasteland is reappropriated 
as a playground for entrepreneurial capital and the techno-salariat . . . [where] 
the techno-gentry dines and cuts business deals surrounded by the stylistic 
chic of the digital cutting edge – polished galvanized pipes suspended from 
the high wooden beam ceiling, [and other refurbished bits of machinofacture] 
compose the space within which the “New Economy” is reproduced. 
Fortunately, the cultural and ethnic cleansing of the area was not as thorough as 
many people feared at the height of the bubble. It was cut short by the puncturing 
of the New Economy bubble. Civic life, like a ravaged forest, proved to be more 
resilient than expected and with a surprising capacity for recuperation. 
A capital city for high-tech
In a remarkable reversal of the historic pattern of metropolitan dominance, San 
Francisco lost its place atop the urban hierarchy to San Jose and Silicon Valley during 
the bubble years. During the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s, the old-line 
corporate powerhouses of San Francisco fell like redwoods before the ax, leaving 
only a couple of megaliths such as Chevron and Bechtel still standing (Walker 
et al. 1990). Meanwhile, electronics companies from the South Bay littered the 
Fortune 500 list. San Francisco lost virtually its entire manufacturing base, while 
Santa Clara County held the most intensive concentration of manufacturing in the 
country (Bay Area Economic Forum 1996, 1999). In the 2000 census, San Jose 
counted 900,000 souls and San Francisco only 775,000. The US Census Bureau 
recently designated the region as, officially, the San Jose–San Francisco–Oakland 
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area.
The New Economy building boom had a dramatic effect on Silicon Valley, 
although the vast spaces of the South Bay disperse the impact compared with 
compact San Francisco. The most pervasive effect of high land values in a grow-
ing city is densification, and Silicon Valley is no exception. The Santa Clara 
Valley is no longer the suburban sprawl of our imaginations. It is home to a true 
city, and a dense one by American standards. By the 2000 census San Jose Metro 
had become the third densest urban area in the USA, after – surprise, surprise! 
– Los Angeles and San Francisco–Oakland.17 What this means is that the New 
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York metropolitan region is more sprawling today than either LA or the Bay Area 
– quite the reverse of expectations.
To accommodate the Valley’s tremendous growth it has been necessary to build 
upward. This shows up in hundreds of mid-rise housing complexes, especially 
along the major transportation corridors. The number of apartment, condominium, 
and townhouse units in San Jose passed 50 percent by 2000, compared with less 
than 30 percent in 1970.18 Some of the new developments offer spectacular new 
urbanist concoctions that mix residential, office, and retail space, as in the Santana 
Village complex in San Jose (Calthorpe and Fulton 2001). Almost every town 
center in the Valley, long neglected as farm towns were transformed into suburbs, 
has been rebuilt to attract residents and shoppers, and infuse a bit of urban life into 
the sterile suburban landscapes. 
The boom put a new face on the electronics industry, as high-tech compa-
nies started using their immense wealth to project an image of corporate stature. 
High-rise headquarters began to appear in the 1980s and became the norm in the 
1990s, replacing the low-rise, slap-up look of the previous generation for which 
the Valley was notorious (Banham 1980). As a result, architecture took a turn for 
the better. This can be seen in the comely designs of corporate headquarters and 
office complexes. Some of the newer buildings have even been designed by name 
architects (although Silicon Valley remains largely a no-man’s land of design 
fame). Even in speculative buildings, architecture improved. While these are still 
suburban high-rises rather than city skyscrapers, they measure up favorably as 
exercises in post-modern and techno-modern styling, thick with colored glass, 
metallic sheathing, and curved surfaces.
The most astonishing transformation of the landscape of Silicon Valley in the 
1990s was the vast makeover of downtown San Jose. Long the country cousin to 
San Francisco – and eclipsed even by Palo Alto and Stanford as the key center 
of the Valley – San Jose began parading itself as “the capital of Silicon Valley” 
in the 1980s. It has never quite achieved this lofty goal, but it did make a stun-
ning bid for the honors by recreating itself as few American downtowns have. 
A redevelopment program was put in place to tear down and rebuild the city’s 
derelict downtown. It got off the ground in the boom of the 1980s, and came to 
fruition a decade later. Downtown San Jose now sports a bevy of gleaming new 
skyscrapers and civic buildings. All this has been paid for (or leveraged by) the 
richest redevelopment agency in California, using tax revenues drawn from the 
vast electronics belt cutting across north San Jose. More than US$1.5 billion has 
been siphoned from the industrial lands to the downtown over twenty years (Rhee 
2006). Downtown San Jose now has 9 million square feet of office space.
In short, the Bay Area’s urban landscape was in violent upheaval through the 
1990s as a result of the New Economy boom and financial bubble. Real estate val-
ues shot up, and so did new buildings, at a markedly higher density than before. 
This came at a real cost in displacement of people and disarray in cultural life. The 
great urban beast arose and shook off many a poor soul like so many fleas. By the 
time it settled down again, the region would never be the same.
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The rubble of the bubble
The aftermath of the boom and the bubble has done more than left the Bay Area 
geographically reconfigured. It has meant serious unemployment, dislocation, and 
despair among workers. It threw the state of California into fiscal chaos at all 
levels of government. It stilled the sirens of the New Economy. And it served as 
midwife to a political upheaval that has captured worldwide attention. 
Economic hangover
The Bay Area economy has taken a tremendous beating since 2000. Markets dried 
up as corporate America (and Asia) cut back on purchases of electronic equipment. 
Companies have bled red ink until they have shrunk to shadows of their former 
bloated selves. Hints of recovery in 2002 proved ephemeral, and the downward 
spiral took off again with a vengeance in early 2003. Massive layoffs came in 
the wake of the passing financial tidal wave as high-tech corporations sought to 
stave off the grim reaper. In the Valley (San Jose metropolitan area) 176,000 jobs 
vaporized from the peak of 1,035,000 at the end of 2000 to the bottom of the 
slump in fall 2003, or over one-sixth of the total; in San Francisco metropolitan 
area (San Francisco plus San Mateo and Marin Counties) the loss was 129,000 
out of 1,085,000, or 12 percent. The East Bay (Oakland metropolitan area) was 
less hard-hit because it is the least dependent on electronics. The total job loss 
amounted to 322,000 around the Bay Area on a base of 3,540,000, or 9.1 percent 
of all jobs. The jobless rate in Silicon Valley hovered in the 7–8 percent range for 
three years; in San Francisco it was around 5 percent, despite the departure of tens 
of thousands of dot-commers (no precise figure exists on the outflow).19
In terms of geographic impact, the Bay Area truly reaped the whirlwind. Its 
job loss represents an astonishingly high proportion of all layoffs in the USA 
during the 2000–03 recession, the area accounting for 322,000 out of a total of 
2.45 million jobs lost nationally (Figure 5.6). That means the Bay Area, with less 
than 3 percent of the national population, suffered 13 percent, or one-seventh, of 
the nation’s job loss. This ought to go down in the annals of economic geography, 
along with the shriveling of Detroit in the early 1980s and the burning of reces-
sion-torn Los Angeles in 1992, as a recent urban disaster born of a major reces-
sion.20 Figure 5.6 shows that unemployment in Silicon Valley reached a much 
higher level than in either California or the USA.
The secondary effects of the drying up of electronics have been quite stark. 
Retailing has been socked, from Stanford Shopping Center to Union Square in 
San Francisco. The Gap, retailing’s second biggest success story in the 1990s 
after Wal-Mart, took a three-year dive. One of San Francisco’s biggest law firms, 
Brobeck, Phleger and Harrison, with 500 attorneys focused on electronics and 
high-tech investment, declared bankruptcy. Talk of the New Economy has been 
stifled as such vocal advocates as Red Herring and The Industry Standard have 
disappeared from the internet. On the other hand, homelessness surged, leaving 
upwards of 20,000 people on the streets in San Francisco, Oakland, Berkeley, and 
San Jose combined. They are still being swept off the streets, this human rubble 
of the bubble.
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Faustian politics
The boom and bust of the turn of the millennium shook Bay Area politics to 
its roots. The high times gave rein to the lustiest of pro-development politicians 
and their cronies, while the subsequent economic earthquake left more than a 
few cracks in the edifice of the state. Through those weakened walls have passed 
those with the ruthless political ambition to steal in and grab the keys to the vault. 
Locally, the boom was seized upon by Mayor Willie Brown of San Francisco, and 
other like-minded politicians, as a means of aggrandizing their careers. There’s 
nothing truer to American local politics than vigorous promotion of business and 
land development (Logan and Molotch 1986) and so they made lusty concourse 
with the New Economy and its financiers and real estate schemes. They eagerly 
greased the wheels of planning boards and other government agencies, allowing a 
great deal of slippery dealing to enrich business, developers, and their campaign 
funds, and left a tainted legacy for both.
Willie Brown is the former Speaker of the Assembly, and the most powerful 
politician in Sacramento during the 1980s. Some say that terms limits were passed 
expressly to end his tenure (Clucas 1995, Richardson 1996). So, in 1995, Brown 
ran for Mayor, serving two terms. Brown had a liberal reputation in the state, 
but by San Francisco standards he is a business Democrat (Walker et al. 1990). 
He cobbled together an alliance of downtown and Pacific Heights capital with 
African-Americans at the forgotten south edge of the city, plus the ambitious new 
money of Chinese San Francisco. He kept the labor movement quiet by granting 
living wages to city employees and wooing the building trades into his pro-devel-
Figure 5.6 Annual employment change in the Bay Area, 1991–2003. Source: State of 










































opment alliance. And he put his muscle behind real estate developers in the beefy 
alliance with the Residential Builders’ Association. Brown installed a pro-devel-
opment Planning Commission that rubber-stamped all the warehouse conversions 
and loft projects developers could muster in the boom times. He was able to sell 
the new baseball park to the voters and to follow that with voter approval of the 
Mission Bay scheme, after two failed efforts in the 1980s (Blackwell 2000, Beitel 
2003, Brahinsky 2004). 
The political machinations of the bubble period triggered a popular response 
of impressive proportions in San Francisco. Many on the left had worried that 
steadily rising rents had driven all but the leftovers of the counterculture and the 
political activists out of the city. But the artists, Mission Latinos, and others put 
up a surprisingly fierce fight against the dot-coms, lofts, and developers. As the 
warehouse and loft conversions washed up on the shores of the Mission District, 
it created solid opposition from a still vibrant working-class and immigrant area 
(Blackwell 2000, Beitel 2003, Carlsson 2004). 
Willie Brown’s regime took the brunt of the anger. This figures, since Brown 
showed not the least compassion for displaced tenants in the Mission and nearby 
neighborhoods where he had twice been outgunned for votes by his mayoral 
opponent, gay Supervisor Tom Ammiano. In a remarkable election at the end 
of 2000, neighborhood activists and leftists won seven out of eight Supervisoral 
seats in San Francisco and dealt Brown a political defeat the likes of which he 
had never experienced in his brilliant, charmed career. The city lurched dramati-
cally to the left (Beitel 2003, Carlsson 2004). The powers-that-be bounced back, 
however. They began grooming young, photogenic Supervisor Gavin Newsom 
as Brown’s successor. Newsom is well connected to Pacific Heights wealth and 
is an up and coming entrepreneur in his own right. Newsom found his headline-
grabbing issue with a campaign to eliminate city handouts to the homeless, in 
a ballot measure deftly entitled “Care Not Cash,” because the human rubbish 
accumulating in the streets was scaring off tourists and shoppers. Newsom was 
elected in fall 2003, though not without a scare from a polyglot assemblage of the 
left, headed by equally young, smart, and charismatic Supervisor Matt Gonzales. 
Not surprisingly, Newsom outspent Gonzales 10 to 1 to earn his narrow victory 
(Carlsson 2004).
In comes the smiling terminator
The biggest political news from California in recent years was the recall of 
Governor Gray Davis and election of Arnold Schwarzenegger in October 2003. 
The presence of Arnold, star of The Terminator series and other violent revenge 
and humiliation flicks, captured the attention of the world. His victory was a coup 
d’état of surpassing brilliance and bloodless efficiency. 
The state Republican Party had been in the doldrums since Davis’s election in 
1998. It had lost a big portion of the immigrant vote because of Governor Pete 
Wilson’s attempt to blame immigrants for California’s fiscal crisis of the early 
1990s (Walker 1995). The legislature was still firmly in Democratic Party hands. 
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George Bush lost the state decisively in 2000. But the bursting bubble-by-the-
Bay made Davis and the Democrats suddenly vulnerable. The state of California 
was broke, with a staggering 2003–04 budget deficit of US$25–35 billion (out of 
US$100 billion). California’s deficit was larger than that of all the other states put 
together. To cover the shortfall, Davis was proposing to cut US$8 billion from 
expenditures, raise US$5 billion by taxes on car registrations, and borrow US$16 
billion short term on the bond markets. In the face of this disaster, the Republicans 
argued that irresponsible spending was responsible for the deficit and, moreover, 
Democrats were going to close the gap on the backs of the citizenry by raising 
taxes. 
The real reason for the deficit was not overspending but the precipitous col-
lapse of revenues (Rosen et al. 2003). A huge part of the increase in state income 
in the late 1990s was derived from capital gains taxes, which had ballooned on 
all the paper stock wealth generated during the bubble. Those taxes had become 
vital to paying the state’s bills for education, health, and infrastructure because 
Californians have been living in a neoliberal fantasy world for twenty-five years 
of declining tax effort (California Tax Reform Association 2005). To make mat-
ters worse, the legislature – backed solidly by mainstream business opinion – took 
the view that the New Economy was permanent, and its revenues could be put to 
use without worry. 
The Republicans hit upon the recall to unseat Davis, an obscure law that 
had been on the books since 1911 but never before employed. California’s is an 
exceedingly facile recall system that allows for no major malfeasance in office 
and a petition by a small proportion of the voters. The petition drive for the recall 
was paid for out of the personal fortune of Darryl Issa, a man made rich selling 
car alarms. Republicans filled up their campaign coffers with millions of dollars 
and started drawing up lists of candidates. Schwarzenegger was not the obvious 
choice for governor. But it soon became apparent that his star-power and personal 
Figure 5.7 The New Economy Cleaners, Berkeley, CA, in 2004.
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charm made him an ideal candidate. He had the further asset of being a Hollywood 
libertine, in a state where reactionary Christian values do not carry much weight. 
Arnold was helped immeasurably by the dull response of Davis. The governor 
was a classic New Democratic: a big fund-raiser weighing political payoffs to 
the fraction. He was utterly mute about issues of importance to an electorate suf-
fering great strain in the face of the state’s economic and fiscal meltdown. So in 
walked the smiling terminator, who swiftly put in place a pro-business agenda 
– making the budget deficit worse by rescinding the car registration tax. The Bay 
Area, to its credit, opposed the rest of the state on the recall and voted against 
Schwarzenegger.
Truly, California has been taken to the cleaners, in this case the New Economy 
Cleaners – which is just down the road from my home in Berkeley (Figure 5.7). 
Here is a business that is willing to partake of the ideological fervor without 
forgetting first principles. It has outlived both the Davis administration and the 
dot-coms because it has a sound basis in the old economy and provides people 
with a real service.
Notes
 1 Gordon (2000) calculates that virtually all the productivity gains of the late 1990s 
were concentrated in the computer sector.
 2 As Lowenstein (2004: 17) says “Silicon Valley made stock options especially 
fashionable.” When the Securities and Exchange Commission tried to crack down on 
options in 1993, John Doerr led the Valley’s successful lobbying effort to hold them at 
bay (ibid: 44).
 3 Despite the economic crash, the Bay Area had added one billionaire to register forty-
four of the Forbes 400 in 2004, putting it ahead of New York and Los Angeles. San 
Francisco still runs neck and neck with the Valley in the number of super-rich.
 4 The percentage had been even higher in the 1980s, nearly 50 percent.
 5 At its peak, the NASDAQ’s stock traded at an average of ninety times earnings, 
compared with a peak of eighty times on the Nikkei just before it crashed in 1989 
(Ingebretsen 2002: 219). By 2002, the NASDAQ had become biggest US stock 
exchange in trading volume.
 6 Most observers have noted the significance of international capital flows in the great 
NYSE stock run-up of the 1990s, when around 25 percent of the funds supporting the 
bubble came from abroad (Brenner 2002, Pollin 2003). Data are readily available at 
the national level, but not the regional.
 7 The catastrophic losses of 2001 are somewhat misleading in that they include some 
enormous write-offs of bogus gains of the late 1990s, when profits were already falling 
but the fact was being covered up. In fact, US manufacturing profits had been falling 
sharply since 1997 (Brenner 2004) and Silicon Valley had been generating more and 
more profitless start-ups (Sylvester 2002). By the end of 2001, US manufacturing 
profits were down to one-third from 1997 and computer equipment profits down by 
80 percent (Brenner 2004).
 8 Based on data from California Association of Realtors.
 9 Because housing turnover is relatively low, prices are leveraged higher than they 
would be in a perfect market, rather like oil in a time of panic buying.
 10 Based on data from Colliers International real estate reports.
 11 Data from Urban Land Institute and courtesy of Colliers International’s San Jose 
office.
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 12 This compares with a national average office vacancy rate of 17 percent (Bardhan and 
Kroll 2003). By no means was the real estate bubble and crash confined to the Bay 
Area. But it was worse here than anywhere else, as had been the case in Los Angeles 
in the late 1980s and in Houston before that.
 13 Data courtesy of Grubb & Ellis solicitors.
 14 Data courtesy of Colliers International’s San Jose office.
 15 Airport managers also wanted more runways and proposed a doubling of the tarmacs, 
by filling the bay. This plan has been on hold since the bubble burst, but will be back. 
It is fiercely opposed by environmentalists.
 16 House prices have continued to rise, in large part because of the most drastic reduction 
in interest rates since the Great Depression. Home buyers can afford much more as 
their monthly payments fall markedly. This is quite a general phenomenon nationally 
(Brenner 2004). In the Bay Area, the rise in house values has actually been slower 
than in many cities since 2000, but still esceeded all other metro areas, surpassing 
US$600,000 in 2005. But two things have added to the increase in prices. The upper 
classes were pulling their considerable savings out of stocks and putting them into 
bigger homes. At the same time, many middle market purchasers panicked as they 
saw this as their last chance to sneak into a starter home under the half-million mark 
(soon to be a distant memory).
 17 Based on census data for “urbanized areas” (metropolitan areas minus open space). 
Tables can be found at www.demographia.com.
 18 City and county data. In fact, multiples have outrun single-family houses in most 
years since the late 1960s.
 19 Employment figures were repeatedly readjusted downward during the long fall, which 
was the worst since the Great Depression and proportionately a good deal worse than 
the horrendous job shrinkage in Los Angeles in the early 1990s.
 20 Employment remained stagnant through 2004 (Armstrong 2004) and was worsened 
by the eagerness of electronic capitalists to offshore work to cut labor costs (Bardhan 
and Kroll 2003).
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6 The role of regional innovation 
systems in a globalising economy
 Comparing knowledge bases and 
institutional frameworks of Nordic 
clusters
Bjørn T. Asheim and Lars Coenen
Introduction
Over the past two decades social scientists and policy-makers have been paying 
more and more attention to regions as designated sites of innovation and 
competitiveness in the globalising economy. The popularity of this argument can 
be traced back to various empirical studies of regional success stories, such as 
the rapid economic growth of networked small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) in industrial districts in the ‘Third Italy’ (Asheim 2000), the exemplar 
industrial system of Silicon Valley (Saxenian 1994) as well as other examples of 
successful regional clustering in most developed as well as developing economies 
(Porter 1990). These studies all draw on the common rationale that territorial 
agglomeration provides the best context for an innovation-based learning economy 
promoting localised learning and endogenous regional economic development 
(Asheim 2002).
In this discourse, two concepts belonging to the territorial innovation theory 
family (Moulaert and Sekia 2003) demonstrate particular resonance: clusters and 
regional innovation systems. Even though the two concepts are closely related, 
they should not be conflated. Therefore, we argue for an analytical distinction 
not the least against the background of a rising popularity of both concepts in 
policy and consultancy circles. It can, in fact, be observed that many regions have 
been treated with off-the-shelf, ‘best-practice’ cluster or regional innovation sys-
tem solutions drawn ‘from the experience of successful regions or some expert 
manual’ (Amin 1999: 371) without due regard for its specific context and circum-
stances. This chapter seeks to take the issue of contextualisation along two tracks. 
First, from a bottom-up perspective, it discusses the linkage between regional 
innovation systems and clusters on the basis of the cluster’s knowledge base and, 
second, from a top-down perspective, it positions regional innovation systems in 
their wider national frame.
The second section introduces the notion of the learning economy as well as 
the two main contextualisation tracks: industrial knowledge base and institutional 
frameworks. The third section elaborates on the two main concepts, clusters and 
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regional innovation systems. The fourth section provides the empirical illustrations 
from a Nordic comparative project on SMEs and regional innovation systems. 
Conclusions and implications for further research are given in the final section.
Providing context: the learning economy, industrial 
knowledge bases and institutional settings
Both the knowledge-based as well as the learning economy rationale argue that, 
in the globalising economy, knowledge is the most strategic resource and learning 
the most fundamental activity for competitiveness (Lundvall 1992, OECD 1996). 
However, in academic as well as policy-oriented discourses, these two concepts 
have from time to time taken on different meanings with potential importance 
for the theoretical understanding of the contemporary economy as well as for 
policy implications. Lundvall has always preferred to talk about the contemporary 
global economy as a ‘learning economy’, whereas the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) (at least the economic sections), being 
strongly influenced by the USA, has instead more often used ‘the knowledge-
based’ economy. The difference between the two can basically be traced back to 
the threefold taxonomy of high-, medium- and low-tech industries as suggested by 
the OECD (1986). This taxonomy reflects the R&D intensity between industries, 
with those spending more than 5 per cent of turnover being classified as high-tech. 
Though the initial discussion was carefully launched, offering many necessary 
qualifications, it still seems that the high-tech fascination has taken on a life of 
its own, equating R&D intensity with innovation at large (Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 
2003). Because of its more inclusive notion of innovation, we prefer to argue 
in terms of the learning economy rather than the more exclusive and high-tech-
focused knowledge-based economy. Thus, we follow Cooke et al. (2003) in their 
broad definition of innovation as the transformation of knowledge into novel 
wealth-creating technologies, products and services through processes of learning 
and searching. 
In a learning economy, innovation is basically understood as an interactive 
learning process, which is socially and territorially embedded and culturally and 
institutionally contextualised (Lundvall 1992). This conceptualisation of innova-
tion means an extension of the range of branches, firm sizes and regions that can 
be viewed as innovative, also to include traditional, non R&D-intensive branches 
(e.g. the importance of design in making furniture manufactures competitive and 
moving them up the value-added chain). An important implication of this broad 
perspective on innovation is to re-establish the focus on the ‘enormous untapped 
growth potential that could be mobilized to solve social and economic problems’ 
if the necessary ‘institutional reforms and organizational change that promote 
learning processes’ were implemented (Lundvall 2004: 1). This implies that the 
introduction of advanced technologies has to be accompanied by organisational 
change and competence-building among employees in order for firms to become 
successful. Furthermore, the outsourcing to subcontractors and suppliers within 
a production system as a result of the development from vertical integration to 
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disintegration of production is accompanied by a transition from an internal 
knowledge base in specific industries to a distributed knowledge base of firms 
(Smith 2000). Knowledge flows, within a distributed knowledge base, can take 
place between industries with very different degrees of R&D intensity, further 
weakening the analytical and substantial distinction between high-tech and low-
tech industries (e.g. when food and beverage firms produce functional food based 
on inputs from biotechnology firms). 
Despite the generic trend towards increased diversity and interdependence in 
the knowledge process, we argue that the innovation process in firms and industries 
is dependent on their specific knowledge base (Asheim and Gertler 2005). Here 
we will distinguish between two (ideal) types of knowledge base: ‘analytical’ and 
‘synthetic’ (Laestadius 1998). These types indicate different mixes of tacit and 
codified knowledge, codification possibilities and limits, qualifications and skills, 
required organisations and institutions involved, as well as specific innovation 
challenges and pressures from the globalising economy. Table 6.1 provides a sum-
mary of some important differences.
An analytical knowledge base refers to industrial settings, where scientific 
knowledge is highly important, and where knowledge creation is often based on 
cognitive and rational processes, or to formal models. Examples are genetics, 
biotechnology and information technology. Both basic and applied research, as 
well as systematic development of products and processes, are relevant activities. 
Companies typically have their own R&D departments but they rely also on the 
research results of universities and other research organisations in their innova-
tion process. University–industry links and resultant networks are thus important 
and more frequent than in the other type of knowledge base.
Knowledge inputs and outputs in this type of knowledge base are more often 
codified than in the other type. This does not imply that tacit knowledge is irrel-
evant, since both kinds of knowledge are always involved and needed in the 
process of knowledge creation and innovation (Nonaka et al. 2000; Johnson and 
Lundvall 2001). Codification is more frequent for several reasons: knowledge 
inputs are often based on reviews of existing studies, knowledge generation is 
based on the application of scientific principles and methods, knowledge proc-
esses are more formally organised (e.g. in R&D departments) and outcomes tend 
to be documented in reports, electronic files or patent descriptions. Knowledge 
application takes the form of new products or processes, and there are more radical 
innovations than in the other knowledge type. An important route of knowledge 
application is new firms and spin-off companies, which are occasionally formed 
on the basis of radically new inventions or products.
A synthetic knowledge base refers to industrial settings, where the innovation 
takes place mainly through the application of existing knowledge or through new 
combinations of knowledge. Often this occurs in response to the need to solve 
specific problems coming up in the interaction with clients and suppliers. Industry 
examples include plant engineering, specialised advanced industrial machinery 
and ship-building. Products are often ‘one-off’ or produced in small series. R&D 
is in general less important than in the first type and often takes the form of applied 
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research, but more often product or process development. University–industry 
links are relevant, but they are clearly more important in the field of applied 
research and development than in basic research. Knowledge is created less in a 
deductive process or through abstraction, and more often in an inductive process 
of testing, experimentation, computer-based simulation or through practical work. 
Knowledge embodied in the technical solution or engineering work is at least par-
tially codified. However, tacit knowledge seems to be more important than in the 
first type, in particular because knowledge often results from experience gained at 
the workplace, and through learning by doing, using and interacting. Compared 
with the first knowledge type, more concrete know-how, craft and practical skill 
are required in the knowledge production and circulation process. These are often 
provided by professional and polytechnic colleges, or by on-the-job training.
The innovation process is often oriented towards the efficiency and reliability 
of new solutions, or the practical utility and user-friendliness of products from 
the perspective of the customers. Overall, this leads to a rather incremental way 
of innovation, dominated by the modification of existing products and processes. 
Since these types of innovation are less disruptive to existing routines and organi-
sations, most of them take place in existing firms, whereas spin-offs are relatively 
less frequent. 
Lam (2000) emphasises that learning and innovation cannot be separated from 
broader societal contexts when analysing the links between knowledge types, 
organisational forms and societal institutions in order to meet the needs of specific 
industries, in particular with respect to learning and the creation of knowledge in 
support of innovations. Soskice (1999) argues that different national institutional 
frameworks support different forms of economic activity, i.e. that coordinated 
market economies (e.g. the Nordic and (continental) West European welfare states) 
have their competitive advantage in ‘diversified quality production’ (Streeck 
1992), based on problem-solving and engineering-based knowledge developed 
through interactive learning and accumulated collectively in the workforce (e.g. 
the machine tool industry), while liberal market economies (e.g. the USA and UK) 
Table 6.1 Industrial knowledge bases
Synthetic Analytic
Innovation by application or novel 
combination of existing knowledge
Innovation by creation of new knowledge
Importance of applied, problem-related 
knowledge (engineering) often through 
inductive processes
Importance of scientific knowledge often 
based on deductive processes and formal 
models
Interactive learning with clients and 
suppliers
Research collaboration between firms 
(R&D department) and research 
organisations 
Dominance of tacit knowledge due to more 
concrete know-how, craft and practical skill
Dominance of codified knowledge due to 
documentation in patents and publications
Mainly incremental innovation More radical innovation
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are most competitive in production relying on scientific based knowledge, i.e. 
industries characterised by a high rate of change through radical innovations (e.g. 
IT, defence technology and advanced producer services). Following Soskice, the 
main determinants of coordinated market economies are the degree of non-market 
coordination and cooperation that exists inside the business sphere and between 
private and public actors, the degree to which labour remains ‘incorporated’ as 
well as the ability of the financial system to supply long-term finance (Soskice 
1999). This represents a situation in direct conflict with a preference for unilat-
eral control over work processes, generated by certain finance and governance 
systems found in liberal market economies, where competitive strength is based 
on institutional freedom as well as financial incentives to continuously restructure 
production systems in light of new market opportunities (Gilpin 1996). While 
coordinated market economies at the macro level support cooperative, long-term 
and consensus-based relations between private as well as public actors, liberal 
market economies inhibit the development of these relations but instead offer 
the opportunity to quickly adjust the formal structure to new requirements using 
temporary organisations frequently.
Such differences – due to the impact of the specific modes of organisation 
of important societal institutions such as the market, the education system, the 
labour market, the financial system and the role of the state – both contribute to 
the formation of divergent ‘business systems’ (Whitley 1999) and constitute the 
institutional context within which different organisational forms with different 
mechanisms for learning, knowledge creation and knowledge appropriation have 
evolved. Through its emphasis on institutional complementarities, the varieties of 
capitalism approach focuses on dynamic ensembles of mutually reinforcing sets 
of institutions rather than isolating individual forms and their impact. As such it 
pieces together consistent configurations of institutions and the implications for 
innovative performance (Nooteboom 2000). However, despite the emphasis on 
institutional complementarities, it takes predominantly institutions at the national 
level into consideration, leaving ‘the multi-scaled set of institutional forms’ 
(Martin 2000: 89) unaddressed.
In a learning economy, which indeed is also a knowledge-based economy, 
competitive advantage is based on the exploitation of unique competencies and 
resources. A firm or a region competes on the basis of what it has that is unique 
in relation to its competitors. A strategic perspective in the contemporary global 
economy is, thus, how to develop such unique competencies and resources in order 
to foster competitiveness based on competitive advantage (Porter 1990). Hall and 
Soskice (2001) partly criticise this position by arguing that the theory of competi-
tive advantage identifies factors that improve the performance of any economy, 
while not taking its comparative advantage sufficiently into account. This refers 
to the aforementioned idea that the distinct institutional structure of a political 
economy favours specific types of firm activities. Moreover, they contend that 
such institutional structures are difficult to change. The institutional landscape 
invoked here can in turn be criticised for being overly inert and inherited (Peck 
2003). It is generally recognised that the theory of competitive advantage is more 
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dynamic than the theory of comparative advantage and, thus, can be more eas-
ily influenced by innovation policies and supporting regulatory and institutional 
frameworks. In this way innovation plays a central role in attaining and sustaining 
competitive advantage.
To understand the difference between competitive and comparative advantage 
it is important to acknowledge the multiple and interrelated layers by which insti-
tutions tend to work (Rogers Hollingsworth 2000). At the high end of the hierarchy 
of the institutional setting of a society we find deeply embedded norms and values 
which are more permanent and durable. Changes at this level are highly likely to 
influence the lower levels of the institutional spheres, which are more open and 
susceptible to change. While the theory of comparative advantage stresses the 
persistence of institutional structures, the theory of competitive advantage allows 
to a greater extent for institutional change. In order to understand both the com-
petitive and comparative advantages of a region it is important to recognise the 
duality of institutional frameworks by interpreting them as ‘enabling constraints’ 
(Nooteboom 2000: 94).
Regional innovation systems and clusters: differences and 
connections
An important tool for analysing regional performance in the learning economy is 
the concept of regional innovation systems (RIS) that emerged in the early 1990s 
(Cooke 1992, 1998, 2001), a few years after Chris Freeman first used the national 
innovation system concept – originally developed by Bengt-Åke Lundvall – in 
his analysis of Japan’s blooming economy (Freeman 1987). Characteristic of a 
systems approach to innovation is the acknowledgement that innovations are 
carried out through a network of various actors underpinned by an institutional 
framework. This dynamic and complex interaction constitutes what is commonly 
labelled systems of innovation (Edquist 1997), i.e. systems understood as 
interaction networks (Kaufmann and Tödtling 2000). A set of variations on this 
approach have been developed over time, taking as their point of departure either 
territories (national and regional) or specific sectors or technologies (Fagerberg 
et al. 2005).
The national innovation systems (NIS) approach highlights the importance of 
interactive learning and the role of nation-based institutions in explaining the dif-
ference in innovation performance and, hence, economic growth across various 
countries. Regions are, nonetheless, seen as important bases of economic coordi-
nation and governance at the mesolevel between the national and the local (cluster 
or firms): ‘the region is increasingly the level at which innovation is produced 
through regional networks of innovators, local clusters and the cross-fertilising 
effects of research institutions’ (Lundvall and Borras 1997: 39). 
To a large extent the ‘system’ dimension in RIS was inspired by this literature. 
In the case that the following two subsystems of actors are systematically engaged 
in interactive learning (Cooke et al. 1998), it can be argued that a regional innova-
tion system is in place:
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• the regional production structure or knowledge exploitation subsystem, 
which consists mainly of firms, especially where these display clustering 
tendencies; 
• the regional supportive infrastructure or knowledge generation subsystem, 
which consists of public and private research laboratories, universities and 
colleges, technology transfer agencies, vocational training organisations, 
etc. 
As it refers to ‘regional’, it is geographically defined by the boundaries of 
the region, i.e. an administrative division of a country yet above the local or 
municipal level (Cooke and Leydesdorff forthcoming). Nonetheless, the level 
of regional administration can differ quite a lot across countries. Furthermore, 
regional governance is expressed in both private representative organisations, 
such as branches of industry associations and chambers of commerce, and pub-
lic organisations such as universities, polytechnics and regional ministries with 
devolved powers concerning enterprise and innovation support, particularly for 
SMEs. The RIS approach does not only exist as a framework for studying eco-
nomic and innovative performance, but is also in use as a concrete tool for policy-
makers to systemically enhance localised learning processes to secure regional 
innovativeness in practice (which in turn influences the functioning of the RIS as 
such) (Asheim et al. 2003a).
Clusters and RIS are indeed closely related. In order to delineate the concepts, 
we argue that it is essential to acknowledge sector specificity and a high density 
of functionally related firms as necessary cluster conditions. Therefore, we prefer 
Isaksen and Hauge’s (2002: 14) definition – ‘a concentration of interdependent 
firms within the same or adjacent industrial sectors in a small geographic area’ 
– rather than the traditional Porterian definition, which conflates both concepts.1 
Through processes of localised learning, clustered firms enjoy advantages in terms 
of innovation performance. An RIS can in principle stretch across several sectors 
in the regional economy and is more lenient in terms of necessary conditions. An 
RIS is in place as soon as there are firms and knowledge organisations that interact 
systematically on the regional level. This means that clusters and RIS may coexist 
in the same territory. The RIS may in fact contain several clusters. 
Furthermore, research has revealed that the regional level is neither always nor 
even normally sufficient for firms in a cluster to stay innovative and competitive 
(Isaksen 1999). Under pressure of processes of globalisation the learning proc-
ess becomes increasingly inserted into various forms of networks and innovation 
systems (at regional, national and international levels). The continuous impor-
tance of the regional level is, however, confirmed by results from a European 
comparative cluster survey (Isaksen 2005), which shows that regional resources 
and collaboration are of major importance in stimulating economic activity in the 
clusters. Nonetheless, the survey found an increased presence of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) in many clusters, and also that firms in the clusters increas-
ingly source major components and perform assembly manufacturing outside 
the clusters (Isaksen 2005). In addition, Tödtling et al. (2005) found support for 
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clustering, because of the importance of social interaction, trust and local institu-
tions. Yet, they also note that both local and distant networks are often needed 
for successful cooperative projects, in particular for projects of innovation and 
product development, when it is usually necessary to combine both local and 
non-local skills and competencies in order to go beyond the limits of the region 
(see also Cooke et al. 2000, Asheim and Herstad 2003, Bathelt et al. 2004).
A central point that this chapter seeks to put forward is that clusters drawing 
on a predominantly synthetic knowledge base are more loosely coupled with the 
RIS than are clusters that draw on a predominantly analytic knowledge base. The 
latter case can thus be typified as an integrated cluster–RIS configuration. In the 
former case, the RIS is contingently supportive to innovation in the cluster but the 
two parts do not form an integrated whole and can thus be typified as an auxil-
iary cluster–RIS configuration. It needs to be noted that this proposition does not 
exclude the importance of non-regional knowledge linkages. It primarily entails 
the argument that in auxiliary cluster–RIS configurations, based on industries 
with a synthetic knowledge base, the logic behind building a regional innovation 
system is to support and strengthen the localised learning of an existing indus-
trial specialisation, i.e. to promote historical technological trajectories based on 
‘sticky’ knowledge. In contexts of an integrated cluster–RIS configuration, it is a 
question of promoting new economic activity based on industries with an analyti-
cal knowledge base, requiring close and systemic industry–university cooperation 
and interaction in the context of, for example, science parks, located in proximity 
of knowledge-creating organisations (e.g. (technical) universities). The difference 
between auxiliary and integrated cluster–RIS configurations is illustrated below 
on the basis of a comparative analysis of five clusters in three Nordic countries: 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
First, however, it is important, in a general institutional framework, to realise 
that Sweden, Norway and Denmark are coordinated market economies (Hall 
and Soskice 2001), in contrast to the UK and USA, which are the liberal market 
economies. The overall effect of this is that firms tend to rely more on strategic 
interaction among firms and other actors. In an innovation system context, the 
prime mode of firm conduct is ‘voice’, in contrast to the ‘exit’ mode that is typical 
of liberal market economies (Nooteboom 2000). Systemic relationships between 
the production structure and the knowledge structure embedded in networking 
governance structures are therefore characteristic of innovation systems in the 
Nordic countries. In comparison, exit-based innovation systems lack these strong 
systemic elements and are to a greater extent based on individual entrepreneurial-
ism, flexibility and venture capital. Hall and Soskice’s (2001) argument that both 
Sweden and Denmark show modest results in term of radical innovation while 
being better in incremental innovation confirms Edquist and Lundvall’s findings 
(1993) about the Danish and Swedish systems of innovation. 
[In Denmark] the survival of small-scale and artisan-like production has 
fostered a kind of corporatism, very different from the Swedish. Small, 
independent entrepreneurs in Denmark will often be quite negative to cen-
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tral union power, but at the same time, often willing to cooperate locally 
with their workers and their representatives. [. . .] This small-scale corporat-
ist model often involving a flexible use of reasonably advanced production 
equipment and a continuous development of incremental product innovations 
has its strength in flexible adaptation.
(Edquist and Lundvall 1993: 275)
In contrast, the authors describe the Swedish innovation system as compara-
tively more advanced in process innovation against the backdrop of a dominating 
position of large firms and heavy investments in R&D on a national level. In 
general, Denmark tends to fit best with the institutional features of a ‘coordinated 
industrial district’ whereas Sweden would belong to the ‘collaborative’ national 
business system (Whitley 1999). The Norwegian general framework seems to be 
quite similar to the coordinated industrial district system of Denmark due to the 
large number of SMEs. However, a key difference that stands out is the national 
specialisation in process industries that follows from the importance of petroleum 
to the Norwegian economy. 
These rather static macro-level tendencies represent the comparative advan-
tages of nations and, as regions are, by definition, part of the national system, they 
also influence innovation processes at the regional level. However, this top-down 
perspective does not take full account of the competitive advantage of firms at 
the regional level which emphasises to a greater extent the exploitation of unique 
competencies and resources through processes of localised learning as discussed 
below.
Comparison of Nordic clusters
Empirically the analysis builds on a set of studies that have been conducted on 
various regional clusters/RIS in three Nordic countries:2 
• in Denmark the furniture cluster of Salling and the wireless communication 
cluster of North Jutland;
• in Sweden the functional food ‘cluster’ of Scania;
• in Norway the Rogaland food cluster and the Horten electronic cluster.
On the issue of method, Cooke (1998: 12) argues that one of the distinct 
advantages of the RIS approach is that it allows for a systematic comparison 
of innovation activities across various regions: ‘Conducting such comparable 
studies can lead to identification of some functional equivalents for specific 
as well as generic problems within the innovation process.’ However, various 
other researchers remain critical and argue that the rise of the ‘Silicon Valley 
fever’ (Benneworth and Hardy 2003) has confined much work to textbook cases 
in high-tech sectors (Doloreux 2002). It is argued that more attention should be 
paid to applying the approach to regions other than the stereotypical ‘happy few’ 
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and, more importantly, theory must be informed by the lessons drawn from such 
ordinary regions. Reflecting on the applicability of the concept, Kaufmann and 
Tödtling (2000) question whether regional innovation systems can be found only 
in exemplar regions or also in less ideal situations. Their comparative study of old 
traditional industrial regions shows that the concept does not necessarily embrace 
extraordinary regions only but allows for utilisation in ordinary regions as well. 
The scope of this chapter does not allow for detailed analyses of the individual 
cases.3 Instead, we focus on the most important characteristics which are required 
to illustrate our previous argument that whether coupling between clusters and 
RIS is loose or tight depends on the type of industrial knowledge base. 
Over the past decades, the furniture-producing sector in Salling4 has demon-
strated considerable economic growth despite high factor costs. Between 1972 and 
1992 employment in the cluster tripled (while overall employment in Denmark 
decreased) and the number of firms grew by approximately 80 per cent. In 1996, 
fifty-four firms, the majority of which could be classified as SMEs, employed 
2,388 employees (Lorenzen 2003). This remarkable performance is ascribed 
to the strong ability of the cluster to collectively penetrate new markets, brand 
products and develop new designs. This high level of low-tech innovativeness 
is in turn underpinned by a combination of stable and at the same time flexible 
inter-firm relationships held together by a high level of trust and shared norms 
and conventions. The high-tech wireless communication cluster in North Jutland5 
consists of roughly thirty-five firms employing around 3,220 people. In terms of 
firm size, the cluster is composed of both SMEs as well as branches of major mul-
tinationals. In 1997, the private sector, Aalborg University and the science park 
NOVI established the formal cluster association NorCOM, reflecting successful 
cooperation between the various actors (Dalum et al. 2002). 
The case for Sweden is represented by functional foods in Scania,6 a region that is 
by tradition an important national centre for agricultural production, hosting some 
of the country’s largest food-processing industries. Previous empirical research 
identifies the food sector as well as the life science sector as constituting the two 
internationally competitive clusters in Scania (Nilsson et al. 2002). Functional 
foods7 are regarded as an area of high future growth and innovation in a sector 
that is traditionally considered as having low growth and low levels of innova-
tion. Against this background, several small, R&D-intensive companies dedicated 
to functional food have emerged around the University of Lund. Furthermore, 
these companies work together with the traditional large food companies for the 
production and marketing of functional foods as well as with regional research 
groups and organisations in the area of scientific research. It would be going too 
far to consider this a full-fledged cluster, but it can be argued that a highly innova-
tive and knowledge intensive embryonic cluster is taking shape.
The cases for Norway are constituted by the Rogaland8 food cluster and the 
Horten9 electronics cluster. Rogaland is a leading production area for food in 
Norway. Onsager and Aasen (2003) distinguish three partially differentiated, 
partially integrated subsystems: agrofood production, seafood production and 
livestock production. Although these subsystems are internally differentiated, 
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each exploiting separate raw materials, production technologies and end markets, 
functional connections and interrelations are in place across the subsystem with 
regard to subcontracting, common customers and support organisations (R&D, 
training and professional fora). Given this differentiation, it is debatable whether 
one can consider this a true cluster. Despite this, Rogaland makes an interesting 
case because of the geographical concentration of companies and a support organ-
isation, which together constitute an ‘agglomerated sector environment’ (Onsager 
1999) that displays a high degree of local collaboration in terms of innovation. 
Finally, the case of Horten can rightfully be defined as a real yet small cluster, 
hosting approximately twenty-five firms and 1,900 employees in the electronics 
sector (Asheim and Isaksen 2002, Isaksen 2003). The cluster contains a few large 
enterprises but is dominated by SMEs. The power factors in the local electronics 
industry are the large system houses and suppliers of original equipment manufac-
turers (OEMs). These mainly collaborate with national and international research 
organisations, universities and customers when innovating. Even so, localised 
learning can be said to occur through the movement and personal networks of 
individuals between different Horten firms. However, a third group of firms in 
the cluster, the local subcontractors, displays clear regional linkages by delivering 
for the system houses and OEM suppliers in Horten. As specialised producers of 
components and software they play a significant role in co-innovation processes 
with their customers by transferring prototypes into effective industrial produc-
tion as well as through joint problem-solving.
In this section we analyse the industrial knowledge base of each of the clusters 
in relation to loose or tight coupling between the cluster and the RIS. Table 6.2 
summarises the result of this analysis.
From an analysis of the case study conducted by Lorenzen (2003), the charac-
teristic knowledge base of the furniture cluster in Salling can be classified as syn-
thetic. In terms of technological product innovations, Salling firms mainly design 
variations on the existing product line that differ in, for example, style, materials 
and colours. Totally new product types and designs are typically introduced once 
a year. Process innovations necessarily follow such new product designs. The 
shift from hardwood to other materials, notably plywood, is considered to be the 
most dramatic shift that the cluster has witnessed. The synthetic nature of the 
knowledge base is further illustrated by the way in which the companies innovate 
internally: through experimentation on the shop floor and product revision based 
upon employees’ ideas. The most important innovation mechanism is, however, 
local inter-firm relations. These appear to be highly conducive to both user–pro-
ducer innovation as well as horizontal networks. In terms of direct knowledge 
flows and learning processes, the Salling cluster appears to be almost exclusively 
firm based, with few connections outside the cluster or other knowledge organisa-
tions. However, two local organisations are indirectly important for the innovative 
performance of the cluster. First, the skills needed by the workforce are largely 
provided through education at the local technical school, which is considered 
to be highly specialised in furniture production. Second, another organisation 
important to the cluster is the local cabinetmakers’ guild. The guild provides a 
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crucial forum for firms to exchange information and form inter-firm relationships. 
However, interactive learning occurs nearly exclusively between firms directly 
involved in furniture production.
The Rogaland regional food cluster provides a somewhat more complex pic-
ture even though the general argument holds: the linkage between the cluster and 
the RIS can be characterised as auxiliary in the light of the predominantly syn-
thetic knowledge base of the regional food industry. As Onsager and Aasen (2003) 
show, Rogaland hosts important R&D bodies involved in innovation activities 
with the cluster companies. An example is Nordconserv (the Norwegian Institute 
for Fish Processing and Preservation Technology), which serves as an important 
centre of expertise for regional companies involved in changing and develop-
ing production processes. The institute is renowned for its emphasis on hands-on 
research of relevance to industry. However, these R&D bodies are often divisions 
of national organisations. This is characteristic of the situation in Norway, where 
there is a long tradition of public R&D programmes being implemented at the 
national level, although there has recently been a move towards greater regionali-
sation in this area. Thus, in Norway clusters are not exclusively embedded in the 
RIS. Learning and knowledge transmission ‘depend extensively on an ability to 
make use of knowledge resources from many different players, centres and levels’ 
(Onsager and Aasen 2003: 28).
The above examples of low-tech innovation can be contrasted with the high-
tech cluster of Northern Jutland and the embryonic functional food cluster in 
Scania. These cases are prime examples of analytic knowledge base clusters in 
which the regional knowledge infrastructure plays a crucial role. The historical 
overview of the development of the wireless communication cluster in North 
Jutland provided by Dalum et al. (1999, 2002) clearly shows how the presence 
of Aalborg University and the NOVI science park have been requisites for the 
cluster’s growth. This interdependence has even been formalised through the 
NorCOM cluster association, founded in 1997. Since the university was estab-
lished in 1974, a central feature of its role in the cluster has been the provision to 
the region of skilled engineers. Moreover, Dalum et al. (2002: 16) argue that the 
university’s research orientation (‘basic research with a sufficiently application-
oriented touch’) in close interaction with local industry constitutes a core asset of 
the region, attracting the attention of major MNCs. In addition, the NOVI science 
park can be considered as an indication of successful integration between private 
and public organisations around wireless communication in North Jutland.
Table 6.2 RIS cluster configuration vs. industrial knowledge base
Analytical knowledge base Synthetic knowledge base
Integrated RIS cluster
Functional food, Scania 
Wireless communication, 
North Jutland
Auxiliary RIS cluster Electronics, Horten Furniture, Salling 
Food, Rogaland
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The story for functional foods in Scania is similar, albeit the scale, in terms 
of companies, is much more modest. Holmberg (2003) identifies three dedicated 
functional food firms that constitute the core of this embryonic cluster. In line 
with findings for the Swedish biotechnology–pharmaceutical sector in general 
(McKelvey et al. 2003), inter-firm knowledge linkages are weak despite the firms’ 
proximity. Instead, the firms cooperate with firms and research organisations at 
the regional, national and international level. Notwithstanding this, the firms’ 
location close to Lund University remains of fundamental importance because 
of the presence in the university of world-class research and education facilities 
in the field of functional foods. This has been further reinforced by the recent 
establishment of the cross-faculty Functional Foods Science Centre. It can, there-
fore, be argued that Lund University serves as the backbone of the commercial 
exploitation of functional foods in Scania as well as of the further development of 
a true functional foods cluster.
As Table 6.2 indicates, the Horten case serves as an exception to the suggested 
proposition. Right from the beginning, in the 1960s, knowledge linkages among 
the pioneering firms in this cluster were largely embedded in the national system of 
innovation. These firms were in fact spin-offs from important national knowledge 
organisations and were established based on product ideas that originated in these 
organisations. Later (radical) product development relied mainly on cooperation 
with technological R&D institutes and large public and private clients in Norway, 
in projects often partly financed by the National Research Council (Isaksen 2003). 
Again, this should be viewed in the context of the Norwegian tradition for national 
R&D programmes. In contrast, the regional knowledge infrastructure was of little 
value to the electronics cluster. For the technologically advanced system houses 
and OEM suppliers this is still the case. According to Isaksen (2003), these com-
panies have even outgrown the national innovation system from which they arose 
and are increasingly collaborating at an international level with firms and R&D 
institutes. What, then, ties these firms to Horten? The answer lies in the build-up 
of unique competencies among key personnel attached to the locality (Asheim and 
Isaksen 2002). Furthermore, the role of local subcontractors appears to be highly 
important. These have arisen since the beginning of the 1980s when system firms 
closed down their in-house production facilities. While the knowledge base of 
the system houses and OEM suppliers tends to be more inclined to an analytical 
knowledge base, the innovation activities of these local subcontractors typically 
build on a synthetic knowledge base.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have argued that, in a learning economy, clusters and RIS are 
two different yet closely interrelated concepts. The fundamental distinction is that 
the cluster concept is substantially narrower than the RIS concept because the 
former has a strong sectorial connotation whereas an RIS can transcend multiple 
sectors. From a policy perspective it is important to remember this distinction 
and bear in mind that some policies may be sector specific whereas others are 
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generic. In addition, we analysed the relationship between clusters and RIS from 
an industrial knowledge base perspective on the basis of a comparison of Nordic 
clusters. This indicated that clusters drawing on an analytical knowledge base 
tend to be more integrated in the RIS than are clusters drawing on a synthetic 
knowledge base, which tend to be more loosely connected to the RIS (i.e. an 
auxiliary configuration). Furthermore, Cooke’s (2003) finding that biotechnology 
clusters (which is a prime example of an analytical industry) are intrinsically tied 
to regional knowledge ‘fountainheads’ corroborates this proposition. Despite 
this, the case of the electronics cluster in Horten showed weak linkages with the 
regional knowledge infrastructure. This needs to be viewed against the background 
of Norway’s traditionally national science and technology orientation. 
However, as a result of empirical studies that have emphasised the significance 
of the regional level in economic development (in addition to – and sometimes 
taking precedence over – the national level), a strong case has been made for an 
approach geared to region-specific innovation activities. The core of the argument 
is that close proximity between actors and organisations strongly facilitates the 
creation, acquisition, accumulation and utilisation of knowledge rooted in inter-
firm networking, interpersonal relationships, local learning processes and ‘sticky’ 
knowledge grounded in social interaction (Asheim and Isaksen 2002). 
In a globalising learning economy characterised by vertical disintegration 
and distributed knowledge bases, the important perspective ought to be the inter-
dependences between regions and nations, with the deciding criteria being the 
location of core activities (rather than the whole value chain) and the relative 
importance of their connections to regional knowledge infrastructures. The argu-
ment that ‘production configurations are often dependent on structures and devel-
opments which are shaped and take place outside’ the actual regional territory 
(Bathelt 2003: 796) applies as readily to most small and medium-sized countries 
as to regions, especially if they are members of supranational organisations such 
as the EU. Also, from an institutional perspective, it is essential to recognise the 
intertwined nature of a region in a wider geographical context (Howells 1999). 
It acknowledges the importance of institutions negotiated and designed at the 
supraregional level but, at the same time, it also allows for differentiation in terms 
of the impact of overarching institutions on the regional level as well as for differ-
ing degrees of regional institutional autonomy. More research across geographical 
scales is needed to avoid the kind of spatial fetishism that deals with territorial 
innovation systems in a confined way.
Notes
 1 ‘A geographic concentration of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers 
and service providers, firms in related industries and associated institutions (e.g. 
universities, standard agencies and trade associations) in particular fields that compete 
but also cooperate’ (Porter 2000: 253). 
 2 These studies were carried out through the common research project ‘Nordic SMEs 
and Regional Innovation Systems’ financed by the Nordic Industrial Fund (currently 
Nordic Innovation Centre).
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 3 For this, see Asheim et al. (2003b).
 4 The case of Salling in Denmark draws predominantly on the work of Mark Lorenzen 
at Copenhagen Business School.
 5 This case draws on studies carried out by Michael Dahl, Christian Pedersen and Bent 
Dalum at Aalborg University.
 6 This case draws for the most part on work by Gustav Holmberg at Lund University.
 7 Artificially developed food with added ingredients that demonstrate scientific evidence 
of positive health-related effects. 
 8 This case draws mainly on a study carried out by Knut Onsager and Berit Aasen at the 
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Development (NIBR).
 9 This case draws mainly on a study carried out by Arne Isaksen at Agder University 
College.
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7 Spatial externalities and local 
employment dynamics
Raffaele Paci and Stefano Usai
Introduction
Over the last decade a vast body of literature has addressed the issue of the 
influence of externalities on local growth (starting with Glaeser et al. 1992, 
until Henderson 2003, to mention just a few). Such literature has, however, paid 
relatively little attention to the wider scenario in which such phenomena are 
rooted, that of an ongoing process of structural change that is transforming our 
economies from manufacturing to service ones.1 Such a process has important 
implications for the analysis of the geography of economic activities. In fact, the 
spatial distribution and functioning of industrial economies have been shaped by 
the characteristics of prevailing levels of production and distribution technology, 
modes of work organisation, labour and capital mobility. All these features are 
currently changing dramatically as a result of the relocation and deverticalisation 
of mass production industries followed by the development of new service 
activities, the transformation of cultural and leisure activities from pastimes into 
economic businesses and the emerging role of information and communications 
technologies. These trends are modifying both the economic geography of 
local production systems and the manner in which these are linked to a broader 
economy. Economic landscapes are increasingly being shaped by a complex 
mixture of forces operating simultaneously at a global, national and local level, 
with the common denominator being the structural shift from manufacturing to 
services in the most developed economies. 
The main aim of this chapter is to analyse local short-term economic perform-
ance, as expressed by employment dynamics, in both the service and the manufac-
turing sectors. Working with a large set of variables and data, we attempt to explain 
some of the differences in the economic performance of sectors2 by assessing the 
role of several potential determinants of local employment dynamics.
In particular, we aim to introduce a useful classification of determinants in 
order to present a general setting for testing different potential explanatory sce-
narios. Such a classification includes the usual distinction between specialisation–
Marshall externalities, resulting from the scale of local, own-industry activity, and 
urbanisation–Jacobs economies attributable to cross-fertilisation enhanced by the 
scale or diversity of activity outside the own industry. Moreover, other important 
phenomena are included both at the local industry level (scale and competition 
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effects) and at the local level (population size effects, human and social capital, 
among others). The use of spatial econometric techniques, moreover, allows us 
to avoid placing artificial bounds on agglomeration economies. We, therefore, do 
not consider our geographical units as isolated closed economies3 by taking into 
account the possibility of some externalities crossing borders. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we briefly survey the 
literature background. In the third section the databank is presented along with 
a descriptive picture of the phenomenon under examination. In the fourth sec-
tion the theoretical underpinnings are presented. In the fifth section we discuss 
the main econometric results. In the last section, we put forth some concluding 
remarks.
Some theoretical and empirical issues
In the last decade, the influence of regional externalities on local economic 
growth has been under recurrent investigation. Glaeser et al. (1992) were the 
first to focus on employment growth as a proxy for local economic performance 
and to study its dynamics at both the city and the sectoral level. The empirical 
analysis was based on the discrimination between static externalities, associated 
with cost efficiencies or pecuniary externalities, and dynamic externalities, 
related to knowledge spillovers. Static externalities are those that affect industry 
localisation4 but not growth. Since then, the debate about dynamic externalities 
has mainly focused on two competing theories:5 those of Marshall (1990 [1890]), 
Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986) (MAR) and those of Jacobs (1969).
The main difference between these theories concerns the effects of specialisa-
tion (the degree to which a location specialises in one industry) and diversity (the 
range of different industries in a location). The MAR framework maintains that 
most spillovers occur among firms in the same industry. Specialised locations 
with high levels of industry concentration should experience more innovation and 
faster growth. In contrast, Jacobs posits that the most important knowledge trans-
fers take place across different industries. Jacobs’s theory predicts that industries 
will innovate more and grow faster in locations with greater diversity. Empirical 
tests addressing this debate have produced conflicting results.
Glaeser et al. (1992) found that both competition and diversity fostered 
industry growth and innovation, whereas specialisation discouraged them. The 
evidence collected for other countries, mainly in the EU, seems to support these 
findings although it should be noted that common features of such studies are 
that the analysis typically covers a short time span and that, owing to a lack of 
data, they focus on employment dynamics as a proxy of productivity growth. In 
the case of Italy, Usai and Paci (2003) found that growth had a positive effect on 
diversity and specialisation a negative effect, at the local labour system level. In 
the Netherlands, at the city level and for the top industries only, van Soest et al. 
(2002) obtained similar results, as did Combes (2000a),6 for France, and Almeida 
(2001), for Portugal, these being the only authors to have examined both the 
manufacturing and service sectors. The consistency of the finding that diversity 
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tends to have a positive effect and specialisation a negative is interesting, given 
that externalities are different across sectors and countries.
However, these results conflict with those of Henderson et al. (1995), who 
reported that both diversity and specialisation externalities had positive effects 
on high-tech industries whereas only MAR spillovers were found among mature 
industries. Similar results were also obtained by Forni and Paba (2002), who found 
that specialisation and diversity are important for growth in most manufacturing 
sectors although each industry needs its own diversity in terms of input–output 
relations. These interesting outcomes are, however, subject to Combes’ critique 
(2000b), according to which the simultaneous inclusion of a specialisation index 
and of total employment among the regressors introduces a positive bias to the 
specialisation coefficient.7 The positive effect of specialisation is, therefore, ques-
tionable.
More compelling is the contribution of more recent studies (Dekle 2002, 
Cingano and Schivardi 2003, Henderson 2003) that manage to avoid some of the 
typical flaws affecting the aforementioned studies. The flaws result from the idea 
that employment growth can be used as a proxy of productivity changes whereas 
this may prove to be unrealistic when: (i) local capital stock is not constant with 
time (Dekle 2002); (ii) productivity shocks have a negative impact on employ-
ment growth because demand elasticity is low and production does not expand 
enough at the same time (Combes and Overman 2004); (iii) the sources of exter-
nalities and agglomeration influence the labour supply (Dekle 2002, Cingano and 
Schivardi 2003); and (iv) capital and labour have a high degree of substitutability 
and technological change is labour saving.
In fact, recent empirical studies (Dekle 2002, Cingano and Schivardi 2003) 
have cast serious doubts on the idea that changes in productivity reflect propor-
tional variations in employment. In particular, such studies, by using total factor 
productivity (TFP) measures of productivity growth, show that specialisation 
may prove to be positively linked to economic performance whereas diversity 
is not.8 Similar results were obtained by De Lucio et al. (2002), who concluded 
that diversity had no effect on labour productivity growth and obtained an inter-
esting U-shaped curve for specialisation effects. Finally, Henderson (2003), by 
estimating plant-level production functions in a panel context, found that localisa-
tion/MAR scale externalities have strong productivity effects in high-tech but not 
in machinery industries. Again, he found no evidence of urbanisation economies 
resulting from the diversity of local economic activity outside the industry con-
cerned and limited evidence of urbanisation economies from the overall scale of 
local economic activity. Henderson also studied the spatial extent of externalities 
and found that they are relatively localised within any particular county, so that 
there are no external benefits from plants in other counties. Similarly, Cingano 
and Schivardi (2003) found that neighbourhood specialisation at a higher level of 
territorial aggregation has no effect on TFP.
The use of TFP measures in these studies is a notable improvement, although 
data availability remains a problem. Both Dekel (2002) and De Lucio et al. (2002), 
in order to obtain sufficient data, had to extend their analysis from the city or the 
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local labour system level typical of such studies to a more aggregated level, that is 
administrative regions, where the labour market and good markets do not neces-
sarily coincide. In contrast, Henderson (2003) and Cingano and Schivardi (2003) 
were able to maintain a very disaggregated level of analysis, that of metropolitan 
areas and counties in the former and that of local labour systems in the latter, with 
the acknowledged problem that both studies relied on samples of plant data with 
the associated serious problems of selection bias.
Another interesting issue raised in the literature is whether the role of exter-
nalities varies with respect to some concurrent economic phenomena. Glaeser et 
al. (1992), for instance, suggested that there might be an industry life cycle in 
which externalities are important only in the early development stages. Similarly, 
Krugman (1991) proposed that, as an industry develops, it might become less 
dependent on pooled labour, specialised inputs and knowledge spillovers. 
Moreover, externalities that foster the initial development of a location might not 
be the same as those that cultivate its subsequent growth (Duranton and Puga 
2001). In other words, the nature of externalities is not independent of the product 
cycle. Experimental activity is initially found in large, diverse, urban areas (Jacobs 
externalities), whereas traditional production, which is more standardised, can 
be more decentralised in smaller, more specialised, urban areas with lower costs 
(Marshall externalities). This line of interpretation has been used by both Combes 
(2000a) and Usai and Paci (2003) to make sense of some differences in results 
among sectors in the former case and among regions in the latter case.
Most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, the role of externalities may 
be very different across industries and most of all between the two macro-sec-
tors: manufacturing and service. The reason, as argued by Krugman and Venables 
(1995),9 is that goods that are essentially non-tradable (i.e. services) have to be 
produced close to customers, leading to activities remaining spread out. In con-
trast, the production of tradable goods, i.e. manufacturing, can enjoy agglomera-
tion economies by locating where it is more convenient and therefore can be more 
concentrated in space. This view, according to Desmet and Fafchamps (2003), 
may have interesting dynamic implications. As transport costs fall, goods become 
tradable, allowing production to take advantage of agglomeration economies by 
concentrating. However, if transport costs continue to drop, those agglomeration 
economies may exceed a threshold at which activities start to spread back out to 
less congested areas. If this holds true, then service sectors, with their non-trad-
able nature, will initially be more spread out, but, as transport costs fall, there 
should be an increase in concentration. In contrast, manufacturing goods are 
eminently tradable and have been for a long time. Falling transport costs should, 
therefore, result in manufacturing industries becoming less concentrated. Finally, 
the dynamics of the service sector are linked to the evolution of the economy and, 
in particular, of the manufacturing compound. One can distinguish two possible 
effects of the interaction of the dynamics of the two macro-sectors. On the one 
hand, service firms may replace manufacturing firms as the latter rely more and 
more on the market because of, for instance, decreasing transaction costs. There 
is, therefore, in this scenario, an inverse relationship between the two sectors. On 
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the other hand, as long as the two macro-sectors remain complementary, which 
may be the case because the manufacturing sector is a customer of the service 
sector, the two dynamics may be positively related. However, one should bear 
in mind that service sectors are extremely heterogeneous: for example, business 
services may follow an altogether different dynamics and localisation process 
from personal services.
Business services are typically concentrated in close proximity to the firms 
to which they sell their products. This is usually explained by the importance 
of intangible aspects of localised knowledge, with a reliance on day-to-day and 
face-to-face contact to facilitate exchanges of essential information. In contrast, 
personal services are usually more spread out. And there may be other important 
differences in dynamics, depending on other characteristics. For example, some 
services may prove to have the characteristics of inferior goods such that their 
consumption decreases with increasing income, for example transport services 
may be replaced by durable goods, i.e. private cars. Conversely, other services, 
such as culture and tourism, are closer to the nature of luxury goods and their 
general consumption increases as income increases. The complexity of the nature 
of the two macro-sectors and of their relationship is bound to be reflected in our 
results.
The data and the descriptive analysis
Our empirical analysis makes use of a comprehensive database on socioeconomic 
indicators for the Italian local labour systems (LLS). LLS are 784 groupings of 
municipalities identified by the Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) by means 
of commuting data from the population census: the geography of where people 
live overlaps the geography of where people work, that is the local labour market 
and local goods market coincide (Sforzi 1997). This high level of geographical 
breakdown appears to be particularly useful for the analysis of local growth as 
production activities have, by construction, a high degree of self-containment that 
makes it easier to identify explanatory factors at a local level. The information 
on local labour systems is also disaggregated with respect to thirty-four sectors 
at the two-digit ATECO 91-ISIC 3 level. In particular, we distinguish between 
twenty-one manufacturing sectors (including building) and thirteen service sectors 
(excluding the public sector, for which data are available only for 1991).
The data, which consist mainly of units of labour and number of firms and 
plants, refer to the five-year period from 1991 to 1996. The reason for our decision 
to confine our analysis to such a short period, which is obviously bound to limit 
our result, is that we preferred to use territorial units that do not vary over time. 
To extend backwards (to 1981) the definition of LLS based on 1991 information 
would have required us to ignore the fact that in 1981 LLS in Italy were deter-
mined differently and numbered 944.
Employment figures at the aggregate level in Italy during the 1990s show a 
loss of 287,000 units of labour with an average annual fall of 0.43 per cent. This 
aggregate trend hides a highly differentiated pattern at the sectoral level. In par-
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ticular, the manufacturing sector reported an average employment fall of 1.47 per 
cent per year, whereas employment in the service sector increased by 0.17 per 
cent per year. Employment growth in the service sector was strictly related to a 
process of structural change and outsourcing, common to all advanced econo-
mies. Between the 1980s and the present day, a large number of manufacturing 
firms, in order to improve their productivity in the core business, transferred some 
auxiliary internal activities, such as cleaning, accounting, engineering, marketing 
and security, to external service firms. 
However, the most striking feature of this general employment decline was 
its considerable geographical variation. Employment dynamics follow the usual 
north–south pattern, although some important qualifications emerge from the data, 
especially among northern regions. In fact, if one distinguishes six macro-areas 
and two macro-sectors (manufacturing and services) some interesting findings 
emerge (Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 and Table 7.1).
Comparing the macro-sectors and Italy as a whole, we can see from Table 7.1 
that the only area with rising employment was the north-east; the centre-north, 
in comparison with the other areas, reported a smaller decrease in employment; 
and the south and islands were the poorest performers. It is, in addition, worth 
noting the dichotomy in the north: whereas the north-east showed a good per-
formance, with employment growth of 0.33 per cent per year, in the north-west 
employment fell by 0.48 per cent per year, which is worse than the national aver-
age. Employment growth in the north-east came mostly from the localisation in 
that area of growing services sectors such as real estate, computer activities and 
tourism activities (hotels and restaurants). The recent story of the north-east is 
one of industrial and service development based on local networks of small and 
medium-sized dynamic firms and plants scattered throughout the area. This is the 
widely studied development model of the ‘industrial districts’ (see, among many 
others, Brusco 1982, Piore and Sabel 1984). Performance in the regions of the 
centre-north was similar, suggesting that the Italian model of agglomeration sys-
tems composed of small and medium enterprises, which are typical of these two 
areas, has been relatively successful during what was a troublesome period. In 
contrast, the story of the north-west very much reflects its development history as 
the Italian industrial centre, with the main metropolitan centres, Turin, Milan and 
Genoa, constituting the so-called ‘industrial triangle’, which is dependent on large 
heavy industries. Services growth in this area has not been able to compensate for 
the deep industrial crisis. At the other extreme, the south and the islands show the 
worst performance, with employment falling by, respectively, 0.8 per cent and 
1.7 per cent per year during the period 1991–96. The crisis in the industrial sector 
in these areas can be attributed to government policy that favoured the location 
of large firms in capital-intensive industries (chemicals, oil, steel) in these areas. 
This had the effect of crowding out a weak domestic network of firms. When these 
heavy industries experienced structural crisis, recovery and growth of a renewed 
structure of endogenous firms did not occur sufficiently quickly and this, together 
with a lack of infrastructure, had a negative effect on employment.
Let us now examine changes in employment in the two macro-sectors. Table 
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Figure 7.1 Total employment dynamics in the local labour systems in Italy, 1991–96 (% 
annual average growth rate).
7.1 shows that the fall in manufacturing employment in the north-east was more 
similar to that in the centre-north, in both cases being lower than the national aver-
age (as a result of the presence of small dynamic firms in the industrial districts), 
than to that in the north-west (which remains characterised by the presence of large 
heavy industries). Once again, as for overall employment, the worst performance 
was found in the islands and the south. In the country as a whole, employment in 
the service sector increased, but again the pattern varied across the macro-regions. 
The best positive result occurred in the north-west, followed by the north-east and 
centre-north. In the three remaining macroregions employment in the services 
sector fell, with the islands again showing the worst performance.
Consider now the performance of individual LLS (Table 7.2). Very often, the 
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difference between success and disaster depends on idiosyncratic shocks that 
affect certain sectors which are (or become) prevalent in certain regions. Most of 
the best-performing LLS are in the north (especially in Trentino). An exception 
is provided by Melfi, where the multinational car manufacturer, Fiat, acted as a 
so-called ‘large developer’ by building a car production plant with the help of 
financial and fiscal incentives available to the Objective 1 regions of the EU. 
Most of the worst-performing LLS are in the south (especially in Calabria and 
Basilicata).
In Table 7.3, we turn our attention to employment figures across the thirty-four 
sectors under consideration. It can bee seen that variability between sectors is as 
great as between areas. The best-performing service sector by far was real estate 
Figure 7.2 Employment dynamics in manufacturing in the LLS in Italy, 1991–96 (% 
annual average growth rate).
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activities (14 per cent annual average growth rate), followed by professional and 
entrepreneurial services (5 per cent). Nevertheless, employment fell in some 
service sectors: motor vehicles trade, retail (which is the most important sector 
in terms of total number of employees), post and telecommunications and rent-
ing of machinery and personal goods. The worst-performing sectors came from 
the manufacturing sector, primarily other transport equipment (down 6 per cent), 
radio, television and communication equipment (down 5.9 per cent) and basic 
metals (down 4.5 per cent). Only a few manufacturing sectors showed a positive 
performance: rubber and plastic (up 2 per cent), instruments (up 2 per cent) and 
machinery (up 0.6 per cent).
Finally, if we analyse the issue of spatial dependence, we obtain conflicting 
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results (Table 7.4). At the global and macro-sectors level there is evidence of 
spatial autocorrelation, as already suggested by visual inspection of the maps in 
Figures 7.1 to 7.3. The Moran index for the whole country and for the manufactur-
ing and services sectors indicates that the dynamics of employment in an LLS are 
influenced by the performance of nearby areas. Moreover, spatial dependence can 
be detected in the building industry. However, when employment growth is disag-
gregated by sector, the occurrence of spatial dependence is more differentiated. In 
fact, there appears to be a positive and significant spatial dependence in fourteen 
sectors out of thirty-four.10 In general, spatial association is stronger in the services 
sector (eight out of thirteen service sectors show spatial dependence) rather than 
in manufacturing (six out of twenty sectors show spatial dependence). 
The estimation framework
The reduced form that is estimated is based on the idea that employment dynamics 
is affected by three groups of potential externalities differentiated with respect to 
their level of specificity: externalities that are unique to a particular local industry, 
those that are characteristic at the local level and those that are specific for a 
particular industry.
We, therefore, agree with recent reports (Dekle 2002, Cingano and Schivardi 
2003) that employment growth regressions are able to provide interesting infor-
mation on the reduced form relation between local conditions and employment 
but not, in any clear-cut way, between local conditions and productivity growth. 
This is because of possible variation in four factors relevant to the latter: local 
capital stock, demand elasticity, the effects of agglomeration on labour supply 
and the degree of substitutability among factors. We believe that in our sample 
only the first hypothesis can realistically be tested on our sample as it is clear that 
local externalities affect labour supply and therefore create identification prob-
lems. Moreover, it seems rather unlikely that the combination of high demand 
Table 7.1 Employment growth in macroregions
Macro-
regiona
Employees (’000) Annual average variation
1991 1996 Total Manufacturingb Services
North-west 4,658 4,546 –0.48 –1.75 0.89
North-east 3,209 3,263 0.33 –0.69 0.65
Centre-north 1,606 1,587 –0.24 –1.04 0.33
Centre-south 1,373 1,344 –0.42 –1.89 –0.19
South 1,691 1,594 –1.18 –2.24 –0.83
Islands 894 810 –1.98 –3.14 –1.73
Italy 13,431 13,144 –0.43 –1.47 0.17
Notes
a North-west: Lombardia, Piemonte, Val d’Aosta, Liguria; north-east: Trentino, Friuli, Veneto, 
Emilia; centre-north: Tuscany, Umbria, Marche; centre-south: Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise; south: 
Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria; islands: Sicily, Sardinia.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.3 Employment growth in manufacturing and services sectors
Sector





1 Food, beverages and tobacco 474 447 –1.2 3.4
2 Textiles 404 345 –3.1 2.6
3 Wearing apparel 419 346 –3.8 2.6
4 Leather and footwear 244 231 –1.1 1.8
5 Wood products, except furniture 186 170 –1.8 1.3
6 Paper 89 85 –0.7 0.6
7 Printing and publishing 195 175 –2.2 1.3
8 Coke and refined petroleum 
products
29 24 –3.7 0.2
9 Chemicals and chemical products 237 209 –2.5 1.6
10 Rubber and plastic 179 198 2.0 1.5
11 Non-metallic mineral products 276 251 –1.9 1.9
12 Basic metals 170 136 –4.5 1.0
13 Fabricated metal products 615 622 0.2 4.7
14 Machinery 539 554 0.6 4.2
15 Office, computing and electrical 
machinery
233 224 –0.8 1.7
16 Radio, television and 
communication equipment
139 103 –5.9 0.8
17 Medical, precision and medical 
instruments
117 129 2.0 1.0
18 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers
214 186 –2.8 1.4
19 Other transport equipment 136 101 –6.0 0.8
20 Furniture, recycling and other 315 318 0.2 2.4
Manufacturing (subtotal) 5,210 4,856 –1.4 36.9
21 Building 1,332 1,342 0.1 10.2
22 Motor vehicles trade and repair 491 446 –1.9 3.4
23 Wholesale trade 901 986 1.8 7.5
24 Retail trade 1,909 1,585 –3.7 12.1
25 Hotel and restaurant 727 727 0.0 5.5
26 Transport services 584 594 0.3 4.5
27 Auxiliary transport and travel 
agencies
186 200 1.5 1.5
28 Post and telecommunications 348 290 –3.6 2.2
29 Financial intermediation and 
insurance
569 561 –0.3 4.3
30 Real estate activities 83 168 14.0 1.3
31 Renting of machinery and personal 
goods
20 18 –2.2 0.1
32 Computer and related activities 181 203 2.3 1.5
33 Research and development 16 20 4.0 0.1
34 Other professional and 
entrepreneurial services
874 1152 5.5 8.8
Services (subtotal) 6,888 6,947 0.2 63.1
Total 13,431 13,144 –0.4 100.0




1 Food, beverages and tobacco 3.3 0.0
2 Textiles –0.1 0.9
3 Wearing apparel 1.7 0.0
4 Leather and footwear –0.3 0.7
5 Wood products, except furniture 2.7 0.0
6 Paper 2.8 0.0
7 Printing and publishing –0.6 0.6
8 Coke and refined petroleum products 0.2 0.8
9 Chemicals and chemical products 0.7 0.5
10 Rubber and plastic 0.9 0.0
11 Non-metallic mineral products 1.5 0.1
12 Basic metals –0.7 0.4
13 Fabricated metal products 0.5 0.6
14 Machinery –0.1 0.8
15 Office, computing and electrical machinery –0.7 0.4
16 Radio, television and communication 
equipment
1.0 0.3
17 Medical, precision and medical instruments –0.3 0.7
18 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi trailers –0.2 0.8
19 Other transport equipment 1.1 0.3
20 Furniture, recycling and other –2.8 0.0
Manufacturing (subtotal) 3.7 0.0
21 Building 5.0 0.0
22 Motor vehicles trade and repair 3.0 0.0
23 Wholesale trade 1.8 0.0
24 Retail trade 9.7 0.0
25 Hotel and restaurant 12.4 0.0
26 Transport services 2.1 0.0
27 Auxiliary transport and travel agencies 1.0 0.2
28 Post and telecommunications 0.8 0.4
29 Financial intermediation and insurance 3.7 0.0
30 Real estate activities 1.9 0.0
31 Renting of machinery and personal goods –0.8 0.4
32 Computer and related activities 0.1 0.9
33 Research and development 0.1 0.9
34 Other professional and entrepreneurial 
services
5.6 0.0
Services (subtotal) 17.9 0.0
Total 11.6 0.0
Notes
Normal approximation. Sectors with significant spatial autocorrelation are in italics.
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elasticity and low factor substitutability occurred in Italy in the early 1990s, a 
period characterised by diffused reorganisation and restructuring at several levels 
of the production chain and, most importantly, by stagnating demand. 
We therefore categorise factors affecting employment dynamics at the local 
industrial level into three major groups: (i) local industry level, (ii) local level 
and (iii) industry level. Let us discuss the various phenomena which are going 
to be considered as potential determinants of the performance of local industrial 
employment.
At the local industry level one finds the most debated factors, that is speciali-
sation or Marshall externalities (SE), diversity or Jacobs externalities (DE) and 
scale effects and/or the degree of competition (SC). 
In general, the specialisation or Marshallian externalities capture the advan-
tages gained by firms producing similar products within a bounded geographical 
location. Marshall externalities are measured by means of an index of relative 
production specialisation. This variable measures static pecuniary and localisa-
tion externalities such as the availability of suitable supplies of labour and pri-
mary and intermediate goods (Ellison and Glaeser 1999), the provision of spe-
cific goods and services (Bartelsman et al. 1994) and the availability of specific 
infrastructures and networks. Moreover, this specialisation index should also take 
into account dynamic spillovers arising from the intra-industry flows of localised 
knowledge that occur among similar firms located in the same area (Henderson et 
al. 1995). Marshall externalities are usually contrasted with diversity externalities 
in production activities (also known in the literature as Jacobs or urbanisation 
externalities; Jacobs, 1969). In this work they are measured by the inverse of the 
Herfindal index applied to employment in all sectors except the one considered. 
Such externalities are expected to have a positive influence on local growth based 
on the hypothesis that a firm located in a particular area will benefit from the pres-
ence in the same area of a wide range of other firms operating in different sectors 
since it can enjoy fruitful inter-industry exchanges and cross-fertilisation.
Finally, among local and sector-specific variables, an index of competition or 
of scale economies is usually included to assess the so-called Porter effect (Porter 
1990). Such an index is the average dimension of plants and, in fact, has been 
used in previous studies to measure two distinct effects: (i) the number of firms 
per worker (the inverse of SC) is interpreted by Glaeser et al. (1992) as a direct 
measure of the degree of local competition; (ii) the number of employees per firm 
can be seen as a proxy for economies of scale that may affect labour productivity 
(O’hUallachàin and Satterthwaite 1992). In principle, it would be better to distin-
guish between the two effects defining two different indicators and to include both 
of them in the estimated equation (as is done in Combes 2000a). Unfortunately, 
the lack of data on employment of individual firms does not allow the construc-
tion of a concentration ratio, which would be a more appropriate indicator of local 
competition. In contrast to previous contributions, we do not attribute a priori 
either of the two effects to such an indicator, leaving its interpretation ambigu-
ous.
Employment changes at the local industrial level may be attributable to some 
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features that characterise the whole LLS. Local factors may refer to a large set of 
socioeconomic phenomena that influence the performance of firms in the area. We 
have classified them as follows: network externalities (NE), human capital (HK), 
social capital (SK) and labour supply (LS).
The first class of network externalities (NE1) is intended to take into account 
the influence of the size of the economic system, as measured by the popula-
tion density (resident population per km2 in each LLS) where a firm is located 
(Ciccone and Hall 1996). In practice, one would expect this to have a positive 
effect on local growth as a higher population density implies higher local demand 
and the availability of a wider supply of local public services. The closeness of 
buyers may have both a static and a dynamic effect, the latter being related to the 
fact that this may facilitate early perception of market needs. At the same time, the 
increasing size of the local economy may imply diseconomies of scale setting in 
when congestion effects prevail, giving rise to pollution and greater competition 
in the factor markets, resulting in higher factor costs.
We have also included a second proxy for network externalities (NE2) that 
focuses on the supply side, taking into account the presence of small firms within 
the local economy. The idea is that, when the proportion of small plants is large, 
firms may have to find ways of compensating for working outside their optimal 
production scale by cooperating and integrating with other firms at the local level. 
This stimulates the creation of local externalities. The opposite happens with large 
firms which are more vertically integrated and therefore are less involved in local 
networks.
The role of human capital in facilitating innovation activities and information 
spillovers, and therefore growth, is examined by means of a proxy to measure the 
availability in the local area of labour forces with a high level of education (share 
of population with a university education).11 A large well-educated workforce 
represents an advantage to firms, thus fostering local growth.
Another important local element that may encourage innovation activities and 
smooth the process of knowledge diffusion is social capital. However, it is not an 
easy task to find suitable indicators for such a complex and intangible phenom-
enon (Helliwell and Putnam 1995). To measure the degree of trust in the local 
society we include an index of the propensity to cooperate among firms based on 
the number of inter-firm agreements and participations in consortia surveyed by 
the industrial census at the provincial level. The idea is that a higher degree of 
propensity to cooperate among firms in a certain area helps local growth since it 
facilitates knowledge diffusion, decreases transaction costs and enables firms to 
take advantage of local externalities.12
Finally, we accept the idea that externalities may affect the labour supply 
(Cingano and Schivardi 2003) and therefore we have tried to account for this pos-
sible effect by including an indicator of its size. Such an indicator is given by the 
participation rate (labour force divided by the total population aged 15–65). Other 
potential local externalities may be those related to natural endowments and other 
geographical factors. They should, however, have more of a static than a dynamic 
effect. We have nevertheless tried to take these into account by means of local 
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fixed effects in the panel regression. However, they proved to have too a strong 
collinearity with the other local indicators and have therefore been removed from 
the basic regressions.
The rate of employment growth in a local industry may also be affected by 
factors that are unique to each production sector although they are common to all 
areas. These factors can capture, for instance, technological progress and oppor-
tunities within each industry at the national level. In our econometric estimation 
they are proxied by the sectoral fixed effects in the panel regressions.
The econometric results
The econometric analysis is based on a simple equation, as is usual in the 
literature (Glaeser et al. 1992), where the growth rate at the local industry level is 
represented by labour dynamics, because of the lack of data on output at the local 
industry level, and is affected by the three components of the technology growth 









































In contrast to previous studies, in this work we attempt to simultaneously consider 
various factors that we believe affect local economic growth thanks to the broad 
perspective suggested by our theoretical framework. In fact, in the search for the 
best specification we do not apply the usual general to specific approach, which 
consists of a sequence of deletions of variables that are found to be not statistically 
significant. Rather, we carry out an analysis of parameter stability with respect 
to different subsections of our main sample. In other words, we apply the same 
general specification to subsamples identified with respect to geographical and 
sectoral features to establish if there is any difference in the value, sign and 
significance of the estimated coefficients.
The main differences with respect to our previous work on Italy (Usai and Paci 
2003) are: (i) we include the entire market economy (manufacture plus services); 
and (ii) sectors are considered at a higher level of aggregation (two-digit instead 
of three-digit) in order to increase the probability of finding non-zero observations 
in the local industry. Indeed, one of the crucial points in the analysis of highly 
specialised sectors in small areas is that we often deal with too small a number of 
firms (or even none) and this makes the econometric analysis more problematic. 
Thus, in order to test the robustness of our findings, we have tried to control for 
the potential causes of distortion. More specifically, in some estimations we have 
excluded (i) all local industry observations with a zero number of firms both in the 
initial and in the final year and (ii) the outlier observations with a residual higher 
than three times the standard deviation.
To take into account the risk of variables omission with respect to the industry 
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dimension, we include sectoral fixed effects. We have also tried to control for 
local fixed effects, but it emerges that they generate problems of multicollinearity, 
given the simultaneous presence of several explanatory variables specific to each 
area. It is important to note that all our regressors are exogenous to the local 
industry employment growth rate since they refer to the beginning of the period 
considered. All variables are in log and are normalised by the value they take at 
the national level.
Aggregate regressions
Let us start with the analysis of aggregate estimations based on a dataset with two 
dimensions: geographical and sectoral. Five different panels have been defined: 
Italy, with 784 LLS and thirty-four sectors; the centre-north (453 LLS, thirty-
four sectors); the south (331 LLS, thirty-four sectors); manufacturing (784 LLS, 
twenty sectors); and services (784 LLS, thirty sectors). The estimation results are 
reported in Table 7.5.13
The first interesting result is the absence of specialisation externalities: the 
coefficient of SE is negative and highly significant in all subsets considered 
(north, south, manufacturing, services). This outcome confirms previous studies 
for the USA (Glaeser et al. 1992), France (Combes 2000a) and Italy (Cainelli and 
Leoncini 1999, Forni and Paba 2000, Cunat and Peri 2001, Usai and Paci 2003). 
The absence of Marshallian externalities at the LLS level can be partly explained 
by the fact that our analysis covers a short time period characterised by an eco-
nomic crisis that may have induced a substantial degree of reorganisation in those 
local productive systems that were highly specialised and therefore more costly to 
modify and transform. Moreover, we may also note that most highly specialised 
local production systems in Italy operate in traditional and mature sectors and that 
the negative relationship between initial specialisation and employment growth 
can be linked to a product cycle mechanism.
Average firm size (SC) is always found to be negatively related to local growth, 
suggesting the absence of economies of scale in employment growth mechanisms. 
This result is strengthened by the positive sign of network externalities represented 
by the presence of small firms (NE2). Diversity externalities (DE) appear to be 
positively related to local growth of the economy as a whole, but remain positive 
only for manufacturing once the sample is divided by area and by sector.
As far as local specific determinants are concerned, the size of the local system, 
measured by population density (NE1), shows contrasting results. It appears to be 
negatively linked to employment dynamics in the north and in manufacturing, but 
positively related in the south and for the service sector. In other words, this result 
suggests that in the centre-north (where most manufacturing activity is located) 
some congestion effects are already at work, whereas a positive agglomeration 
effect is still present in the southern regions.
The indicators measuring the different qualities of capital (human, social) 
show interesting composite results. First, university education (HK) emerges as a 
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However, this relationship becomes more complex when considering a more 
detailed sectoral analysis. University education negatively influences employment 
growth in manufacturing, but has a positive effect in the service sector. Second, 
the importance of social capital is suggested by the coefficient of the variable 
that measures cooperation among firms (SK), which is positive, as expected, in 
all regressions except for the south and manufacturing. Finally, the presence of a 
large labour supply (proxied by the participation rate) exerts a positive influence 
on employment dynamics.
All these results reinforce the idea that – especially during the negative phase 
of the business cycle, such as was the case during the period under considera-
tion – a production system based on a diversified network of small flexible firms, 
which are willing to cooperate and characterised by a well-educated labour force, 
is a crucial asset in promoting local employment growth. 
Sectoral regressions
In this section we turn our attention to the analysis of employment growth in 
each sector based on a cross-section estimation of the equation above. In this 
case we are also able to address directly the problem of spatial association. As 
we have remarked before, employment growth in a region may be influenced 
by employment dynamics in the nearby areas, introducing a possible bias into 
regressions that do not take this possibility into account. In order to deal with 
this problem we have applied the following estimation procedures: (i) ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation with SpaceStat to assess the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation based on the Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests; (ii) if there is no 
autocorrelation, and the least squares estimates are efficient and consistent, we 
have used the OLS–White robust standard errors estimations, which allow us to 
correct for the heteroscedasticity; (iii) if spatial autocorrelation is detected, we 
need to correct this by including a spatial lag-dependent variable. In such a case it 
is necessary to use maximum likelihood (ML) estimation instead of least squares, 
introducing spatial lag-dependent variables up to the contiguity level necessary to 
correct for the presence of spatial autocorrelation.
The results of sectoral regressions are reported in Table 7.6. We detected spa-
tial autocorrelation in ten out of thirty-four sectors, and therefore a ML estimation 
was performed with the inclusion of first- and second-order contiguity spatial 
lag-dependent variables. These were always positive and significant. As a result 
of this procedure, spatial autocorrelation was controlled for in all sectors. The 
sectoral results show that the impact of local characteristics differs significantly 
in the manufacturing and service sectors.
Some observations deserve emphasis. First, the coefficients for specialisation 
externalities appear to be mostly negative and statistically significant in both the 
service and manufacturing sectors. In only one case did specialisation result in 
increased employment over the period, the tourism sector. Tourism is a grow-
ing industry across Italy, and especially in the north-east, where it turned out 
there were strong agglomeration and specialisation externalities; this was also 
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true of contiguous areas. Second, the magnitude of such negative effects appears 
to be greater in the service sectors. This may cause employment composition to 
converge among regions (Rombaldoni and Zazzaro 1997). However, this finding 
seems to conflict with evidence from the USA, where the service sector seems to 
be becoming more concentrated with time as a result of decreasing transport costs. 
Further analysis, possibly over a longer time span, is needed to determine whether 
this is just a temporary phenomenon related to the period under examination.
Diversity externalities have a positive and significant influence on employment 
dynamics in less than half of our sectors, in ten manufacturing and five service 
sectors to be exact. There are also four sectors in which diversity plays a negative 
role. In the case of this indicator, we believe that more evidence needs to be col-
lected in order to distinguish between those effects that are truly cross-fertilisation 
spillovers (and therefore more dynamic in nature) and those which are due to 
input–output relationships (and therefore with more static consequences).14
The variable that measures both scale internal economies and competition 
effects, as expected, varies greatly across sectors. A positive correlation is found 
mostly in the manufacturing sectors (basic metals, printing, petroleum, rubber, 
etc.), indicating, most probably given the selection of industries, economies of 
scale at work rather than the counter-effects of competition. Interestingly, a posi-
tive role is also found for some service sectors, notably in retail trade, where a 
process of strong concentration has been taking place over the last decade. The 
other service sector that displays a positive sign is R&D. Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that for four service sectors (motor vehicles trade and repairs, hotels and 
restaurants, real estate activities and other business services) either diseconomies 
of scale are affecting employment growth or, more likely, local competition effects 
are at work. Finally, for construction the coefficient is negative and significant.
Of the other determinants, we can see that human capital, that is the availabil-
ity of employees with a university degree, turns out to be especially important in 
the service sectors. Similar results are found for social capital, the effect of which 
is mostly positive and significant mainly in the service sectors. As for the size of 
the economy, results are ambiguous. In five sectors (three in manufacturing and 
two in services) there are positive and significant effects, whereas in three others 
(two in manufacturing and one in services) the effect is negative. The indicator 
concerning labour supply proved to be mostly positive, especially in the service 
sectors.
Concluding comments
This chapter has attempted to measure local economic performance in the context 
of an ongoing process of structural change that is transforming the economies 
from manufacturing to service ones. It is argued that such a process has important 
implications for the analysis of the geography of economic activities in that the 
forces of agglomeration are different in the two sectors. The main contribution of 
this chapter is, therefore, the analysis of local short-term economic performance, 
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sectors. Thanks to a large set of variables and data, we have been able to explain 
some of the differences in the economic performance of sectors by assessing the 
role of several potential determinants of local economic dynamics.
Our results confirm that the picture of agglomeration forces operating at very 
small geographical units is multifaceted. Overall, we find that specialisation has 
negative effects, possibly because of the specific critical period we are analysing, 
but also as a result of a process of restructuring that replaced labour with other 
factors.
Average firm size is always negatively related to local growth, suggesting the 
absence of economies of scale in employment growth mechanisms (or the effects 
of pro-competitive effects). This result is confirmed by the positive sign of the 
indicator for the presence of small firms in the local area. Finally, as in previous 
work, diversity externalities appear to be positively related to local growth for the 
whole economy, and maintain their positive influence in manufacturing, but not 
services. Human and social capital also prove to be important for employment 
growth. All these results reinforce the idea that – especially during the nega-
tive phase of a business cycle such as the one considered – a production system 
based on a diversified network of small flexible firms, willing to cooperate and 
characterised by well-educated labour forces, is a crucial asset to promote local 
employment growth.
In the case of sectoral regressions, the picture becomes even more complicated, 
apart from the role of specialisation, which appears always to be negatively linked 
to employment dynamics with the notable exception of the tourism sector. Spatial 
correlation is taken into account, when needed, by the estimation of spatial lag 
equations.
Some interesting extensions lie ahead. First of all, we would be interested to 
know to what extent some of the results are dependent on the economic downturn 
that the economy was experiencing during the period under study. In this regard, it 
is important that new data from the Italian census will soon be available to enable 
us to perform such an update. Newly available data at the plant and provincial 
level will enable us to convert employment data to value added, thus making 
possible the analysis of real economic performance as measured by productivity.
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Notes
 1 Most analyses have, in fact, concentrated on the manufacturing sectors only. The main 
notable exceptions being those of Combes (2000a) for France, who considers forty-
two service sectors, and, more recently, Almeida (2001) for Portugal, who analyses 
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thirty-two sectors. Dekle (2002) also considers the service sectors, but at a very 
aggregated level.
 2 The analysis of differences across areas, but in manufacturing only, is mainly pursued 
in Usai and Paci (2003).
 3 In the USA in particular, most studies (Glaeser et al. 1992, Henderson et al. 1995) 
have relied on the city as the geographic unit of analysis, so they have necessarily to 
consider them as economic islands.
 4 Marshall (1990 [1890]) identified three causes: (i) specialised labour forces and the 
generation of new ideas, arising from face-to-face communications and human capital 
accumulation, (ii) the availability of specialised inputs and infrastructure and (iii) 
economies of mass production. In Marshall’s view, firms tend to collocate with their 
buyers and suppliers, which creates positive externalities arising from transportation, 
communication and coordination efficiencies.
 5 In fact, Glaeser et al. (1992) also included Porter’s arguments in contrast to Jacobs’s 
and Marshall’s ones. According to Porter (1990), urban areas which are very 
specialised may boost growth as a result of competitive effects. 
 6 However, in Combes (2000a) the significance levels of results are not given for sector 
by sector regressions.
 7 As a matter of fact, this was also the case in Glaeser et al. (1992). But in this case, the 
specialisation coefficient is already negative and the elimination of the bias would just 
possibly reinforce that result. 
 8 Most importantly, Cingano and Schivardi (2003) show that within the same sample, if 
one uses employment growth as the dependent variable, specialisation effects became 
negative.
 9 See also Baldwin and Martin (2004) for the effects of tradability, transaction costs and 
capital mobility on the growth dynamics within a centre–periphery model.
 10 The unexpected presence of negative and significant spatial dependence in furniture 
and recycling may be interpreted as a purely statistical result because this is the 
‘residual’ sector in the classification of manufacturing activities and therefore it is 
highly heterogeneous. 
 11 We have also tried another proxy – the share of population who complete only primary 
education – which measures low-level education and therefore should negatively 
affect local growth.
 12 We have also tested a second indicator to capture the characteristics of the social 
environment: an index of the existence of organised crime at the provincial level, 
based on the hypothesis that a high level of crime is detrimental to local development 
as it increases firms’ costs and reduces expected revenues.
 13 In the panel estimations it is not feasible to deal with the problem of spatial association 
due to technical storage limits imposed by SpaceStat on such large datasets. Spatial 
association is dealt with in the sectoral estimations, where we find that most results 
are, nevertheless, robust with respect to the presence of spatial autocorrelation.
 14 See the interesting methodology developed by Forni and Paba (2002) on this aspect.
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8 Accessibility and regional growth 
in Europe
 The role of ICT policies
Roberta Capello and Alessia Spairani
Introduction
Powerful economic processes of internationalisation and globalisation have 
occurred over the last fifteen years. Particularly in Europe, national boundaries are 
no longer barriers to economic activity and commerce, thanks to the institutional 
integration of European states into the EU and to advances in transport and 
communication networks. This means that European regions compete in a 
global, or at least continental, market. In this context, the concept of accessibility 
is increasingly important as a determinant of local economic competitiveness. 
Accessibility indicates the extent to which it is possible to overcome spatial 
distance at low cost and gather strategic information before competitors. In 
a worldwide economy, accessibility reinforces its role as a strategic factor in 
regional competitiveness. In operational terms, accessibility is generated through 
the existence of physical transport networks, which reduce distance in space. 
However, with the rapid development of new technologies and the birth of a new 
form of production organisation, a new type of accessibility must be considered. 
This is not physical, but ‘virtual’ accessibility deriving from information and 
communication technologies (ICTs). In this chapter, we focus on this new 
concept of accessibility, and we will assess its impact on regional growth and 
competitiveness.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section we present a review 
of the role played by accessibility in spatial economic theory. The third section 
contains our empirical analysis of the impact of accessibility on regional growth. 
It describes our accessibility indicators, presents a descriptive analysis of the cur-
rent situation of endowment and use of ICTs relating to the economic develop-
ment of the regions, and contains an econometric estimation of the impact on 
regional growth of ICT accessibility. Alternative policy options and their forecast 
results are presented in the fourth section, while the final section highlights the 
differences in the impacts of accessibility on regional growth due to the existence 
of different preconditions favouring ICT exploitation. The last section contains 
some concluding remarks.
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Accessibility in spatial economic theory
The concept of accessibility is one of the basic elements of spatial economic 
theory. The concept encompasses the advantages for economic activity of reduced 
geographical distance, measured in terms of reduced transport costs. In spatial 
economics, accessibility means the possibility of overcoming spatial distance 
and the spatial barriers for the exchange of goods and information; accessibility 
means access to sources of inputs with low transport costs; it means the ability 
to gather strategic information before competitors. In general terms, accessibility 
means reduced transport costs when space is included in the explanation of 
market forces. In fact, the existence of transport costs – and therefore of different 
levels of accessibility in space – is significant for spatial economic theory, since 
it is the factor that discriminates space and justifies its treatment in economic 
theory. If transport costs were zero, accessibility to input or output markets, to 
specific central locations or to the ‘business centre’ would not be a relevant and 
discriminating factor among territories.
In location theory, accessibility is the principle governing the location choices 
of firms and individuals, and therefore the organisation of activities in space. In 
a logic of a monocentric city and continuous space, Von Thünen’s and Alonso’s 
models elegantly explain the way in which accessibility governs location choices 
for both firms and individuals, and the consequent spatial distribution of urban 
space among possible alternative destinations (Von Thünen 1826, Alonso 1964). 
Moreover, in location theory, accessibility explains the regularities in the differ-
ences of price and demand in a spatial market; therefore, accessibility explains 
the behaviour of consumers in a spatial market, their choice between alternative 
producers and the identification of ‘market areas’ (Lösch 1954). Finally, in some 
theories location is the result of a balanced choice between accessibility to input 
and to output markets, which guarantees minimum total transport costs (Weber 
1929).
In regional development theories, characterised by a microeconomic and 
behavioural approach, the importance of transport costs (and therefore accessi-
bility) is theorised in the concept of ‘agglomeration economies’ or ‘proximity 
economies’. The microeconomic local endogenous development theories merge 
with local location theory, since they identify reduced transport costs and higher 
accessibility to input and output markets as the economic rationale for firms’ clus-
tering. Local growth is, in these theories, based on the concepts of ‘agglomeration 
economies’ or ‘proximity economies’ which embed the advantages stemming 
from reduced geographical distance.1 Accessibility to relevant input markets, to 
specific information, to specialised knowledge and to relevant services is recog-
nised and highlighted as reflecting the advantages of clustering, and as sources of 
economic competitiveness. A high level of competitiveness attracts new activities, 
whose presence increases agglomeration advantages, giving birth to a cumulative 
and self-reinforcing mechanism of local development.
In regional growth theories characterised by a macroeconomic approach, 
accessibility still plays a role in defining economic growth. Central locations 
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offer accessibility to qualified inputs, to a diversified and large output market 
and to a large labour market, all elements enhancing the chances of economic 
growth. A region’s level of accessibility becomes a key factor in attracting activi-
ties, in increasing the development potential of the area and thus in entering a 
virtuous cycle of regional development. Following this reasoning, the models of 
‘economic potentials’ look at accessibility as a necessary condition for regional 
growth (Giersch 1949, Friedmann 1966). According to the centrality–peripheral-
ity approach, accessibility is the main element explaining the differing economic 
performance and growth potential of central regions with respect to peripheral 
ones (Clark et al. 1969, Keeble et al. 1988).
Another set of less abstract and more operational theories interprets local 
public investment in accessibility as a strategic promoter of local growth. When 
devoted to transport infrastructures, public investment is also expected to affect 
economic growth because it acts on the accessibility of the area.2 Following this 
approach, our chapter focuses on a more modern kind of accessibility, a sort of 
‘virtual’ accessibility, based on information and communication technology (ICT) 
networks. These networks become strategic resources underpinning the competi-
tiveness of firms and territories. These technologies allow information and knowl-
edge to be achieved in real time and with no geographical constraints.
In this chapter, our interest lies in the empirical analysis of the role of acces-
sibility in regional development, with accessibility being measured in our work 
as ‘virtual accessibility’. A vast literature was produced during the 1980s on the 
impact of ICTs on regional development (Goddard 1985, Goddard and Thwaites 
1986, Gillespie and Williams 1988, Gillespie et al. 1989, Capello 1994). These 
studies made an important finding relating to differences in the way ICT networks 
and services were adopted and used: in order to generate economic growth, these 
new communications networks need to be used intensively and in a strategic 
way. The introduction of ICT networks is not in itself a guarantee of economic 
development. This important result is present in our empirical analysis. We, in 
fact, build two accessibility indicators, one capturing only adoption, the other also 
measuring the use of ICTs.
Our study differs in two respects from the existing literature on ICTs and 
regional development. First, it encompasses all European regions together, 
and is therefore not confined to the study of particular areas or regions, which 
inevitably provides partial evidence. So far, hardly any studies have focused on 
all the regions of fifteen-country Europe at the same time, given the difficulties in 
finding territorially disaggregated data on ICT diffusion. Second, and most impor-
tantly, our evidence provides ex ante assessment of future accessibility effects 
on regional growth, by evaluating the future regional per capita growth in gross 
domestic product (GDP) generated by European ICT implementation policies. 
In particular, our chapter presents a measurement of the impact of European ICT 
policies on regional development, giving emphasis to alternative policy options 
that can be put in place, and on the costs of the alternative options in terms of loss 
of efficiency and cohesion.3
Four main aims drive our analysis, namely: (i) the creation of adequate acces-
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sibility indicators to cover both ICT endowment and ICT intensity of use; (ii) the 
assessment of the impact of accessibility (in terms of both endowment and use) 
on regional growth; (iii) the extension of the results of the assessment model into 
the future, through a scenario-building methodology with alternative accessibility 
policy options; (iv) the identification of different regional impacts of accessibil-
ity policies due to different territorial preconditions in different regions, such as 
learning capacity in their use, the endowment level of ICTs (which defines the 
marginal efficiency of the networks) and the intensity of ICT use (which defines 
network congestion levels).
Accessibility and regional growth: empirical evidence
The accessibility indicators
The first difficulty in analysing the role of accessibility in regional growth concerns 
the availability of ICT data at a territorially disaggregated level. The main data 
source available at present is a survey commissioned by the European Commission 
from EOS Gallup in 1999 and updated by INRA in 2002. Both surveys were based 
on over 44,000 household interviews in 130 regions of the fifteen member states 
(EOS Gallup 1999, INRA 2003). It is by far the largest survey at a European 
level that has been undertaken in the sector. Data are available at NUTS-2 level, 
covering only the traditional fifteen EU member states. A second critical issue 
is the definition of indicators. As a measure of physical endowment, several 
indicators are available at NUTS-2 level:4 the number of internet connections, 
the number of cable and satellite TVs, and fixed telephony penetration, each 
expressed as the percentage of households equipped with these technologies. Each 
indicator reflects a different level of technological endowment, from traditional 
telephone networks to advanced networks, such as internet connections and cable 
and satellite TV.
As far as ICT use is concerned, a more innovative indicator of accessibility, 
also taking into account the use made of ICTs, is built on a gravitational model, 
adapted from Newton’s universal gravitational law. In our model the population 
is used as mass, and the share of households using internet as an e-commerce 
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g
rt
 = spatial friction between r and s measured by the inverse of c;
c
rt 
= 1/g = percentage of households using the internet as an e-commerce 
vehicle.
This index can be read as the number of people interested in e-commerce that 
can be reached through an internet connection. It is a sort of potential use, since 
it indicates the potential market for a firm adopting and using ICTs in a strategic 
way.
A descriptive analysis
Once the appropriate indicators for ICTs have been constructed, we can investigate 
the relationship between ICTs and economic growth. This relationship can be 
initially sketched using some descriptive maps. Below, we use an econometric 
model to analyse the relationship in greater detail. Our main source of economic 
data is the Eurostat Regio databank (Eurostat 2000). The data cover many 
different areas: GDP, employment, patents, human resources in high-tech sectors, 
population. Moreover, data are in most cases available in at least five-year time 
series.
The map of per capita GDP levels in 1999 clearly shows significant disparities 
in the EU between advanced regions and less developed regions (Figure 8.1). The 
highest levels of per capita GDP are in the central regions of the EU, particularly 
northern Italy, Austria and southern Germany. Peaks can also be found in the 
metropolitan regions of Paris and London, and in northern Europe, where the low 
population density pushes up the per capita GDP. The poorer regions are the more 
peripheral ones, such as Portugal and Greece.
Current regional disparities in ICT endowment, known as the digital divide, 
are very evident from the maps based on data extracted from the EOS Gallup 
survey (Figures 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4).5 
The first map (Figure 8.2) shows that the percentage of households with a fixed 
telephone is quite high everywhere, as expected from the pervasive presence of 
the telephone in everyday life. However, we can see the values are lower in more 
peripheral countries with a lower GDP (Portugal, Spain, Ireland). A comparison 
of Figures 8.1 and 8.2 shows that the fixed telephony index is generally a good 
proxy for the level of wealth of regions. Home internet access is less widespread 
than fixed telephones, resulting in a greater digital divide (Figure 8.3). This is to 
be expected, since the internet is a new technology and, compared with the fixed 
telephone, is considered less essential. Thus, the correlation with GDP is higher 
than for fixed telephones, except in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, 
where a low population density favours new communication technologies more 
than traditional ones. The most developed area in terms of internet connections 
is undoubtedly Scandinavia, followed by the rich areas of central Europe. In 
developed regions with a low population density (such as Finland and other 
Scandinavian countries), mobile and internet technologies have developed faster 
and have more thoroughly penetrated the fixed telephone market area.
Figure 8.1 Per capita GDP, 1999 (’000 euros in PPS). Source: EOS Gallup (1999).
Figure 8.2 Fixed telephony penetration. Source: EOS Gallup (1999).
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Figure 8.4 ‘Virtual’ accessibility (number of people interested in e-commerce who can 
be reached through an internet connection). Source: Authors’ elaborations on 
data from EOS Gallup (1999).
Figure 8.3 Internet connections. Source: EOS Gallup (1999).
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Our indicator of ‘virtual accessibility’, based on population and internet use, 
highlights the strong position of geographically central and highly populated 
regions, as expected, with some exceptions: southern Spain and Italy show high 
virtual accessibility due to their higher than average internet use (Figure 8.4).
By comparing the map of per capita GDP (Figure 8.1) with those of ICT 
endowment and use, we can see that the regions with highest ICT endowment and 
use are the richest regions: ‘virtual’ accessibility and per capita GDP levels are in 
some way related. It is interesting to see how alternative ICT policies, fostering 
accessibility in different geographical areas, affect GDP growth. This relationship 
can be best explained through an interpretative model, presented in the next sec-
tion.
An interpretative analysis
The purpose of this section is to build an interpretative model to analyse the impact 
of ICT endowment and use on economic growth. From the methodological point 
of view, we estimate a production function to measure the role that ICTs play 
in regional performance, as first suggested by Aschauer and replicated in other 
studies (Biehl 1986, Aschauer 1989). The estimated model is the following:
Lgdp99p = f(Luse, Lfixtel, Lcabsta, Ltotemp, Lhitech) (8.2)
where:
L indicates conversion to a natural logarithm (ln);
gdp99p = per capita GDP in 1999;
use = ICT use in 1999;
fixtel = percentage of households with a fixed telephone in 1999;
intcon = percentage of households with an internet connection in 1999;
cabsat = percentage of households with a cable or satellite TV in 1999;
totemp = total employment in 1999;
hitech = high-tech employment in 1999.
From a conceptual point of view, the framework of analysis is based on the 
idea that ICT infrastructures and services are production factors which, together 
with the traditional labour and capital factors, account for the GDP level. Thus, 
a change in ICT investments produces a change in ICT endowment which enters 
the quasi-production function and estimates changes in the per capita or abso-
lute GDP growth rate. The results are presented in Table 8.1 (columns 1 and 2). 
Interestingly, all the ICT variables are significant and have the expected positive 
sign. The fit of the model is quite good, with an R2 index around 0.67.
However, when working with territorial data, a problem of spatial dependence 
between the observations may arise.6 Statistical tests to detect the presence of spa-
tial dependence were run, and showed the presence of both spatial lag and spatial 
error.7 Table 8.1 (columns 3 and 4) contains the results of the model corrected for 
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spatial dependence. Finally, in order to obtain a better fit with real data, the model 
was calibrated as shown in Table 8.2.
A dummy variable is built in order to analyse regional disparities. This dummy 
splits regions between lagging and non-lagging, following the criteria expressed 
by the European Commission for the definition of Objective 1 NUTS-2 regions 
for the period 2000–2006.8 
Alternative ICT policy options
Building different policy alternatives
Based on some hypotheses on the distribution of EU financial resources among 
regions and among possible policy actions (network endowment, support to service 
use, investments in skills and people in the ICT sector), the model presented in 
the previous section is able to provide an estimate of future GDP growth and of 
its spatial distribution.
Table 8.1 Model results
Normal model Spatial lag model
Coefficient 
value t-value
Coefficient value adjusted 
for spatial dependence Z-test value
Constant –3.386 (3.38)** –3.552 (–4.07)**
Luse 0.042 (2.38)** 0.051  (3.31)**
Lfixtel 0.733 (4.09)** 0.574  (3.61)**
Lintcon 0.049 (2.45)** 0.037  (2.07)*
Lcabsat 0.107 (5.30)** 0.061  (3.13)**
Lhitech2 0.061 (1.96)* 0.004  (0.12)
Ltotemp 0.457  (3.65)**
ρ 0.437  (5.14)**
R2 0.67
Notes
Number of observations = 185. Dependent variable: Lgdp99p. 
*Significant at P < 0.05.
**Significant at P < 0.01.
Table 8.2 Calibration of the spatial lag model (dependent variable Lgdp99p)
Indicators Estimated coefficients Calibrated coefficients Differences
Constant –3.552 –3.552 0.000
Luse 0.051 0.055 0.004
Lfixtel 0.574 0.650 0.076
Lintcon 0.037 0.037 0.000
Lcabsat 0.061 0.070 0.009
Lhitech2 0.004 0.005 0.001
Ltotemp 0.457 0.640 0.183
ρ 0.437 0.300 –0.137
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The magnitude of future EU investments in ICTs over the next twenty years 
is estimated as follows. ICT investments at the national level between 1990 and 
2000 in the fifteen EU member states, at 2000 prices, reached around 50 billion 
euros per year9 (Table 8.3). Given the financial efforts made by the EU in those 
years, which were equal to 4 per cent of the total investments made by national 
governments, and given the entry of the new accession countries, we assume that 
the EU financial commitment in this field over the next twenty years will amount 
to 2 per cent of total investments made by the fifteen EU member states, reaching 
a level of around 1 billion euros per year. This amount, multiplied by twenty, 
provides a twenty-year investment scenario.10
Once the financial expenditure on ICT policies has been calculated, alterna-
tive policy options are built according to the Europe 2002 Action Plan of the 
Community, which envisages three main normative actions (European Commission 
2000): (i) investment in a cheaper, faster and more secure internet, i.e. a focus on 
ICT infrastructure; (ii) investment in people and skills, i.e. an adoption support 
policy; (iii) investment in stimulating internet service development (e-govern-
ment, e-commerce, intelligent transport systems), i.e. an ICT policy oriented 
towards service promotion.
These intervention policies are rather different in nature since they act on dif-
ferent features. The first action aims at enhancing ICT endowment: ICTs are in fact 
expected to act on accessibility, allowing territorial peripherality to be overcome, 
and generating the popular perception of a ‘death of distance’ (Castells and Hall 
1994). In remote areas in particular, ICTs are generally perceived as providing the 
opportunity to overcome geographical disadvantages, to be connected in real time 
to the ‘core’. The second and third actions are directed at supporting strategic use 
through the creative and organisational transformation of firms’ internal opera-
tions, where strategic and intensive ICT use results in greater competitiveness.
Table 8.3 European country investments in ICTs
Country
Average annual investments in ICTs, 1990–2000 
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Different impacts on regional performance are therefore expected from the 
three policy actions:
1 The first policy action generates an increase in ICT endowment, but not 
necessarily in real use of ICTs. This policy can be applied to lagging areas 
to fill in the infrastructural gap, and to non-lagging areas to overcome the bot-
tlenecks that characterise these areas. In our model, this policy corresponds to 
an increase in internet connections.
2 The second policy action is a medium-term policy, since it helps in the 
medium term to spread the necessary skills and knowledge for innovative 
and strategic ICT use to all areas. In our model, this policy influences the 
high-tech employment share.
3 The third policy action is a long-term policy; it aims to develop advanced 
ICT services (and their employment) in the economy, influencing the long-
term efficiency of the whole productive system. In our model, this policy 
corresponds to an increase in ICT use.
The increased financial commitment made in the ICT field is translated into 
an increase in physical ICT endowment or ICT use or high-tech employment, 
by estimating the elasticity of internet connections, of accessibility and of high-
tech employment to financial investment, and therefore its marginal efficiency.11 
Capital invested in ICTs can been calculated by cumulating the investments over 
the period 1990–2000 at 2000 prices. The results of the three regressions are 
presented in Table 8.4; as regressions are run on the logarithms of the variables, 
the results obtained are the elasticity of, respectively, accessibility, internet con-
nections and high-tech employment to investments, and are therefore comparable. 
Even at a first look, it is evident that investments in internet connections prove 
to be much more efficient; a 1 per cent increase in financial resources devoted 
to internet connections provides an increase in internet connections of 0.96 per 
cent, whereas the same investment generates an increase of only 0.22 per cent and 
0.26 per in high-tech employment and accessibility respectively. The substantial 
differences in the marginal efficiency of investments between the different policy 
actions show that the impact of ICT policies on territorial distribution significantly 
depends on the choice of alternative policy actions.
Given a certain level of financial resources devoted to ICTs (Table 8.3), three 
alternatives can be envisaged on the basis of the policy actions chosen and the 
spatial distribution of financial resources, with a time reference of twenty years 
(Table 8.5). The results are compared against a do-nothing scenario, in which per 
capita GDP growth is equal to zero. In order to highlight ICT policy impacts, our 
model considers ICT policies to be the only factor affecting GDP growth.
The indiscriminate ICT policy option envisages widespread diffusion of ICT 
infrastructures and services throughout Europe, with implementation of all three 
European ICT policy actions in all countries and regions of the EU, whatever their 
economic performance and ICT endowment level. Funds are subdivided among 
regions according to their population share, and then directed in equal parts to the 
three policy actions.
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Internet access at 








(ln) (2.3)* (12.7)** (2.13)*
Notes
t-Values are given in brackets.
*Significant at P < 0.05.
**Significant at P < 0.01.
Table 8.5 Distribution of investments by region and ICT policy according to the different 
scenarios
ICT policy options Regional distribution ICT policy actions
A: indiscriminate 
policy option
All regions receive equal 
investment distributed according 
to regional population
Among all regions 33% use, 
33% internet, 33% high-tech 
employment
B: efficiency policy 
option
Lagging regions receive 20% of 
total investments. Investment 
is distributed according to the 
lagging region’s share of the 
population
Lagging regions: 90% use, 10% 
internet
Non-lagging regions receive 
80% of total investments. 
Investment is distributed 
according to the non-lagging 
region’s share of the population
Non-lagging regions: 10% use, 
90% internet
C: cohesion policy 
option
Lagging regions receive100% 
of total investment. Investment 
is distributed according to the 
lagging region’s share of the 
population
Lagging regions : 33% use, 
33% internet, 33% high-tech 
employment
The efficiency ICT policy option envisages implementation of ICT policy 
actions according to the marginal efficiency of investments (Table 8.4). In this 
case, 80 per cent of financial investment in ICTs is directed to the more efficient 
non-lagging regions, with the remaining 20 per cent going to the lagging regions. 
Moreover, 90 per cent of financial resources within each subgroup of regions are 
devoted to the policy action with the highest marginal efficiency of investment. 
Therefore, once investments are weighted by population, they are divided within 
each subgroup of regions as follows:
1 In Objective 1 areas, 90 per cent of European regional ICT resources are 
directed at increasing ICT use, while the remainder is invested in increasing 
infrastructure development.
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2 In advanced areas, 90 per cent of European regional ICT resources are 
invested in infrastructure development, while the remaining 10 per cent is 
invested in ICT use.
The third policy, cohesion policy option, envisages that increased accessibility 
is directed at lagging regions, as has been the case in the past with the STAR and 
Telematique projects run by the EU. In this case, all the resources are devoted to 
Objective 1 regions, one-third for each policy action.
Future GDP growth
The growth in per capita GDP differs substantially in the three cases. In Table 8.6 
the growth rates for the whole sample and for the two subsamples of lagging and 
non-lagging regions are presented.
Results at the regional level are plotted in Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7. The do-
nothing alternative is zero, i.e. if no ICT investment is made, GDP growth is 
equal to zero. In the indiscriminate scenario (A), the GDP growth rate is 0.033 
per cent; in this scenario the effect appears to be higher in lagging regions (+0.12 
per cent) than in non-lagging ones (+0.016 per cent). Figure 8.5 shows that the 
GDP growth rate is broadly evenly distributed in most regions, with some peaks 
(positive or negative) that in most cases can probably be explained by statistical 
effects. Most regions show per capita GDP growth rates between 0.012 per cent 
and 0.03 per cent. Thus, as expected, this scenario affects all regions more or less 
in the same way.
In the efficiency scenario (B), as expected, the growth rate in per capita GDP 
turns out to be stronger than in scenario A. Figure 8.6 is directly comparable 
with Figure 8.5. The difference is a stronger GDP growth rate in some non-
lagging regions, like the regions belonging to the so-called Blue Banana (The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and French regions near the Reno River) 
and to the Sunbelt (southern regions of France and Spain and northern Italy). The 
efficiency scenario produces the highest per capita GDP growth rate, as expected 
(+0.037 per cent), most of which is in advanced regions (+0.04 per cent), leaving 
to lagging regions only 0.012 per cent of the increase.
In scenario C, all financial resources are devoted to lagging regions, with the 
result that growth rates in these regions are higher under this scenario than in 
the other two scenarios. The concentration of investments means that not only 
Table 8.6 Per capita GDP growth rate in the three policy options
Policy options
GDP growth rate over twenty years (%)
Lagging regions Non-lagging regions Total
0: do nothing 0.000 0.000 0.000
A: indiscriminate 0.120 0.016 0.033
B: efficiency 0.012 0.040 0.037
C: cohesion 0.140 0.000 0.023
Figure 8.5 Policy option A: per capita GDP growth rate in twenty years.
Figure 8.6 Policy option B: per capita GDP growth rate in twenty years.
Policy option A - pc GDP growth rate in 20 years 
§ 0.001 - 0.003 
D 0.003 - 0.012 
~0.012 - 0.03 
rallJ 0.03 - 0.3 
Policy option B - pc GDP growth rate in 20 years 
~ 0.001 - 0.003 
D 0.003 - 0.012 
~ 0.012 - 0.03 
~ 0.03 - 0.078 
~ 0.078 - 0.241 
d 
d 
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GDP, but also accessibility and internet connections, increase in Objective 1 areas 
(Figure 8.7).
Thus, from the point of view of efficiency (i.e. of economic growth), scenario 
B is obviously the most appropriate, as scenarios A and C result in lower economic 
growth. In the case of the cohesion policy, the negative effect on growth rate is 
relatively large, the increase in per capita GDP being only 0.023 per cent com-
pared with 0.037 per cent for the efficiency policy. The indiscriminate policy also 
leads to lower efficiency gains, although, as expected, the effect is less severe than 
with the cohesion policy: with the indiscriminate policy per capita GDP increases 
by 0.033 per cent compared with 0.037 per cent under the efficiency policy. 
The second main result of the forecasting model concerns the aim of achieving 
cohesion. Differences in income growth between regions from the three differ-
ent policy alternatives are presented in Figures 8.8 to 8.10. Policy A results in 
some peaks, mainly as a result of statistical effects, such as arises from the low 
population density in the Scandinavian countries or the low level of GDP in some 
countries. However, in general, very few regions present consistent differences 
from the EU mean (northern Italy, some regions of France and Portugal) (Figure 
8.8).
In option B, the highest relative regional growth rates are in two French north–
south corridors, in northern Italy and in southern Ireland, although Germany, 
central Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands also show relatively high per capita 
growth rates (Figure 8.9).
Figure 8.7 Policy option C: per capita GDP growth rate in twenty years.
d 
Policy option C - pc GOP growth rate in 20 years 
~ o 
CJ 0 -0.017 
~ 0.017- 0.053 
~ 0.053- 0.165 
~ 0.165-1 .174 
Figure 8.8 Policy option A: differences from the EU mean in per capita GDP growth 
rates.
Figure 8.9 Policy option B: differences from the EU mean in per capita GDP growth 
rates.
Policy option A - Dif ferences from the EU mean in pc GDP growth rates 
§-0 032 - -0.031 
CJ -0 .031 - -0.03 
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Alternative C results in the highest relative per capita GDP growth rate in lag-
ging regions such as parts of southern Italy, Greece and Spain (Figure 8.10).
A way of quantifying changes in regional disparities is through Gini’s concen-
tration index and its graphic representation through the Lorenz curve. The Gini 
coefficients for the different scenarios are presented in Table 8.7.
As regards GDP distribution, option A results in a coefficient similar to the 
current situation, as expected, whereas option B increases regional disparities and 
option C decreases them. The magnitude of the effects is very small because of the 
very small change in per capita GDP that we are forecasting. These results can be 
represented by a Lorenz curve. As a result of the very small difference in the Gini 
coefficients, the curves produced by the different scenarios are very close to each 
other. The differences are more clearly seen in the zoomed area. Interestingly, the 
efficiency option does not substantially increase regional disparities compared 
with the present situation, while the current regional imbalance would be greatly 
improved by choosing the cohesion alternative.
The same results are presented in Figure 8.11. Option C, satisfying its cohesion 
objective, reduces regional disparities by creating a more equal distribution. The 
curves obtained under alternatives A and B are quite similar; as we can see in the 
magnified area, the efficiency scenario results in a lower Lorenz curve, a sign 
that disparities in income distribution are increasing. If this is true at the general 
level, it would be interesting to examine whether the capacity to take advantage 
Figure 8.10 Policy option C: differences from the EU mean in per capita GDP growth 
rates.
Poky option C - Differences from the EU mean in pc GDP growth rates 
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of the growth opportunities provided by ICT policies is the same in each region. 
As we will see in the next section, this is not the case. Our analysis highlights the 
importance of choosing appropriate policy options in the ICT field.
Preconditions for ICT policy exploitation
From the maps presented above it is quite evident that advanced regions 
react differently to ICT investment policies. Some are better able to grasp the 
opportunities offered by these exogenous policies, whereas others are more 
inclined to react only if policies are directly concerned with particular local needs. 
The same holds for backward regions, among which the response capacity to ICT 
policy opportunities differs substantially, irrespective of the policy choice made 
(Figures 8.8, 8.9 and 8.10).
A way to isolate common behaviours to ICT policies is by running a clus-
ter analysis, a statistical technique able to group observations (in our case the 
regions) according to their similarities in the values of some selected variables (in 
our case, GDP growth and the growth rate of internet connections). Our cluster 
analysis identified four different clusters, mapped in Figure 8.12. The subdivision 
Table 8.7 Gini coefficients
Policy alternatives Per capita GDP Accessibility Internet
Current situation 0.37170 0.3992 0.22558
Option A 0.37170 0.4383 0.24562
Option B 0.37173 0.4382 0.24379
Option C 0.37161 0.4381 0.22354
Equal distribution 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
Figure 8.11 Per capita GDP distribution in the three policy options.
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of regions among clusters is rather interesting. Nearly 50 per cent of both lag-
ging and advanced regions do not react in a decisive way to ICT policies (cluster 
3). The reasons are probably different in lagging and advanced regions; in the 
former the reasons may be found in the limited level of knowledge and learning 
capacity in exploiting ICT networks. In the case of advanced regions, the reasons 
may be related to the already high endowment of ICTs, which limit the effects of 
additional investments on the performance of these regions.
Another large group of lagging regions (37 per cent) reacts only to the cohesion 
policy scenarios, while a very limited number of backward regions (7.5 per cent) 
are able to grasp growth opportunities offered by an efficiency policy scenario; 
interestingly, no lagging region gains greatly from an indiscriminate ICT policy 
(Table 8.8). On the other hand, advanced regions react either to the efficiency 
policy only (31.9 per cent) or to indiscriminate and efficiency policies (18.1 per 
cent) (Table 8.8).
Figure 8.12 shows which regions belong to each of the four clusters. Advanced 
regions that react to both indiscriminate and efficiency policies are found in north-
ern Italy and the western part of France. Regions reacting to efficiency policies are 
principally the German regions (where the country effect is sufficiently strong that 
efficiency policies are useful even in the eastern regions), some French regions 
Figure 8.12 Typology of regions by ICT policy impacts.
Typology of regions by ICT policy impacts 
~ Regions reacting to efficiency and indiscriminate ICT policies 
□ Regions reacting to efficiency ICT policies 
~ Regions with low reaction to ICT policies 
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and some Scottish ones. Regions reacting to cohesion policies only are most of the 
Greek regions, part of Spain and southern Italy. Regions that do not react strongly 
to any ICT policy are those in the UK, the Scandinavian countries and the central 
regions of Spain.
Concluding remarks
The concept of accessibility is increasingly important in the context of a globalising 
economy. Accessibility can be defined as the ability to overcome spatial distance 
at low transport cost, as well as to gather strategic information before competitors. 
Consequently, accessibility becomes a strategic factor for the competitiveness 
of regions. Traditionally, accessibility is operationally related to mobility, and 
therefore to physical transport networks. However, in this chapter, we focused 
on a new concept of accessibility, deriving from ICTs. Our aim was to assess the 
impact of ICT accessibility on regional growth and competitiveness.
The importance of accessibility through ICT and not only through physical 
networks for economic growth is clearly evident. In particular, ICT accessibility 
policies show very different impacts (from the point of view of cohesion and effi-
ciency) when projected twenty years into the future. European economic growth 
as well as economic cohesion will also significantly depend on the political deci-
sions that are made regarding ICTs – decisions on ICT actions and the regional 
distribution of financial resources. Once applied, ICT policies should also take 
into account the different local preconditions relating to the level of ICT use, the 
level of ICT endowment and the learning processes required to use these tech-
nologies. All these elements affect the impact of ICT policies in fostering regional 
development and cannot be ignored when policy actions are planned.
Notes
 1 On local economic development, see, among others, Ciciotti and Wettmann (1981), 
Garofoli (1981), Johannisson and Spilling (1983), Becattini (1990), Stöhr (1990), 
Courlet and Pecqueur (1992) and Ganne (1992). See Vásquez-Barquero (2002) for a 
general presentation of these theories.
 2 For studies concerning the role of infrastructure on regional development, see Perroux 
(1955), Keeble et al. (1982), Biehl (1986), Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990), Bruinsma 
et al. (1992), Vickerman (1991), Fabiani and Pellegrini (1997) and Ferri and Mattesini 
(1997).
 3 The analysis presented here and developed over the fifteen member states of the EU, 
at regional (NUTS-2) level, is part of the ESPON 2.1.1 project (Territorial Impact of 
EU Transport and Ten Policies) coordinated by Johannes Bröcker of the University 
of Kiel. The research unit of the Polytechnic of Milan was coordinated by Roberta 
Capello. 
 4 EOS Gallup (1999) included a larger number of ICT endowments than INRA (2003). 
Our interpretative model was run on 1999 data. Since it interprets a structural 
relationship, the 1999 data are acceptable.
 5 The digital divide remains the same when the analysis is based on the more up-to-date 
data of the INRA report. We prefer to present the 1999 data here, as this is what is used 
in the interpretative model presented in the following section. 
 6 For more details concerning spatial dependence problems, see Anselin (1988, 1992), 
Anselin and Hudak (1992) and Anselin et al. (1996).
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 7 We applied Moran’s I, the Lagrange multiplier and the robust Lagrange multiplier. 
These tests assume higher and significant values when there is positive spatial 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable (lag) or in the errors. For calculating the 
spatial autocorrelation tests and the spatial lag model, we used STATA 7 with the 
extensions for spatial analysis (Pisati 2001). The results are presented in the following 
table:
Test Statistic d.f. P-value
Spatial error
Moran’s I 7.621 1 0.000
Lagrange multiplier 40.385 1 0.000
Robust Lagrange multiplier 2.695 1 0.101
Spatial lag
Lagrange multiplier 51.264 1 0.000
Robust Lagrange multiplier 13.574 1 0.000
 8 European Commission (1999). The Objective 1 regions should meet one of the 
following requirements: (a) GDP < 75 per cent of EU average; (b) most remote 
regions (DOM-TOM, Azores, Madeira, Canaries); (c) very low population density 
(old Objective 6 areas – in particular the Scandinavian regions).
 9 ITU data on national investments (ITU 2003).
 10 It seems quite a reasonable hypothesis when compared with the results of other studies 
such as Technopolis et al. (2002).
 11 Table 8.5 shows the elasticity of internet connections, accessibility and high-tech 
employment to financial investments; once the elasticity is calculated, the marginal 
efficiency of investments is easily obtained by multiplying the elasticity value for the 
ratio of each dependent variable (internet connections, accessibility and high-tech 
employment) to the independent one (invested capital).
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9 Regional inequalities and EU 
enlargement
 The macrospatial dimension
Marinella Terrasi
Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn, 
Im dunklen Laub die Goldorangen glühn, 
Ein sanfter Wind vom blauen Himmel weht 
Die Myrte still und hoch der Lorbeer steht?1
(J. W. Goethe, Mignon, 1783)
Introduction
Since Krugman’s contributions (Krugman 1991a,b) a new approach to spatial 
economics has been developed. This ‘new economic geography’ aims at 
integrating trade with geography, having finally discovered that ‘space matters’ in 
international as well as in regional economics.
One of the most commonly used experimental fields for these theoretical devel-
opments has been European integration. European integration appears for many 
reasons to be the ideal context to which the predictions of the new theories could 
be applied. First, the integration process has come about in consecutive phases, 
which can be identified either as an enlargement of the space of integration or as 
an intensification of its degree. This makes it possible to verify the effects of the 
reduction in transport cost that plays such an important role in the models of the 
new economic geography.
Second, in each phase of European integration a well-defined centre and well-
defined periphery have emerged, which again are essential ingredients to the new 
economic geography approach. If we go as far back as 1961, we can read in 
the documents of the ‘Conférence sur les économies régionales’ that ‘L’espace 
économique communitaire est doméné par une dichotomie très caractéristique: 
sous l’angle du développement économique s’opposent une Europe périphérique 
et une Europe centrale’ (CEE 1961: 164). Subsequently, the identification of central 
and peripheral regions has been of constant interest to the European Commission 
and has fuelled a long list of applied studies (Clark et al. 1969, Keeble et al. 1982, 
1988, Copus 1999, Schürmann and Talaat 2000).
But perhaps the main reason why European integration has become such an 
important case of study for the new economic geography research is the adop-
tion of a spatial cohesion objective in the European constitutive Treaties and the 
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resulting emergence of a European regional policy, which has gradually become 
one of the most important items in the EU budget (Boldrin and Canova 2003). It is 
clear that, from the point of view of cohesion, Krugman’s approach has important 
consequences. If it is true that economic integration can feed spatial divergence 
between centre and periphery, regional policy becomes an essential instrument in 
creating cohesion and must be supported by the identification of the appropriate 
centre/periphery spatial structure.
Today we have just passed over the threshold of a new phase of European 
integration: the entry of ten new members into the EU, which has increased its 
area by 23 per cent and its population by 20 per cent. But what matters the most 
is the ‘unprecedented widening of economic disparities within the Union and the 
geographical shift in the pattern of disparities’ that the new enlargement will bring 
with it (European Commission 2003: 2).
In this chapter some new empirical evidence will be offered about the change 
in the EU regional inequality problem resulting from the admission of eight 
acceding countries (excluding Malta and Cyprus, which do not play an important 
role in the problem of European regional inequalities) and some hypotheses will 
be advanced about its future evolution in light of the experience of past enlarge-
ments. The chapter is organized as follows: in the next section the main results 
obtained by the new economic geography are reviewed and their relevance for 
the European case are discussed. In the third the evolution of European regional 
disparities is analysed in terms of different variables, such as gross value added 
(GVA), gross domestic product (GDP), labour productivity and rate of employ-
ment, during consecutive phases of the integration process, starting from 1950 
and ending with 1997. The Theil coefficient and its various decompositions are 
the principal tools of analysis adopted. In the fourth the changing environment of 
the regional inequality problem after the new enlargement will be presented, while 
the fifth section focuses on the determinants of regional productivity inequalities. 
Finally, some general conclusions are drawn that are relevant for the formulation 
of future European regional policy.
The spatial effects of economic integration
Traditional economic theory has analysed the effects of economic integration in 
terms of different endowments of resources and comparative advantages. According 
to this view, integration is beneficial to all the participants of the economic game 
because although the strongest players may have an absolute advantage, there is 
still room for the weakest ones to produce what they are relatively better endowed 
for. In international trade, equilibrium is met through the mobility of goods, while 
in inter-regional trade the mobility of production factors plays the most important 
equilibrating role.
In this economic model, space is present only for its original heterogeneity, 
which is exogenously determined. There is no room for transport costs or for the 
costs of migration, and no advantages result from the agglomeration of firms, 
because economies of scale and external economies are ruled out. The predictions 
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of the dominating model, i.e. the diffusion of economic activities and equilibrium 
in productivity levels and input rewards, rarely come true in reality, but according 
to Krugman (1991a,b) economic theory was not provided with the right tools for 
modelling the much more complex world that emerges when mobility meets a 
cost and production is carried out in conditions of increasing returns.
In fact, some non-mainstream economists such as Perroux (1955), Myrdal 
(1957), Hirschman (1958) and Kaldor (1970) have claimed that increasing returns 
and agglomeration economies are important determinants of trade and growth, 
but their arguments were not supported by an adequate analytical framework. 
It was only in the 1990s, when the toolbox of the economists had been enriched 
with models of the ‘new industrial organization’, the ‘new trade theory’ and the 
‘new growth theory’ (Krugman 1998), that the costs of overcoming distance and 
increasing returns could be explicitly introduced in modelling international and 
inter-regional trade. It is at this point that a new genre of research emerged, namely 
the ‘new economic geography’.
Even though different versions of the new economic geography model have 
been proposed and they are undergoing continuous evolution because of the short 
period of time that has elapsed since its first appearance, some interesting results, 
relevant to the European integration process, have already been achieved. In this 
approach an essential role is played by transport cost, which must be considered 
a very general category embracing not only the pure cost of transferring goods 
from one place to the other, but also trade taxes, costs of frontier formalities 
and different product standards, difficulty of communication and cultural dif-
ferences (Krugman and Venables 1990). The reduction in transport cost that is 
associated with economic integration does not determine, however, a lone result 
because of the presence of increasing returns. In the simplest model with two 
regions and two sectors, which are manufacturing (operating under conditions 
of increasing returns and monopolistic competition) and agriculture (operating 
under conditions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition), different 
results are associated with different levels of transport costs. When transport 
costs are high, diffusion of manufacturing prevails, determined by the costs of 
transferring goods. When the level of transport costs is middling, concentration of 
manufacturing emerges as a result of the agglomeration economies that dominate 
transport costs. Finally, at low levels of transport costs diffusion again prevails 
owing to the congestion in the agglomeration centre, which results in the prices 
of production factors being higher than in the peripheral regions. This process is 
fuelled by a cumulative mechanism that runs between the home market of final 
products and/or intermediate inputs and the location choices of firms, so that firms 
move towards the centre because they find a larger market, but in this way they 
contribute to making the home market even larger. In these conditions the spatial 
effect of integration remains open-ended, depending essentially on the size of the 
reduction in transport cost and on the differential of input prices in central and 
peripheral locations.
The new economic geography model, according to this essential version, seems 
particularly suited to providing a sound theoretical framework in which to analyse 
Regional inequalities and EU enlargement 219
the evolution of the centre/periphery dichotomy that characterizes the European 
case. Along these lines the essential task is to establish whether or not the reduc-
tion in transport cost has been large enough to determine the diffusion of footloose 
activities. Of course, the essential model may be enriched in many directions. 
One of the most interesting for the European case is that of the multiregional 
structure of the integrating economies. In this case, the results depend not only 
on the parameters but also on the geometry of the economy (Krugman 1998) and 
the model provides a justification for the ‘market potential’ function so frequently 
used in location studies (Harris 1954). At the end of the process, depending on the 
initial conditions, various centres of agglomeration may emerge and a third type 
of region may be identified between the centre and the periphery, the intermediate 
one, which may end up winning the game at the expense of both the central and 
peripheral regions.
The new economic geography model represents the theoretical framework 
in which the present chapter was conceived. Although the model has been for-
mulated as a location model rather than as a growth/development model, it is 
possible to establish a link between the two approaches (Baldwin and Martin 
2003) and interpret along those lines the evolution of regional income disparities 
at the European level, which constitutes the principal objective of the chapter. The 
analysis starts with the first phase of European integration in the late 1950s and 
follows the evolution of regional disparities in three consecutive phases, the entry 
of the UK, Ireland and Denmark in the 1970s, then Greece, Spain and Portugal in 
the 1980s and, finally, some central and eastern European countries (CEEC). The 
admission of Austria, Finland, Sweden and eastern Germany in the 1990s is not 
separately analysed because of their limited contribution to the level of European 
regional disparities (Terrasi 2002). In each phase, regional disparities are exam-
ined not only in the aggregate but also component by component. The comparison 
between two of these components, the disparities between countries and those 
between groups of regions, represents one of the focal points of the analysis. As 
Krugman and Venables (1990: 59) write ‘Increasingly it makes sense to think 
of economic Europe as consisting not of a collection of internally homogeneous 
countries, but of a collection of regions, of varying degrees of peripherality from 
a centre located somewhere around Brussels’.
Regional inequalities during consecutive phases of European 
integration: 1960–97
Before starting the historical excursus of European regional inequalities, another 
important point must be clarified. In the new economic geography model, production 
technology and the phase of economic development of the integrating economies 
also play a part in determining the concentration of economic activities. In the 
simple model of two regions and two sectors originally proposed by Krugman 
(1991a), production technology is represented by a fixed cost in the production 
function, while the phase of development determines the shares of mobile 
(manufacturing) and immobile (agriculture) economic activities in the aggregate 
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economy. Therefore, it is important to consider that during the long period of time 
that has elapsed since the beginning of the European integration process not only 
the space and the degree of integration, but also the technological paradigm and the 
relative position of the different sectors in the aggregate economy, have changed. 
In other words, structural change must also be considered as an important factor in 
the evolution of European regional disparities (Paci and Pigliaru 1997, 1999).
The beginning
To analyse regional disparities back in the 1950s, when the first six countries 
(EU-6) decided to move towards a common market, there is only one suitable 
source of information: the database collected by Molle and his associates on 
population, GDP in US dollars and employment in sixty-one regions of the 
European Community (Molle et al. 1980).
The Theil index2 was calculated from these data by using an alternative decom-
position: between-country/within-country versus between-macroregion/within-
macroregion components. The macroregions were derived from the map of the 
economic potential that appears in the study by Clark et al. (1969) for EU-6 in 
1960–64. On the basis of the values of economic potential, three macroregions 
were identified: central, intermediate and peripheral. The central macroregion 
embraces the three Benelux countries, four German regions and seven French 
regions. The periphery consists of twelve Italian regions and four French regions, 
while the remaining regions are considered intermediate. In 1970 the centre had 
a population share of 40 per cent, while both the periphery and the intermediate 
regions had a population share of 30 per cent. In Appendix 9.1 the elementary 
regions pertaining to each macroregion can be found, while in Table 9.1 the 
results of the calculations are reported for the only three years available: 1950, 
1960, 1970.
Table 9.1 shows that (i) European regional disparities start to decrease between 
1950 and 1960, but the decrease intensified between 1960 and 1970 in connec-
tion with the integration process; (ii) the disparities between countries and within 
countries absorb a similar share of total inequality, with the between-countries 
share increasing from 1960 to 1970; (iii) both between-country and within-coun-
try disparities decrease, mostly between 1960 and 1970, with disparities within 
countries decreasing more that those between countries; (iv) in 1970 the three 
macro-areas reach the same share of total disparity as the six countries, but their 
share substantially grows from 1950 to 1970; (v) both between-macro-area 
and within-macro-area disparities decrease, with within-macro-area disparities 
decreasing more than the between-macro-area disparities.
Table 9.2 provides some more interesting information about the components of 
regional disparities. Here we find the disaggregation of total and between-group 
inequality in labour productivity and employment rate inequalities.
Table 9.2 shows that productivity accounts for a much greater share of total 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































decreases, the employment rate share increases. The same mechanism can be 
recognized at the country and at the macroregion levels, with the between-group 
employment rate shares growing. This result shows that in the catching-up proc-
ess of the weakest regions, productivity plays the most important role, but at the 
same time there is evidence of difficulty in employing the labour force released 
from the low-productivity activities.
In terms of the new economic geography reasoning, we could argue that the 
reduction in the transport cost associated with the low cost of labour in peripheral 
locations is enough to determine a process of diffusion both at the country and at 
the macroregion level and that this process comes about through diffusion within 
countries as well as within macro-areas. At the same time, it should be noted that 
in the initial period of European integration a delimitation based on the centre/
intermediate/periphery categories is useful in interpreting the process of spatial 
adjustment.
The first enlargement: the entry of the UK, Ireland and Denmark
Starting in 1975, regional disparities can be analysed using the Regio database 
collected by Eurostat for different levels of territorial units, called NUTS-1, -2 
and -3 (Eurostat 1999). The following analysis is based on GVA in 1985 euros 
and population and employment data obtained from the Cambridge Econometrics 
dataset, which is a revised version of the Regio database (Cambridge Econometrics 
and Ereco 2001).
Tables 9.3 and 9.4 present values for the various Theil coefficients for the nine 
countries and seventy-six regions of the enlarged Economic Community (EU-9). 
Of course, the new data are not homogeneous with Molle’s, and for this reason 
it is not possible to compare the values of the Theil indexes in Tables 9.3 and 
9.4 with those calculated for EU-6 in Tables 9.1 and 9.2. Neither are the regions 
and macroregions comparable with those of the previous tables. Regions are now 
mostly NUTS-2, but in some cases NUTS-1 are adopted (Terrasi 2002). As for 
the macroregions, a more recent study on the economic potential at the European 
regional level has been used (Keeble et al. 1988). On this basis, four macroregions 
have been identified – central, intermediate, northern peripheral and southern 
peripheral – which in 1975 accounted for, respectively, 41, 43, 7 and 8 per cent 
of the total population. It seems appropriate to identify two separate peripheral 
macroregions, in order to take into account their different historical and cultural 
roots (Terrasi 2003). The precise delimitation of each macroregion can be found 
in Appendix 9.1.
Table 9.3 reports the three-year average of total, between- and within-group 
Theil coefficients for the lengthy period 1975–97. Although in the mid-1980s 
regional disparity again changed as a result of further enlargement, it is of interest 
first to examine what occurred at the EU-9 level during the entirety of this period 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































According to Table 9.3, between-country disparity in the last three years 
accounts for a much lower share of total disparity than before, reaching a value of 
about 20 per cent. In contrast, between-macroregion disparity still accounts for a 
considerable share of total disparity (45–55 per cent).
Regarding the contributions of productivity and employment rate to total 
inequality, Table 9.4 shows that productivity was the predominant factor con-
tributing to inequality throughout the study period although its share fell over 
time. This trend was a result of a fall in productivity inequality share at both the 
between-country and between-macroregion levels. In contrast, the proportion of 
total inequality contributed by employment inequality increased over the period 
as a result of increases both between countries and between macroregions, but 
especially the latter.
For the first period, 1975–84, which in fact corresponds to the first enlarge-
ment, a regression equation has been estimated, in which the various Theil coeffi-
cients are the dependent variables and time is the independent one. The results are 
reported in Table 9.5. It seems quite clear that divergence at the between-country 
level and convergence at the between-macroregion level have prevailed. At the 
same time, there is a process of divergence both within countries and within 
macro-areas. Generally, the analysis produces better results at the macro-area than 
at the country level.
How do these results match with the predictions of the new geography models? 
Surely, they are in line with the prediction that the centre/periphery dimension 
will prevail over the national one as integration goes on. The enlargement of the 
European space to include three northern countries makes it possible for the cen-
tre/periphery structure to emerge more clearly. But with respect to the preceding 
period, the diffusion among the macro-areas is accompanied by concentration 
within the macro-areas. This, again, is in accordance with the prediction of the new 
geography theory that the spatial structure is subject to a process of endogenous 
transformation due to integration, from which winners and losers will emerge.
It must also be taken into account that the period 1975–84 was one of struc-
tural change, in which the general economic situation was subject to a substantial 
turnabout and a new technological revolution was being prepared. This may have 
reinforced the role of the economies of agglomeration within the different macro-
areas.
The second enlargement: the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal
Starting in 1985, we find European regional inequalities in a completely different 
setting. Not only do three Mediterranean countries at a much lower level of 
development, Greece, Spain and Portugal, join the group, but the degree of 
integration intensifies with the adoption of the Single Market Programme.
Using the same database as above, Table 9.6 shows the usual Theil coefficients 
calculated for the resulting twelve countries (EU-12) and 101 regions from 1985 
to 1997. The Theil indexes calculated for EU-9 at the beginning of the period are 
also reported in order to make the comparison with EU-12 easier. Four macro-
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regions are again identified through the economic potential calculated in Keeble 
et al. (1988). In 1985, 33 per cent of the total population lived in the central 
macroregion, compared with 36 per cent in the intermediate regions, 6 per cent 
in the northern periphery and 25 per cent in the southern periphery. As before the 
precise delimitation can be found in Appendix 9.1.
From Table 9.6 it is easy to evaluate the large increase in regional disparity that 
the new enlargement brought. It is evident that the between-country inequality 
accounted for a much larger share of the total, even though towards the end of the 
period the between-macroregion share reached a similar size.
The results of the productivity/employment rate decomposition are reported in 
Table 9.7 and confirm once more the role of productivity disparity.
The temporal behaviour of the various inequality coefficients can best be appre-
ciated by looking at Table 9.8, in which the results of the same simple regression 
equation estimated above are reported. Regional convergence clearly emerges 
at the total, between-country and between-macro-area levels, while divergence 
dominates the within-country scene. At the within-macro-area level no clear ten-
dency can be identified.
It seems reasonable to comment on these results along the following lines. 
Unlike before, the new enlargement involved some countries at a much lower 
level of development than the European average, which had to undertake a proc-
ess of substantial structural change. In these conditions, national factors were 
more important than spatial ones in determining convergence. Nevertheless, there 
is clear evidence that the European centre/periphery structure is still relevant. 
The behaviour of both total and between-group inequality supports the hypoth-
esis that the reduction in transport cost favoured a process of diffusion, but this 
was achieved at the expense of within-country disparity, whose productivity and 
employment rate components increase. Again, there is evidence that the process 
of integration feeds the endogenous change of the spatial structure at the country 
level.




b sign Student’s ta R2 b sign Student’s ta R2
IT
total
+  3.06** 0.54 +  3.06** 0.54
IT
between-
+  3.50** 0.60 – –5.69*** 0.80
IT
within-
+  1.75** 0.28 +  7.05*** 0.86
IT
between-, productivity
+  2.72* 0.48 – –6.79*** 0.85
IT
between-, employment
– –1.28 0.17 +  2.52* 0.44
IT
within-, productivity
+  1.7 0.28 +  5.80*** 0.81
IT
within, employment
+  6.65*** 0.84 – –0.23 0.01
Note
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The change in regional inequalities after the new 
enlargement
Ten new members joined the EU in 2004, but for the purpose of analysing the 
change in regional inequalities, eight of them are particularly important: the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia 
(EU-8). Thus, Cyprus and Malta are left out of the following analysis.
Basing the analysis of regional disparity on a homogeneous set of data becomes 
more difficult when the eight new entrants are added to the fifteen countries of the 
old EU (EU-15). Fortunately, Eurostat has recently made available a new stock 
of data, suitable to this purpose, in its Regio database. These data make it pos-
sible to analyse regional inequalities in terms of three variables: GVA, GDP in 
euros and GDP in purchasing power standards (PPS). Comparing regional GDP 
in PPS seems to be the best way to evaluate the relative welfare position of the 
regions pertaining to EU-23.3 But at the same time GDP and GVA in euros are 
useful in evaluating the competitiveness of different regions in the international 
markets. Moreover, the new Regio dataset shows GVA in euros disaggregated in 
eight sectors, which is very useful information when the productivity components 
of regional disparity are considered. For this reason, in Tables 9.9 and 9.10 the 
usual Theil coefficients are reported for all three variables: GVA, GDP in PPS and 
GDP in euros.
The regional delimitation adopted is NUTS 1999 (Eurostat 1999) for EU-15, 
which makes it possible to identify 124 elementary regions corresponding gener-
ally to NUTS-2 and sometimes to NUTS-1 levels. For the acceding countries the 
statistical delimitation of Eurostat (2003) has been adopted, which gives a total of 
thirty-nine elementary regions. The macroregional dimension is still maintained, 
and for its identification a more recent study on the economic potential in the 
enlarged EU has been used (Schürmann and Talaat 2000). Five macroregions 
have been identified: central, northern, intermediate, southern peripheral and 
acceding countries. In 1999, which is the year selected for the analysis, the five 
macroregions accounted for, respectively, 29, 20, 17, 17 and 17 per cent of the 
total population. The precise delimitation can be found in Appendix 9.1.




b sign Student’s ta R2 b sign Student’s ta R2
IT
total
– –14.65*** 0.95 – –14.65*** 0.95
IT
between-
– –11.77*** 0.93 – –13.27*** 0.94
IT
within-
+   3.55*** 0.53 –  –1.73 0.21
IT
between-, productivity
–  –7.8*** 0.85 – –10.87*** 0.91
IT
between-, employment
–  –8.72*** 0.87 –  –6.25*** 0.78
IT
within-, productivity
+   2.51* 0.36 –  –1.33 0.14
IT
within, employment
+   4.53*** 0.65 +   0.75 0.01
Note
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The indexes of disparity for the year 1999 in EU-8, EU-15 and EU-23 are 
reported in Table 9.9. It can be seen that, for EU-8, the total index of disparity is 
higher in PPS than in euros. This behaviour can be explained by the difference in 
price levels among acceding countries, indicating that the poorer countries have a 
higher price level. The opposite happens for the EU-15 where the index in PPS is 
lower than in euros, denoting that in these cases the poorer countries have a lower 
price index. Regarding the comparison in PPS, it must be pointed out that PPS 
is determined for a standard basket of goods and services, ‘selected to represent 
the whole range of goods and services, and to be representative of consumption 
patterns in various countries’ (Eurostat 2003: 46). This seems quite arbitrary when 
countries are very different in terms of average income. Moreover, ‘no conver-
sion rates at regional levels are available’, so, for example, ‘the same conversion 
factor is used for northern and southern Italy or for western and eastern Germany’ 
(Eurostat 2003: 46). For all these reasons the comparison in terms of GVA and 
GDP in euros must be considered more significant (Mele 2002).
The essence of the problem of regional disparity after the most recent enlarge-
ment is shown in Table 9.9 by the change in the total Theil coefficient, which 
increases almost fourfold in terms of GVA and GDP in euros, and threefold in 
terms of GDP in PPS. This is a much greater increase than occurred following the 
entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal in 1985–87, when the index in terms of GVA 
increased 2.7 times compared with that of the EU-9 (Table 9.6).
The share of disparity accounted for by between- and within-group inequal-
ity also changed substantially, the between-country share jumping from 47.29 to 
85.76 and the between-macroregion share from 55.97 to 85.20. Therefore, even 
though the country share increased considerably, the macroregional dimension 
remains a relevant component of the regional inequality problem. In comparison 
with the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal, when the between-country and 
between-macroregion shares were respectively 73.57 and 64.90 per cent (Table 
9.6), the weight of the two components increased. 
Table 9.10 shows the results obtained for the disaggregation of total inequality 
into its productivity and employment rate components. Productivity accounts for 
practically the whole inequality, rising to 94 compared with 75 per cent for the 
EU-15. The shares of the productivity index accounted for by between-country 
and between-macroregion components are 83.55 and 83.21 per cent respectively. 
In Table 9.7 the corresponding shares after the entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal 
were 80 per cent for total productivity and 58 and 55 per cent for between-country 
and between-macroregion components.
All the above results indicate that, as other studies have already pointed out 
(Martín et al. 2001, Boldrin and Canova 2003), there are many similarities between 
the enlargement of the mid-1980s and the recent enlargement, but at the same 
time the change appears to be greater in the latter case and supports the hypothesis 
that its spatial effects may be even stronger. What might be the expected results of 
these effects? According to the new economic geography model, the relevant point 
concerns the size of the reduction in transport cost compared with the economies 
of agglomeration and the price of factor inputs. Many data support the hypothesis 
that diffusion at the country and at the macroregion level will again prevail.
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As explained beforehand, transport cost must be understood in an extensive 
way, embracing cultural and communication obstacles in addition to pure mobility 
costs. In the case of the new entrants, it has already been proposed that, as Europe 
regains its full dimension, old historical and cultural links can be fully rediscov-
ered and renewed (Terrasi 2003). The best example of this recomposition of ‘old 
acquaintances’ is the Scandinavian–Baltic region, which is going to become a 
highly integrated and dynamic area of the new EU (Peschel 1992, 1998). In the 
same way, another strong, integrated region may emerge around Austria, and it is 
worth noting that Slovenia in 2000 had already reached a per capita GDP in PPS 
of 67 per cent of the EU-15 average, which is the same as Greece and slightly 
below Portugal’s 70 per cent (Stapel 2002).
At the same time the experience of past enlargements suggests that a growth 
of within-country and within-macroregion disparities must be expected. Not only 
is there clear evidence of a trade-off between convergence at the macro scale and 
divergence at the micro scale during past European integration processes, but the 
size of the share of between-group inequality in the case of the new enlargement 
makes it easy to predict that the trade-off will be particularly high. 
A final point must be made regarding the southern peripheral regions of the 
EU-15. Although their problems appear at present to be less serious than those of 
the new entrants, they still exist and may become even worse if the convergence 
process of these regions is interrupted by the recent enlargement. In fact, accord-
ing to the predictions of the new economic geography, the change in the geometry 
of the European space could substantially alter the conditions regarding their 
potential for attraction and convergence.
The determinants of regional productivity inequalities
Up to this point the analysis of European regional inequalities has been carried 
out through a concise index of measurement with the aim of showing that the 
macroregional dimension plays a comparable role to the country one. At the 
same time it has been shown that European regional disparities are mostly due to 
differences in productivity, although the employment rate becomes increasingly 
important during the process of integration.
The final objective of this chapter is to delve deeply into the productivity com-
ponent of regional disparity and the macroregional dimension itself. For this pur-
pose, a disaggregated analysis of productivity inequalities will be developed by 
making use of the sectoral data of GVA given in the new Regio dataset. However, 
in so doing, the UK regions have been eliminated since they are not present in the 
database, so the analysis continues for EU-14 rather than EU-15 and for EU-22 
rather than EU-23. Eight sectors in total are considered in the Regio dataset, but 
two of them, ‘mining and quarrying’ and ‘electricity, gas and water supply’, have 
been aggregated for the purpose of the following analysis, leaving a total of seven 
sectors. The complete classification used is given in Appendix 9.3.
In order to understand what underlies productivity differences between regions, 
it is usually considered important to identify the role played by two different kinds 
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of factors: (i) the industry mix of regions, where high- and low-productivity sec-
tors are present with different weights and (ii) the different endowment of com-
petitive factors that causes both high- and low-productivity sectors to be present 
with lower productivity in some regions and with higher productivity in others. 
Thus, while the first factor captures the contribution of the production structure of 
the regions, the second one shows their general competitiveness.
From the contribution of Lederbur and Moomaw (1983) until Esteban’s recent 
one (2000), shift-and-share analysis was considered a powerful tool in separating 
the above-mentioned effects. Esteban (2000) applied this method to different sets 
of European regional data and was able to conclude that ‘region-specific produc-
tivity differentials account for virtually all interregional differences in aggregate 
productivity per worker’ (Esteban 2000: 362).
This study parts with Esteban’s contribution as regards both the dataset used 
and the kind of decomposition of regional productivity adopted. It has already 
been pointed out that a new Regio dataset is used, and for the method of decom-
position we have reformulated the original decomposition suggested by Lederbur 
and Moomaw (1983) in order to isolate the role played by the macroregions and 
have come up with the following formula:
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 are the shares of total employment 
in sector i in macroregion m and region r. According to equation (9.1), in each 
region the difference in productivity compared with the European average can 
be decomposed into four parts: the structural component (α) of the difference in 
productivity between the region and the macro-area; the competitive component 
(δ) of the difference in productivity between the region and the macro-area; the 
structural component of the productivity difference between the macro-area and 
the European average (γ); and the competitive component (π) of the productivity 
difference between the macro-area and the European average. In order to fully 
appreciate the contribution of the four components, α, δ, γ, π, introduced in 
equation (9.1) to the total variance of productivity between the regions considered, 
we have also come up with the following formula:




= + + + +α δ γ π
α2 , ) cov( , ) cov( , )
cov( , ) cov( , ) co
δ α γ α π
δ γ δ π
+ + +
+ + v( , )]γ π
 (9.2)
where var = variance and cov = covariance.
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In this way it is possible to evaluate the share of the variance of each compo-
nent in the total variance of regional productivity. A high share for the variance of 
the structural component γ and/or of the competitive component π will indicate 
that the delimitation adopted is able to capture substantial productivity differences 
between macro-areas.
Equations (9.1) and (9.2) were applied to two groups of regions: EU-14 and 
EU-22 in 1999. In this way it was possible to evaluate the contribution of each 
component before and after the new enlargement. The results of the analysis are 
reported in Tables 9.11 and 9.12. 
In Table 9.11 the structural (γ) and the differential components (π) for the 
macro-areas are reported. The first column of the table shows that in the EU-14 
the central regions have the highest level of productivity, but the northern and the 
intermediate regions also lie well above the European average. The region that 
is left behind is the southern peripheral region, with 70 per cent of the European 
average. The next two columns of Table 9.11 show that the competitive compo-
nent accounts for the majority of the difference, while the last column, in which 
the structural component has been eliminated, clearly demonstrates the weakness 
of the southern regions and the strength of the northern ones. It seems reasonable 
to conclude that at the EU-14 level there is only one real economic periphery: the 
south. The second part of Table 9.11 shows the effect of enlargement to EU-22. 
The competitive component remains dominant, but productivity in the southern 
regions now compares favourably with that of the acceding countries, which is 
approximately 30 per cent of the European average net of the structural compo-
nent. 
The greater significance of the macrospatial dimension after the new enlarge-
ment is evident in Table 9.12, where the share of the total variance covered by π 
amounts to 32 per cent for EU-14 and to 67 per cent for EU-22. Column 2 of the 
same table shows that at the EU-14 level a high share of the variance is accounted 
for by inequalities within the central and the southern peripheral regions. These 
results shed much light on the likely effects of the most recent European enlarge-
ment and lead to a fundamental question: will it be possible to reconcile the needs 
of the old economic periphery and the new economic periphery that emerges from 
the new phase of the integration process?
Conclusions
The previous analysis reveals that enlargement has both positive and negative 
effects on European regional inequalities, and provides an awareness of the 
enormous change to be expected in the next few years. On the positive side, there 
has been a general tendency towards diffusion and convergence, except during 
the period 1975–84, which was characterized by great economic instability and 
structural change. On the negative side, convergence on a macro-territorial scale 
is often accompanied by divergence on a micro scale, either within countries or 
within large regions. Thus, we cannot agree with Boldrin and Canova’s (2001: 
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EU. Exception made for a couple of miracles and a few disasters, more regions are 
growing at a fairly uniform rate irrespective of their initial conditions’. Although 
these authors insist on the importance of territorial delimitation when analysing 
regional convergence, they seem to underestimate the centre/periphery dimension 
that is present in the European space.
However, the most interesting question is the extent to which past experience 
can be used to predict the effects of the recent enlargement. The exceptionally large 
increase in regional inequalities that has resulted from the entry of the acceding 
countries, and particularly the increase in inequality attributable to between-coun-
try differences, suggests that a big trade-off will take place between the macro- 
and the micro-territorial scales. According to the new economic geography model, 
if, as is likely, concentration at the micro scale prevails, an endogenous process 
of transformation of the spatial structure will start, and will fuel future regional 
disparities. Some of the ‘disasters’ to which Boldrin and Canova refer, such as 
southern Italy, could be interpreted exactly as the results of this process (Faini 
1983). The main message here is to put a limit to this process of concentration at 
the micro scale and to sustain the formation of alternative poles of development 
in the disadvantaged regions (Braunerhjelm et al. 2000).
Another crucial point regards the possibility that the old European periphery, 
i.e. the southern regions, will bear most of the burden of the recent enlargement. 
Their weakness appears to be substantially reduced compared with the new 
peripheral regions, but their competitiveness factors may be strongly affected 
by the new entrants. There is a danger that the shift of the European centre to 
the east and the revival of historical and cultural links between some old and 
new members will isolate the southern peripheral regions. The present phase of 
international development, in which globalization and knowledge-intensive tech-
nologies prevail, could further favour the new entrants because of their higher 
educational attainment in comparison with southern regions.
All this suggests that European regional policy should not be dismissed, as 
Boldrin and Canova (2003) seem to propose, but rather should be completely 
reformulated, as the same authors maintain, in accordance with the new environ-
ment in which regional inequalities will develop in the future.
Since the first reform of structural funds, European regional policy has been 
guided by some general strategies that have been considered valid for all types 
of regions, with the consequence that regions that were not able to adapt to these 
strategies, often the weakest ones, have been cut off from the policy. In addition, a 
pedantic account of the level of development of different regions has determined 
their eligibility for different objectives, which frankly appears incorrect in statisti-
cal terms, due to the difficulty of evaluating the precise level of development, and 
unsatisfactory in political terms because of the absence of a broad-minded spatial 
strategy. Finally, the goal of promoting participation from the bottom up, accord-
ing to the principle of subsidiarity, has on the one hand contributed to dispersing 
financial intervention and, on the other hand, often reinforced the national govern-
ment as the only available interlocutor between Europe and the periphery.
What could be suggested on the basis of these remarks is that European regional 
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policy should be reformulated by explicitly taking into account the macrospatial 
structure that is present in the European space and by envisaging differentiated 
strategies for different macroregions. In particular, the old and new problems of the 
southern regions should not be underestimated. These regions appear particularly 
weak in terms of the so-called C-factors, i.e. competence, culture, communication 
and creativity (Peschel 1998). At the same time they have not been able, so far, to 
achieve a cooperative approach to their development problems and have behaved 
mostly according to a competitive zero-sum game. An explicit strategy for the 
southern regions that takes into account these characteristics is to be preferred to 
the continuation of the one-for-all strategy. After all, what we are calling for is a 
European regional policy aimed at exploiting resources specific to the different 
kinds of regions, which may become either the strength or the weakness of the 
new Europe.
Appendix 9.1: Delimitation of macroregions
Table 9A.1 EU-6
Macroregion Regions
Central 1601, 1602, 1603, 19, 1501, 1502, 1503, 1504, 112, 1132, 
1133, 1141, 1411, 1412, 1413, 1417, 142, 1431, 1432
Intermediate 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1131, 1142, 115, 1414, 1415, 1416, 
1433, 1441, 1442, 1443, 1451, 1452, 1453, 1461, 1462, 1471, 
1472, 1473, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324
Peripheral 1451, 1452, 1471, 1473, 1331, 1332, 1333, 1334, 1341, 1342, 
1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348
Source: processed from Molle et al. (1980).
Table 9A.2 EU-9
Macroregion NUTS-1/2 regions
Central BE1, BE2, BE3, NL3, NL4, DE1, DE3, DE5, DE6, DE7, 
DE9, DEA, DEB, DEC, FR1, FR3, FR42, UK5, UK7
Intermediate DK01, DK02, DK03, DE2, DEF, FR21, FR22, FR23, 
FR24, FR25, FR26, FR41, FR43, FR51, FR52, FR71, 
FR72, FR82, IT11, IT12, IT13, IT2, IT31, IT32, IT4, 
IT51, IT52, IT53, IT6, LU, NL1, NL2, UK1, UK2, UK3, 
UK4, UK6, UK8, UK9
Northern peripheral IE, UKA, UKB, FR53, FR61, FR62, FR63, FR81
Southern peripheral FR83, IT33, IT71, IT72, IT8, IT91, IT92, IT93, ITA, ITB
Source: processed from Keeble et al. (1988).
Table 9A.3 EU-12
Macroregion NUTS-1/2 regions
Central BE1, BE2, BE3, NL3, NL4, DE1, DE3, DE5, DE6, 
DE7, DE9, DEA, DEB, DEC, FR1, FR3, FR42, UK5, 
UK7
Intermediate DK01, DK02, DK03, DE2, DEF, FR21, FR22, FR23, 
FR24, FR25, FR26, FR41, FR43, FR51, FR52, FR71, 
FR72, FR82, IT11, IT12, IT13, IT2, IT31, IT32, IT4, 
IT51, IT52, IT53, IT6, LU, NL1, NL2, UK1, UK2, 
UK3, UK4, UK6, UK8, UK9
Northern peripheral IE, UKA, UKB, FR53, FR61, FR62, FR63, FR81
Southern peripheral FR83, IT33, IT71, IT72, IT8, IT91, IT92, IT93, ITA, 
ITB, GR1, GR2, GR3, GR4, ES11, ES12, ES13, 
ES21, ES22, ES23, ES24, ES3, ES41, ES42, ES43, 
ES51, ES52, ES53, ES61, ES62, PT11, PT12, PT13, 
PT14, PT15
Source: processed from Keeble et al. (1988).
Table 9A.4 EU-23
Macroregion NUTS-1/2 regions
Central BE1, BE2, BE3, DE1, DE2, DE3, DE4, DE5, DE6, DE7, 
DE9, DEA, DEB, DEC, DED, DEE. DEG, FR1, FR21, 
FR22, FR24, FR26, FR3, FR41, FR42, FR43, LU, NL1-
NL11, NL2, NL3, NL4
Intermediate FR23, FR25, FR51, FR52, FR53, FR61, FR62, FR63, 
FR71, FR72, FR81, FR82, IT11, IT12, IT13, IT2, IT31, 
IT32, IT33, IT4, IT51, IT52, IT53, IT6, IT71, IT72, AT1, 
AT2, AT3
Northern FI13, FI14, FI15, FI16, FI17, FI2, SE01, SE02, SE04, 
SE06, SE07, SE08, SE09, SE0A, DK, DE8, DEF, UKC, 
UKD, UKE, UKF, UKG, UKH, UKI, UKJ, UKK, UKL, 
UKM2+UKM3, UKM1+UKM4, UKN, IE01, IE02
Southern peripheral FR83, IT8, IT91, IT92, IT93, ITA, ITB, GR1, GR2, 
GR3, GR4, ES11, ES12, ES13, ES21, ES22, ES23, 
ES24, ES3, ES41, ES42, ES43, ES51, ES52, ES53, 
ES61, ES62, PT11, PT12, PT13, PT14, PT15
Acceding countries CZ01, CZ02, CZ03, CZ04, CZ05, CZ06, CZ07, CZ08, 
EE, HU01, HU02, HU03, HO04, HU05, HU06, HU07, 
LT, LV, PL01, PL02, PL03, PL04, PL05, PL06, PL07, 
PL08, PL09, PL0A, PL0B, PL0C, PL0D, PL0E, PL0F, 
PL0G, SI, SK01, SK02, SK03, SK04
Source: processed from Schürmann and Talaat (2000).
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Appendix 9.2: Theil index
Calculation of Theil index
The Theil index was calculated according to the following formula:
T y y x
r r r
r
= ∑ log( / )




 are regional shares of 
European population and GVA (or GDP) respectively. A dual form also exists, 
in which the roles of population share and GVA shares are interchanged, but in 
our case it seems more appropriate to weight the contribution of each region to 
inequality by its demographic rather than by its economic strength. 
Decomposition of Theil index into between-group and within-group 
components
The following formulas were calculated:
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are the same shares for groups of regions.
Decomposition of Theil index into productivity and employment rate 
components
The following formulas apply:
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where T is total inequality, T
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 is the share of total inequality due to regional 
differences in labour productivity, T
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 is the share due to regional differences in 







the shares of European population, employment and GVA (or GDP) of region r.
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Appendix 9.3: Sector definitions
1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing.
2 Mining and quarrying; electricity, gas and water supply.
3 Manufacturing.
4 Construction.
5 Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and per-
sonal and household goods; hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and 
communication.
6 Financial intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities.
7 Public administration and defence, compulsory social security; education; 
health and social work; other community, social and personal service activi-
ties; private households with employed persons.
Notes
 1 Do you know the land where lemon trees bloom, in the darkness of the lives the 
golden oranges burn, a light wind blows from the blue sky, the myrtle stands still and 
the laurel high? 
 2 The Theil index is considered the most suitable measurement of spatial inequality 
(Walsh and O’Kelly 1979, Terrasi 2002, Brülhart and Traeger 2003). The various 
formulas used in this chapter can be found in Appendix 9.2.
 3 In the preceding cases taken into consideration, the evaluation of GDP in PPS was 
considered less relevant, both because countries have gradually become an integrated 
monetary area and because PPS are estimated by Eurostat for countries but not for 
regions, which are actually the areas in which the differences in purchasing power are 
most relevant.
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